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PREFACE
The objective of this study is to analyse the settlement of trade and investment
disputes, in particular the GATT/WTO mechanism, given the fact that such settlement
has made a huge impact on how governments deal with their trading partners,
particularly as states are inclined to practice protectionist political and economic
policies in order to protect their own interests. In order to achieve this objective, I
would a) examine why disputes are brought to settlement mechanisms, which in most
situations have risen as a result of protectionism, and discuss the broader concept of
protectionism, b) discuss the underlying elements behind different forms of dispute
settlement such as negotiation, mediation and arbitration in the light of such
protectionist policy making. I would limit my analysis to the three above mentioned
settlement forms for reasons of not only limited space, but also as I see negotiation
and mediation as being very similar to other forms such as conciliation and good
offices, under Art. 33(1) of the UN Charter. Furthermore, my discussion of
adjudication would be limited to the ICJ, particularly, as I see the ICJ jurisdiction
being at the forefront of international adjudication. Further, I would review the ICJ,
ICSID, which work under the umbrella of peaceful methods of settlement, and d)
review the GATT/WTO system discussing substantive issues which relate to dispute
settlement taking into account the protectionist aspect to such settlement, and d)
contrast the GATT/WTO to other institutions as mentioned above, with a eye on the
philosophy of these mechanisms, which is at loggerheads with protectionism.
Chapter One of the present work will focus on the connection that exists between
protectionism and international economic disputes, which ultimately provides the
varying reasons for such disputes to arise between states. Disputes in any sense are not
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hard to identify. It usually concerns some sort of disagreement between parties with
respect to either, a) a legal right as a result of some contract being breached or b) an
interest being nullified. The Permanent court of Justice described a dispute as "..a
disagreement between on a point law or fact, a conflict of legal views or of interest
between two persons." 1 Therefore one could say in a broader sense that in
international law such disputes arise when states have a disagreement with other states
or with individuals in different parts of the world; and in the case of international
economics, when it concerns a resulting legal right arising from a economic
transaction or relation. Thus one could say that settlement arises, as a result of these
disputes arising for varying reasons, be it political or economical.
In economic relations, it has been an accepted norm that
protectionism has been a factor in the rise of disputes between states. However, in the
main, protectionism has been identified with the protection of a economic benefit,
rather than a interests in the protection of a broader political interests, where state
sovereignty has been a key part of this interests. It is my belief, however, that one
could identify a broader notion of protectionism on the part of the states, where the
interests is not necessarily economic, but also the protection of one's political
interests, which unfortunately has given rise to disputes. Therefore I would first deal
with this broader notion of protectionism, which I believe is the underlying element in
international disputes that arise between states and individuals and state parties
respectfully.
Hence, I would briefly identify the sort of disputes, which have been
brought forward for resolution, prior to dealing with these varying reasons for such
disputes. I would deal with these reasons briefly in order to understand the basis on
which the states enter into methods of peaceful settlement of disputes, because it is
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my contention that these reasons, however mentioned, are based on some sort of
protectionism, be it state sovereignty, local legislation, tariffs etc. which leads to
dispute settlement. Furthermore I also believe that this reasoning does have a bearing
on how states react to the initiation, process and implementation of awards granted by
such dispute settlement. Some authorities have argued that these reasons range from
the protection of a states reputation of power, as have happened in the political
disputes such as the Cuba-The United States dispute of 1959-61, The Gibraltar
dispute between Britain and Spain or The Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, 2 to the extent
of states protecting their local interests through protectionist policy making. 3 Hence,
this necessitates settlement, which could avoid war or enable the promotion of trade.
Secondly, disagreements arise on conflicting assertions of rights and obligations with
regard to economic activity, which quite appropriately are called "legal" disputes and
are separated from the above mentioned policy interests. However, at the same time
these legal interests have been inter-twined with the above mentioned political
interests. As we have seen in many a case, such disputes have risen as a result of
mainly investment and trade contracts being breached at international level by
governments, who practice protectionist economic policy or frustrating circumstances
which make these contracts 'force majeure'. 4 In these cases settlement is needed to
protect future investment or the rights of investors, the rights of states involved in
international trade whose rights or economic interests are effected, notwithstanding
the fact that these disputes could be categorised as political disputes. Therefore, in the
context of the first chapter, I would try to emphasise the fact that protectionism in the
broader sense is the key to international disputes and has a bearing on the future
settlement of such disputes and elements of such settlement mechanisms.
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Chapter Two would be focused on the settlement of the above mentioned international
disputes, via peaceful methods, as emphasised under international law. Given the fact
that such protectionism has led to international disputes, settlement at international
level has been a necessity. Hence the international community has resolved to the
settlement of such disputes by international dispute settlement mechanisms. These
have varied from legal to peaceful methods of settlement as emphasised by the
Charter of the United Nations. 5 Bearing in mind of this fact, attention would be
focused on the different forms of international settlement, and how protectionism has
effected the working of these settlement methods. Thus, three of the peaceful methods
of settlement would be dealt with at present.
Negotiation & consultation:
Negotiation has been recognised as one of the key avenues for dispute
settlement, as a result of the mutuality that is needed for its success (Ar.33(1) of the
UN Charter). Thus many of the ad hoc or institutional settlement mechanisms utilise
negotiation as one way of dispute settlement, as a result of this mutuality which is
supposed to diminish any obstruction to the settlement process. Nevertheless, this
necessary mutuality of parties, be it state or individuals, depend on the protection of
one's own economic and self-interests. This is to be identified from the satisfactory
conclusion or breakdown of negotiations in international relations, where the sole
reason for such breakdown in negotiations is protectionism. Therefore I would discuss
this concept of mutuality in light of the concepts such as state sovereignty, secrecy in
negotiations and the inherent protectionism, which has a bearing on the final outcome
of negotiations be it ad hoc or institutional, which works under the axis of general
peaceful settlement.
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Mediation:
Mediation has been recognised as another way of dispute settlement by
the international world, be it in political disputes or international trade and investment
disputes. Mediation, as with negotiation, has to be balanced with the concept of state
consent and control of the settlement process, which has become one of the hallmarks
of international dispute settlement. Therefore mediation as a settlement method has to
be accepted by the parties concerned, and the mediators have to have the respect of the
parties as being suitable for the settlement of the dispute. These issues become more
important in institutional settlement than ad hoc settlement, given the fact that parties
have already granted their consent to these institutions for settlement and the fact that
mediators are chosen from a list, where the parties concerned may or may not have a
right to choose. This is to be contrasted with the mutual consent of the parties
concerned, who have the right to withdraw from such settlement, which may be as a
result of protectionism. Hence I would deal with these issues prior to discussing the
relevance in relation to institutional dispute settlement, such as the ICJ, ICSID and the
WTO.
Arbitration:
Arbitration is, one could say, is the more legalised method of peaceful
settlement measures, where the consent of the parties is stretched to the limit, and
where the control that parties have is minimised to the extreme, notwithstanding the
protectionists attitudes of the relevant parties. Hence, one could argue that arbitration
is more similar to adjudication than negotiation or mediation, as a method of peaceful
settlement. One could argue that this situation is more so, when parties resort to
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arbitration via institutional arbitration in an international setting, where the parties
have agreed to such via the signing of international convention. Therefore, prior to
discussing the institutional proceedings, I would discuss relevant issues such as the
selection and authority of arbitrators, the basis of law and arbitrators right to select a
relevant law and the enforcement of arbitral decisions, which I believe, is to a certain
extent influenced by state protectionism.
Chapter Three would narrow the focus on some of the settlement processes available
under the axis of peaceful settlement, for international economic disputes. Having
discussed the peaceful settlement procedures and relevant issues in general, I would
follow to deal with the International Court of Justice (ICJ), The International Centre
for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), in order that such mechanisms
could be contrasted with the World Trade Organisation (WTO), taking into account
the protectionist attitudes of state parties. The ICJ in particular will be discussed as a
result of it being one of the key judicial authorities and the judicial organ of the
United Nations, which provides for peaceful settlement, and how and when the court
has used its judicial powers to deal with international trade and investment disputes.
The ICSID would be compared with the WTO, particularly as it makes a move away
from the norms of public international law principles, which opens the debate over the
effect of protectionism on the ICSID procedure, particularly as it has a direct effect on
the private person, in contrast to the effect on states.
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a) The Permanent Court of International Justice and International Court of Justice
(ICJ)
The PCIJ and its successor, the ICJ have both been regarded as one of
the most authoritative judicial institutions available to states for the settlement of their
legal disputes. However, such high hopes have not materialised as a result of the
reluctance of states to make use of these institutions, given the protectionist nature of
state practice. I would deal with issues such as jurisdiction, applicable law and
enforcement and the effect on states, taking into account this protectionist position
advocated by all countries, be it developed or developing nations.
b) The International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID)
The ICSID procedure is one of the most elaborate dispute settlement
mechanisms at present, granting rights and obligations, not only on state parties but on
individual investors, which is a first in international dispute settlement terms.
Furthermore, it is right in saying that the ICSLD procedure has formalised dispute
settlement, in contrast to other procedures which preceded it, which depended on
politics to resolve international investment disputes. I would briefly review the ICSID
and the relevant procedures in this light, to clarify the problems of applicable law, the
selection of arbitrators, state sovereignty and consent of states, which is of importance
in comparing these procedures with the existing GATT/WTO law, give the fact that
protectionist attitudes are prevalent in state practice, on the part of developing states in
most cases.
Chapter Four of the thesis would concentrate on the main regulatory body for
international economic relations, namely the WTO, particularly with a view to making
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a comparison with previously discussed institutions, with protectionism being a basis
for such discussion. It is my intention here to discuss the dispute settlement procedure
of the World Trade Organisation and its nature in satisfying the grievances of the
parties to a trade dispute. Prior to the WTO agreement of 1994, the regulation of
international trade was done via Art.22 & Art.23 of the GATT Agreement. However,
as a result of its informality, which I believe is a direct result of states trying to protect
their own economic and political interest; it failed in its desired effect. It is my
intention to identify why such a procedure failed, particularly given the fact that the
underlying sentiment was to eradicate or control protectionism. In order to do this, I
would first deal with the basis under which the GATT was initiated, particularly
taking into consideration Art.1, and Art.55-57 of the United Nations Charter, which
was of relevance in these circumstances. Following on from this, I would briefly
discuss the procedures that were initiated and the negotiating rounds undertaken by
the Contracting Parties, which was to provide procedures to supplement the Art.22
and 23 settlement process.
Having discussed the legal or "non-legal" basis of the GATT/WTO
and the procedures prior to 1994; in order to put into perspective the improvements
made by the 1995 Uruguay round agreement which followed the 1979 & 1989
Understandings, I would attempt to clarify the merits and deficiencies of the pre-1994
regime from a on a legal point of view, specially taking into account the dichotomy in
thinking with regard to legalising the process or keeping it informal, which I believe is
a precursor to "free for all" protectionism, which was to be eradicated by the
GATT/WTO. Having dealt with the pre 1994 Dispute Settlement process from a
protectionist point of view and the effect it had on the system, I would follow to
discuss the substantive issues of the new system, in order to make a comparison with
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the above discussed institutional settlement processes. As such, key issues such as the,
a) The establishment of a Panel and the Composition of such panels, b) Adoption of
panel recommendations & appeal process, c) applicable law and d) enforcement of
WTO reports, would be dealt, with reference on how protectionism has effected the
new procedures adopted by the WTO system.
Having dealt with the ICJ, ICSID and the WTO procedures in dispute settlement and
the relevant substantive issues, and the effect that the broader norm of protectionism
has on these issues, I would endeavour to make a comparative analysis of these
procedures in Chapter Five. In order to de this, I would deal with the three key issues,
namely, jurisdiction, applicable law and enforcement of awards, taking into account
on how state protectionism has effected these issues, which I believe is key to the
satisfactory conclusion of these respective dispute settlement
The final synthesis I intend to provide on the above discussion is
threefold. First, that protectionism plays its part in the satisfactory completion of
dispute settlement, be it negotiation or arbitration. Secondly, that in the field of
international trade and investment settlement, such protectionism has played its part in
the satisfactory conclusion of dispute settlement, be it the ICJ, ICSID or the WTO,
which has a far more wider scope in such settlement. Thirdly, that notwithstanding the
major technical and legal improvements made by the World Trade Organization as the
leading institution in international trade, the prevalent protectionist attitudes have
depleted such improvements which have in turn effected the motives of liberalisation,
as envisaged at the time of drafting of the UN Charter and the working of the
associated institutions, particularly as state liberalisation is based on state consent and
consensual relations.
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Chapter One
Reasons for International Disputes and Settlement: A Protectionist
view
INTRODUCTION
Protectionism has generally been attributed to economic
restrictions imposed by states on other states, when concerned with losing a subjective
benefit, even though such restrictions are against the accepted norms of liberalisation.
At the same time, some states enter into disputes with another for reasons which are
beyond the accepted reasons of protectionism, but which are categorised as
political/philosophical disputes. However, the fact has remained, that in getting
involved in such disputes, the state in question, has utilised a justification or has tried
to protect one's sovereign rights, which unfortunately is not being recognised as being
protectionist, particularly as it would be separate from legislating for the protection of
subjective economic rights. Therefore, in the context of this chapter, I would first try
to emphasise this broader concept of protectionism, which I believe, not necessarily to
be restricted to the protection of subjective economic rights, but also the broader
protection of a state's sovereign rights, which includes the right to accept the
jurisdiction of arbitral tribunals or legislate for the immunity laws from such
jurisdictions. It is my belief that, this broader conception of protectionism is the basis
for the varying reasons provided for international disputes, which I would be
discussing in the latter part of this chapter.
Having dealt with the broader conception of protectionism, I
would briefly deal with what is accepted as a dispute in international law. Legal
disputes in any sense are not hard to identify. They usually concern some sort of
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disagreement between parties with respect to either, a) a legal right as a result of some
contract being breached or b) an interest being nullified. According to Behrens, the
elements of a dispute are foursome. First it consist of a) some kind of disagreement, b)
between two or more parties with respect to c) a previously existing relation between
them d) in light of their interests.' Therefore, one could say in a broader sense that in
international law such disputes arise when governmental institutions or governments
have a disagreement with other governments or with individuals in different parts of
the world; and in the case of international trade and investments, when it concerns a
resulting legal right arising from a economic transaction or relation. As we have seen
in many a case, such disputes have risen as a result of mainly investment and trade
contracts being breached at international level by governments, who practice
protectionist economic policies, which make these contracts 'force majeure. '2 In these
cases settlement is needed to protect future investment or the rights of investors, the
rights of states involved in international trade whose economic interests may be
affected by the protectionist practices of another state party, notwithstanding the fact
that these disputes could be categorised as political disputes. I believe that while the
above mentioned legal reasons may be true, it is also the fact that the rise of such
disputes could be more to do with broader political reasons and protectionism, be it
directly or indirectly, as evidenced in the case history of international relations.
It is on this premise that, reasons for disputes up for resolution
can be separated into two types. The second of these arise on political interest and
policies, where parties may change their preferences, or governments face changing
majorities in their constituency and as a result political policy being changed to suit
their needs, notwithstanding the outcome of the breached contract or the effect it has
on the other party concerned. These reasons are argued to range from the protection of
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a states reputation of power, the sense of justice, as happened in the political disputes
such as the Cuba-The United States dispute of 1959-61, The Gibraltar dispute
between Britain and Spain or The Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962,3 to the extent of
states protecting their local interests through direct protectionist economic policy
making.4 As was said with regard to the Kashmir dispute between Pakistan and India,
"deeper incompatibilities of culture, ideology, psychology or historical experience
than those ordinarily present in a dispute." 5 were in existence. Thus necessitating
settlement of broader issues other than pure economic issues, which could avoid war
or enable the promotion of good international relations between parties. I would deal
with these philosophical reasons briefly in order to understand on which basis these
arguments are made. Therefore, it is my contention that this relationship between
states have to be broadly defined, not only in legal terms, but also in political terms,
which not only broadens the scope of what a dispute is in international law, but also
emphasises the nature of protectionism, which encapsulates these philosophical
reasons as being a part of international disputes. Having discussed the philosophical
reasons \ for international disputes 6, I would also endeavour to discuss, what is
considered to be the "real" reasons for international trade and investment disputes,
particularly as it is these reasons that are primarily put forward by states in justifying
the obstructions to trade liberalisation. However, while discussing the "real" reasons
for international trade disputes, I would also concentrate on emphasising the point that
states do ultimately have an ulterior motive in the imposition of these protectionist
laws. Taking into account of this fact, I would proceed to deal with the issue of
protectionism and the reasons for international disputes to arise, which I believe to
depend on the broader concept of protectionism, notwithstanding the fact that these
have been separated into two separate groups.
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1.1 The Issue of Protectionism: 
Protectionism is related to economic activities which are thought
to be illegal in terms of the accepted norms of international trade. The General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade provided the principles reflecting multilateralism and
non-discrimination that would assist states to benefit from obligations, that states in
the GATT had accepted. Thus, state parties who accepted these non-discrimination
obligations were to comply with the GATT disciplines and were limited in the use of
restrictive activities against other states or investors/importers. 7 These restrictive
economic practises have ranged from tariffs to non-tariff barriers. The reasons for
their usage can often be termed as "subjective" mainly because the states believe that
it is within their sovereign right to impose such restrictions for the protection of what
they believe to be theirs, notwithstanding the fact that these restrictions may be illegal
according to accepted normative obligations under the GATT/VVTO. The methods
included first, the protection of infant industries, which has been a favoured
justification by most developing nations for operation of trade distorting practices.
Secondly, the growth of export interests in some individual nations has been
advocated as a justification in the practice of legislative and administrative practices,
which has resulted in these activities being challenged by other states as being
GATT/WTO illega1. 8 Thirdly, the schemes for the control and stabilization of prices
have also been advocated by states as a justification for the practice of economic
activities which have been agreed as being illegal under the norms of GATT.9
Many states, be they developed or developing, have promoted these
varying arguments in justifying subjective protectionist policies, as we have witnessed
with regard to cases brought to international dispute settlement forums. 1 ° As Bhagwati
notes with regard to the United States, who has been a major protagonist of
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protectionism, "the protectionist fallout, however, has come not merely from troubled
industries seeking relief There has been the national-interests concern that America is
threatened with de-industrialisation and that this, in turn will damage the economic
wellbeing of the US." While Bhagwati has focused on the United States in this
particular instance, this has been the trend of most states who implement these
regulations against accepted norms. It is this concern for the protection of one's local
interests, notwithstanding the commitments for liberalisation, which has resulted in
most international trade disputes. Hence the coinage of "protectionism" to such
economic measures which goes against the accepted norms of trade practice.
While protectionism is attached mainly to economic activity and
its regulation, protectionism in a subjective sense, where the states argue their case
according to what they believe to be their sovereign rights, has also been practised in
what Donelan calls "political disputes." 12 As I will explain in this chapter, political as
well as economic reasons have been factors in international disputes. While economic
reasons in most cases have been alleged illegal economic practices, in most "political"
disputes the reasoning has been the subjective views of states on its state sovereignty
and its individual standing in international relations. 13 In most of these cases, the
dispute relates to disagreements on economic interests, protection of territory or
reasons of what states believe is theirs in relation to the other disputing nations or
international investors. Furthermore, in other circumstances, the states legislate for
protection on the basis of sovereign immunity, which allows it to fall back on this
exception when challenged by another state or international investor. One such
example is the United States Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act of 1976 and the UK
State Immunity Act of 1978, which allows only local jurisdiction over any activities
undertaken by the respective states and in certain areas the complete exemption of the
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state from legal enforcement. In most cases, the arbitration would involve commercial
activities, hence allowing the state to argue immunity when challenged by others,
notwithstanding the fact that these activities might be protectionist according to the
accepted norms.
States or state authorities thus argue their case on the basis of what
they believe to be their sovereign right. While a state may subjectively believe that it
is entitled to a commodity or the right to make decisions on the basis of its sovereign
right, another state or international investors affected by such a decision might argue
the opposite, resulting in international disputes. 14 It is this same subjective political
mentality that was taken over to trade/investment relations, where states have resorted
to economic control with concern towards, either its status and standing as economic
superpowers or in other cases as the protector of the nations interests, as we have
evidenced over the years and emphasised by Bhagwati. 15 As Bhagwati notes, this
concern of protecting one's sovereignty and resources has resulted in states advocating
unilateralism rather than multilateralism. 16 In most cases, this conception of protecting
the local and regional interests has resulted in disputes arising as evidenced in
international trade, while could be termed as economic protectionism, has also
emphasised the protective nature of states in protecting what they perceive to be their
right to protect, for the national interests. As evidenced in the international oil
concession cases such as the Kuwait Vs AMINOIL 17, the states have also utilised their
character as the protector of the public interests in changing the previously accepted
rules of the concession agreements with the oil investors by concluding further
agreements with other states which restricted the benefits accruing to the investors.
While the facts that involved such a change in policy were economic benefits, the
decisions made by the states nonetheless were made under the guise of sovereign
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states, and not just as economic players. This gave the states the opportunity to argue
immunity from the legal jurisdiction of certain dispute settlement forum and the right
to change its economic policy to benefit its needs.
Furthermore, larger states have advocated situations of what
Bhagwati calls "Diminished Giant Syndrome" in economic activity by legislating for
restrictions on the basis of purportedly protecting national security or public policy,
when faced with competition, according to the a state's sovereignty to construct such
laws. 18 The "Diminished Giant Syndrome", as Bhagwati calls it, has been apparent,
where larger states enforce economic barriers when threatened by the economic power
of other states. In other circumstances, exceptions to accepted economic norms have
been constructed on the basis of what the individual state perceives to be the
"protection of its internal security" and the sovereign right of these governments to
legislate for such protection. 19 The perception has been that restrictions should be
implemented on the commercial activities of state B, on the basis that the these
commercial activities would hinder the national security of state A and further that
these states are free to legislate or act on this base of protecting one's supremacy.2°
While one may argue that the subjective concern for economic benefits justifies the
concept of protectionism being attached to economic activity, it is my belief that it is
also the fact of political sovereignty that has prompted these states to advocate such a
position, on the basis of their individual sovereign right to legislate for such protection
of subjective interests. Therefore, protectionism could be defined as illegal state
practices which contradicts accepted norms, on the basis of either the protection of
economic commodities, or what these individual states subjectively believe to be the
protection of state sovereignty, which has motivated states to get involved in
international disputes. It is my contention that it is this broad conception of
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protectionism that has influenced states to dispute economic and political facts with
other states.
1.2 Reasons for International Disputes and Settlement
1.2.1 Political and moral reasons:
Having dealt with the separation of legal and political disputes,
and what I believe to be the broader sense of protectionism, I intend to discuss some
of the reasons as to why such disputes arise and necessitate its settlement. The
reasoning surrounding such disputes could be classified into many areas. However, as
many of the disputes that arise concern some disputed political and economic interest,
I would begin by discussing such reasons. It has been argued, from a
political/sociological perspective, that the reasoning behind states disputing interest
whether it be legal/political or economical can be threefold. As Northedge has pointed
out such disputes for political and economic interests depends on the fact that states
"...belief that it is theirs."21 Hence, this has resulted in a) the protection of interest &
honour, b) reputation of power and security reasons and c) sense of justice being
advocated as justifications for disputing factual or legal situations of disputes. While I
do appreciate the fact that there are instances that the parties have argued and disputes
have occurred as a result of philosophical reasons, I believe that one has got to
appreciate the fact that in the majority of cases the reason is more to do with, what I
believe to be protectionism in a broader perspective, i.e. protecting perceived interests
what they believe is theirs on the basis of state sovereignty and state's ideology of
being the protector of public interest. It is bearing this fact in mind that I would
approach the following discussion.
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In many cases as it happens, in spite of the issue being veiled in
terms of economic interests, it is also a fact that the issue of self preservation of
honour is a sublime factor in many a dispute. As it happened in the Nicaragua
case(US vs Nicaragua), the authorities in Nicaragua were adamant that such
paramilitary activities were a direct intervention in its internal activities, thus resulting
in a dispute at the ICJ. 22 This is also similar to the Panama Canal case of 1964,23
where the issue was more than an interest in a canal land, where the ownership was
given to the US, by the Hay Bunean Varilla Treaty. Here the dispute arose as a result
of a nationalist mentality of the Panamanians, who argued that they had been forced to
agree into the Treaty, and thus having to give up the sovereignty of the canal land. To
the naked eye, such arguments are a result of an existing sense of justice and fairness.
This is supported by the fact that both parties, in particular the Panamanians, striving
to show that they had been victimised and abused by the dominant mentality of the US
citizens who lived in the canal Zone. As jurists have observed it was "...unfortunate
that the US citizens who lived all their lives in the canal zone, and citizens who were
born and raised in the zone, have developed a particular state of mind not conducive
to the promotion of happier relations between them and the people of Panama. Indeed
on the contrary, this particular state of mind has resulted in building up resentment
over the decades."24 Thus it is argued that this particular situation aggravated the
situation and consequently prompting the Panamanians to raise their national flag in
defiance of US actions. This, on the other hand does emphasise the fight for fairness
as the reason for the dispute, where as Northedge points out the "Panamanian people
being eager to see the US atone for past injustices." 25 However, while the actions of a
group of Panamanian students and nationalists could be described as a fight for justice
and fairness, one has also got to identify a hidden motive or reason for such a sense of
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aggravation. On one hand the officials of Panama were keen to recoup the best
possible sum of annuity from the US in return for the control of the Canal, where it
was their belief that the canal was under their sovereign control. The comparison
made by the Panamanians was with the Suez Canal dispute, where they argued that
they should receive compensation which was in parity with what Egypt received.
Furthermore, they also believed that Panamanian commercial enterprises should get
greater access to the Canal Zone, thus bolstering its economic benefits. On the other
hand, the United States was keen to gain control of the Panama Canal for reasons of
commercial value, where it was able to reduce the time factor in which such
commercial exploits were completed. 26 While, economic interests were a motive in
the dispute, the protection of honour and the protection of justice was not a reason on
its own for the resultant dispute. The emphasis by the Panamanians that they were
pushed into signing the Treaty, shows the fact that in this instance, the philosophical
reasons were not alone, but protectionism based on sovereignty, and sovereign rights
were a factor in the dispute.
One other example of a political dispute which was intertwined
with the broader sense of protectionism was the dispute between Guinea and Guinea-
Bissau(Guinea vs Guinea Bissau) 27 , which concerned the maritime boundary between
these states. While on the face of this dispute, it may seem a political border dispute of
fisheries jurisdiction, it was more concerned with the opportunity for petroleum
production, and the actions taken by both parties to protect such interests, which they
believed was theirs as sovereign states. The dispute was triggered by the speculation
that the contested area might contain petroleum/oil in commercial quantities. While,
one may argue that the dispute concerned was about what was "ours" and "theirs", a
sense of fairness, and with protectionist economic interests; in reality, this supposedly
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philosophical reasons were triggered by the fact that states arguing their individual
cases on the basis of state sovereign rights. This is emphasised by the fact that the two
states, in order to gain access to the commercial benefits available were prepared to
take action, be it restrictive action and legislation, hence giving rise to the dispute.
The two states decreed legislation to establish lateral limits on the territorial limits, in
order to protect the oil concessions given to companies and protect fishing activities.
The final outcome of these actions was to give the states the maximum opportunity to
make a commercial profit of such opportunities. Hence the restrictive actions and the
ensuing dispute. Furthermore, if one is to quote directly from the official reports itself,
it is self evident that the states were not disputing any fact in a sense of justice or for
the protection of its honour on their own as reasons for the dispute. On the contrary,
the dispute was motivated by a combination of a compulsion to gain any accruing
commercial profits from petroleum production, and using sovereignty to gain such
benefits. As the ICJ noted "the land boundary between the two Parties in the present
case, established at the time of the colonial period, is not in dispute."28 Furthermore, it
also noted that "nor do the Parties dispute the homogeneity of their coastline or,
despite successive marine transgressions and regressions, the unity of the continental
shelf which naturally extends their land areas."29 Thus, it is my belief that one has to
accept that international disputes, in the majority of instances are motivated by
protectionist attitudes in a broader sense of protection of sovereign rights, despite
being couched in terms of justice and fairness.
The second political/philosophical reason for states to engage in
a dispute with another state is the protection of its security and maintaining its
reputation of power. The argument propagated in justification of this reason is the fact
that states are concerned in protecting its "prestige" in the eyes of the world order, by
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not giving into the demand of other states, notwithstanding the fact that in some cases
the states are not in competition in terms of international trade or investments. As was
seen in The Cuban conflict with the US, the tension that was building in the US as a
result of the growth, of what they called "communism"; aggravated into a dispute of,
not only conflicting embargoes and take-over of international investments, but to the
extent of a diplomatic dispute involving the Soviet Union. According to Donelan,
"Cuba's defiance of the US and breach of western hemisphere solidarity went beyond
economic affairs", and this was exemplified by its sudden establishment of diplomatic
relations with the USSR, which with its reputation of missile capability, was a direct
affront to the interests of the US. The establishment of diplomatic relations and
practising communism has been noted as a reason for the dispute to arise, because the
US felt threatened by such actions, thus arguing its case against Cuban actions. The
US who had in earlier cases wanted the status quo to be balanced and resisted Russian
involvement in its international affairs, criticised its interference in this dispute with
Cuba. As president Kennedy commented, while denouncing the action, the Soviet
action was looked upon as "...deliberately provocative and unjustified change in the
status quo."3° Thus maintaining the fact that the power of the US should not be tread
upon and that such intrusion will be retaliated with uninhibited action. In Donelan's
assessment, the United States, in this particular case, was not mainly concerned with
the economic or political interests at stake, but with "showing off' its strength and
power to its arch rival, Russia. Thus, the fact remained that Cuba's actions were based
on its sovereign rights by practising such a communist philosophy and protecting
one's political interests in this broader sense. Hence, resulting in a dispute with the
United States. This is notwithstanding the fact that there did not exist an economic
interest in the dispute at hand. As we have witnessed in the past, this example of a
22
state party flexing its muscles, so to speak, which ignites an international dispute, is
one among many cases. The Suez Canal Case 31, where British & French power was
challenged by Egypt, and the invasion by China in India are some cases in point32,
which justifies the arguments of authorities who promote these reasons of honour and
political might, which however, to my mind is encapsulated in the fact that these
states are arguing their case as sovereign states with such sovereign powers to protect
what they believe to be theirs by right.
In the Suez Canal case for example, the government of Egypt
announced a decree nationalising the Suez Canal Company, which was the controlling
company, protecting the shipping activities in the Canal. The reasons for this attitude
were intensified as a result of the local political pressures on the government to end
British control of the Canal. To these actions was attached the rivalry between Egypt
and Israel, who were keen on gaining control of the Sinai area. By getting control of
the Canal, Egypt and its government intended to gain a stranglehold on the economic
embargo which the Arab world had imposed on Israel, using its sovereign powers of
legislation. Furthermore, the Egyptian government was keen on gaining the necessary
finances for the Aswan Dam project through the profits of the nationalised company.
Notwithstanding the discussions between the parties on resolving this issue of
nationalisation, a settlement of the dispute was not foreseeable. As a result, it is
argued that the British and French, on the pretext of protecting the canal invaded the
canal area for reasons of economic and military superiority. While this argument
could hold sway, it is my belief, that the real reasons for the British and the French to
invade the canal area was broader than economic factors. This is emphasised by the
fact that on one side of the equation, Egypt used its sovereign rights to nationalise the
company and on the other hand, Britain using its sovereign powers to protect its
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interests, economical as well as philosophical/political. This was particularly true,
given the fact that a quarter of British shipping was to pass through the canal area, and
the fact that British trade in Middle Eastern oil was to be transported via the canal
area. The French on the other hand were keen on protecting the assets of their
subsidiary company, of which, the headquarters was situated in Paris, which it
believed was its duty as a sovereign state.
To be fair to the arguments promoted by authorities of
philosophical/moral arguments of international disputes, there have been cases where
the simple reason of the dispute has been the concern of states of protecting
economic/military dominance or the concern for justice based on historical events.
Thus the action taken by states to pursue its own interests, as in the case mentioned.
The combination of these reasons for an international dispute to arise is exemplified in
the West Irian case, 33 where the Dutch and Indonesians were in a deadlock over the
sovereignty of the island. Under the Hague Agreement of 1949, the Dutch were
legally bound to hand over the authority of the island to Indonesia, by negodating such
terms. However, Indonesia argued on the basis of sovereignty that the transfer of the
island has been exempted and only the control of the territory is at issue, meaning that
all islands of Indonesia were a part of the unitary state of Indonesia. Indonesia
supplemented this argument by stating that West Irian(W.I.) belonged to Indonesia
since the proclamation of the republic and further that W.I. has been a part of the
ancient Javanese empire. As noted above, such arguments do not wash well in
International law, specially as a international agreement has been signed and sealed by
the respective parties, deciding the fate of the island, hence nullifying such
geographical and historical reasons. Nonetheless, Indonesia argued that, it should have
the authority of the island and further that this was a political dispute rather than a
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legal one, hence refusing the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice. As
Northedge notes "necessity is the tyrants plea." 34 However, while noting the justice
argument, one could also see the power argument, where the US, USSR and China
were involved in the negotiations, not merely to resolve the dispute, but to concentrate
on protecting stronghold and interests. As a result the parties agreed to negotiate, thus
signing a agreement, where the sovereignty of W.I. would be passed to the
Indonesians, before the population makes a "act of free choice"35, under UN
supervision to decide its future. Thus, what made the parties decide that this issue to
be a legal dispute rather than a political dispute as first perceived? It is my contention
that the involvement of the US, USSR and China and the persuasion skills of then
Prime minister of the UK Harold Mcmillan, changed the tide in the direction of
resolving the dispute. While it is true that the superior power of the larger states did
play a role in the dispute, it also nevertheless emphasises the fact that the dispute did
arise as a result of the protectionism in a broader sense than pure economic factors.
1.2.2 Economic Reasons:
Having discussed what Donelan would call the Philosophical/political
reasons for international disputes to arise and being a reason for its settlement where
economic reasons are said to be secondary in the rise of international disputes, I will
now concentrate on some of the direct economic reasoning which, at-least on the face
of it seems to be the be the real reason for international disputes arising in the past and
present. While most of the above mentioned disputes could be classed as politically
protectionist, where it concerned a piece of territory or the right to passage or
protecting a economic interest by arguing for the right of land, the majority of
protectionist reasoning concerns more of the disputes with relation to disruptive
(Uri, ‘,.1-shy
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trading practices, economic embargoes, investment disputes. The reason for this
situation is the fact that international trade is seen as an avenue of gaining economic
prosperity. Thus, the protection of the individual positions of these states. Here, the
parties are concerned more with the protection of its legal rights and economic
benefits thereof accruing under a contractual agreement, signed with one of its trading
partners. As noted at present the world economy is mainly dominated by market rules
which co-ordinate the greater part of the international exchange of goods,
commodities, capital and technology. This exchange of goods and commodities has
not only been restricted to inter-state relations but also to investor-state relationships
which has given cause to the promotion of more protectionism.
So what are these economic "protectionist" measures?
Protectionist measures in general include all tariffs and non-tariff barriers, where the
trading parties tend to protect their own interests by imposing restrictions on other
country imports and exports. As pointed by Salvatore, since the mid 1970s developed
countries, beset by slow growth and high unemployment, have increased the trade
protection they provide to some of their large industries against imports from
developing countries. 36 Some such protection measures are namely tariffs and non
tariff barriers such as VER's, countervailing duties, anti dumping measures etc and
protectionist legislation, where the country that imposes such restrictions reduce the
opportunity of other countries to gain advantage of these protected industries or
commercial opportunity. This protection of infant industry argument or the protection
of one's national economic growth has been the case of most trade barriers
constructed by these developed and developing countries in justification of
protectionist policy making. 37 While, direct tariff and non-tariff barriers are
emphasised as being a reason for international disputes, it is my belief that states
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legislating for such policies, based on what they believe to be their sovereign right is a
more broader protectionist reason for international disputes that arise as a result of the
application of tariff and non-tariff measures. Therefore, First I would concentrate on
some of these local economic situations and national policies, which I believe, give
rise to international trade and investment disputes. Secondly, I would discuss some
case law to emphasise the nature of direct protectionist policies based on sovereign
rights and to justify as to why international disputes arise with regard to trade and
investment, and necessitates its settlement.
Regulating unfair trade has become a powerful slogan in the US
in contrast to protectionism, since the establishment of GATT/WTO. As Berry has
mentioned "one business lobbyist called to say 'free trade rhetoric is a loser
politically; unfair trade rhetoric is a winner.' Mr Reagan met with a group of outside
advisors, including long time Reagan strategists Stuart Spencer and Lyn Nofzinger,
who echoed that view." 38 As James A.Baker put it "We have not neglected our
responsibilities to fair trade... .President Reagen, in fact has granted more import relief
to US industry than any of his predecessors in more than half a century."39 While this
may be true in the sense of protecting the industry in the US, has it in any way
impeded the fairness in terms of international competitors, and conflicted with
international trade laws, which has resulted in disputes arising? It seems that as large
trade deficits resulted in the 1980s, it meant that more US industries were
experiencing import competition, thus bringing about changes including ss301 of the
Trade Act of 1974, modified by the Acts of 1979 and 1994.° As Finger has noted"
export interest no longer see the trade negotiations process as the primary vehicle for
advancing their interests-they have '301'."41 Hence assisting them in taking action
against any foreign trade parties; who in their opinion "restrict US commerce in an
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unreasonable or a discriminatory fashion."42 However, while this improved the US
commercial interest, it also attracted the attention of other state parties, who were
themselves involved in protecting their own national/local commercial interest by
practising protectionist economic policy according to state sovereignty; thus
culminating in international trade disputes arising.43 However, while the US exporters
are armed with ss3 0 1 , the issue is the protective barrier's put up by the US; which
reduces other states to compete with its local commerce. Thus in some instances, the
US has applied restrictions based on ss3 01 action, where the US alleges that the
restrictions of the other state is of a unreasonable nature which is in contrast to the
ideal of free trade.44 One such case of the extent of barriers put up by the US based on
individual commercial interest, is the US anti dumping duties on imports of seamless
stainless steel hollow products from Sweden; where the GATT panel considered a
dispute brought forward by Sweden, alleging that such duties were a nullification and
impairment of benefits. While considering the relevant regulations and its
interpretation, the panel denied the argument of the US that "on its face" the request
supported the initiation of an investigation. Furthermore it also confirmed that there
was no statistical evidence before it to support the claim of inquiry; and further
denying the US argument that there was no opposition by other domestic producers,
thus justifying the investigation. The cases which concern the involvement of the
United States, as a result of direct protectionism wary, notwithstanding the economic
status of the other state. One such case was the United States- Prohibition of Imports
of Tuna and Tuna Products from Canada (Canada Vs US), 45 which concerned the US
prohibition of imports of tuna and tuna products from Canada, pursuant to national
legislation.46
 Canada eventually won the case and the panel agreed that the measures
were trade measures, which emphasised the fact that the US restrictions were the
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motivation for the dispute and was held as such by the panel. Two points arise out of
this case. First, that the US as a individual state is prepared to initiate a dispute, in any
case, to protect its commercial interests using its sovereign rights to legislate for such
subjective protection, notwithstanding the fact that it is not justified and in contrast to
its ideals of free trade. Secondly that the local commercial pressures and protectionist
policies practised as a result are a reason for individual states to initiate a dispute on
their behalf, although such action might in the long term affect the credibility of such
a state in inter state relations.
As mentioned above, countries such as the US and other
developed and developing nations in particular, have used protective measures, which
I believe, is the reason on the whole for international disputes, while individual
circumstances are a reason for such protectionist economic policy. One of the
concepts upon which developing countries in particular depend on, is the sovereignty,
political as well as economical, which in other words is the improvement and
attainment of the economic status of the developed nations. As such the question has
arisen as to whether the developing countries should be allowed leniency in terms of
tariff rates as well as the legal obligation when entering into international trade
agreements. The developing countries believe that as a result of the imbalance in
economic power of the respective parties and the possibility of abuse of such an
imbalance; they should be given preference in international nude and investments on a
non reciprocity basis. This I believe to mean that developed states are not allowed to
reciprocate to any tariffs imposed by developing countries on exports of developed
states. However, as pointed out by Horn, "International commerce and co-operation
require, however, the stability of contractual relations and mutual legal
obligations",47meaning that such contracts should adhere to the principle of pacta
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sunda sevanda, and thus if a party breaches such legal obligations, such states should
be made to remedy such a breach. It is here that the importance of international
dispute settlement takes centre stage, as a result of the simmering mistrust between
parties, while such a breach exists. However, before concluding that such a breach is
the reason for international disputes to arise in cases of trade and investment, I believe
it is necessary to delve further into the economic and social background of these
developing countries to understand why such protectionist economic policy is
legislated for and put into practice by these states.
Many of the developing countries who gained their
independence in the late 1940s have very similar characteristics among them. Most of
these states suffer from overpopulation, where it could range from 10 million to 900
million in the case of India. 48 Secondly these countries in the majority of cases
followed in some way or another a mixed economic policy, where it could range from
protectionist policies to stimulate industrial development, as in the case of Nigeria in
the 1960s and 70', or to the extent of India or China, where the policy was totally
planned to build self sustained growth. 49 This kind of policy was to regulate any
method of external enterprises and investment conglomerates, keeping with the left
wing thinking, which in my opinion, not only kept politicians in office, but
emphasised the fact that they were prepared to legislate for such policy using the
sovereignty of states and sovereign rights. As noted by Bhagwati on the policies of the
then ruling Congress party of India, "...socialist thinking and precept influenced not
merely the policy making elite in the congress party that has virtually dominated the
political scene since independence in 1947; it also constrained the flexibility of the
congress party to move in other directions, because the more naive left wing political
parties pulled the congress party's programmes in the socialist direction, at-least at the
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ex-ante level of party resolutions and declared intentions." 50 Thus in India's case,
since 1947 until the late 1970s, the economic policies were highly interventionist and
restrictive, where all imports of consumer goods were banned, unless the importer
proved "essentiality" and "indigenous availability" 51 and where the ministry of
commerce decided whether such imports were essential for consumer use. On the
other hand, the government allowed selected exporters to export manufactured foods,
with the knowledge, as Pursall puts it, that it would be "offsetting the system's anti
export bias"52, thus emphasising the nature of state protectionism, in that the usage of
state sovereign rights to regulate and control what it believes is to be its interests. This
trend of an anti export bias is emphasised in many Asian and Middle Eastern states
who apply trade barriers and policies in order to satisfy the interests of its local
industries and consumers. 53 To be fair to the Indian government's economic policy,
one has to emphasise however, that since Rajiv Ghandi came into power, the export
leniency has been increased to certain proportions. But at the same time non-tariff
barriers have been and remain the principle means of regulating imports and
protecting local industries. If one may think that Indian economic policy is rather
extreme, such policy is not alone in developing countries. I would briefly outline the
economic policy making of Nigeria to prove the fact that subjective state
protectionism based on sovereign immunity and rights influence the enforcement of
direct and non-tariff measures. While Nigeria practised very similar economic policies
to India in the 1960s, since its discovery of oil, it has gradually shifted its economic
policy to suit the market rules in place. This followed, as Olofin states "...from the
increasing realisation that domestic inefficiency, sheltered by high tariff rates, could
only lead to inefficiency and stagnation of local industry", 54 which is in stark contrast
to the "infant industry" theory protectionism. In keeping with such sentiment, Nigeria
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adopted a structural adjustment programme, where it took steps to reduce existing
tariff and non tariff barriers to international imports and exports. However, such open
ended policies legislated to build an open market is not without its drawbacks and
restrictions, aimed at giving the Nigerian government a wider role of discretion. As
Horn says, "the protagonists of market concepts, however, cannot be content with the
status quo of the world economy either. There is, on one hand, the problem of abuse
and manipulation of the free market through restrictive business practices and through
protectionist and neo mercantilistic measures of government." 55 As if keeping with
this sentiment, the government of Nigeria has reduced and withdrawn in some
instances, the open market policies implemented in the SAP. For example the new
Customs and Excise Tariffs (Consolidated Decree) of 1988, makes provision for
import and export duties payable on imported goods and local manufactures. In place
of any outright prohibition of imports, as was the case in the 1960s, the new laws
allow the selection of goods for imposition of tariffs, thus protecting local industries.
This is not only going back on the open market policies, but also provides the
administration with discretion to administer tariffs, when and how it desires.56
Furthermore, if one takes into consideration the Customs Duties (Dumped and
Subsidized goods) Act of 1958; which allows the government to impose special
duties, one cannot help notice the discretion involved in such imposition of duties. As
the official gazette provides, such duties could be invoked if the government is
satisfied that a) material injury will be threatened or caused to potential or established
industries in Nigeria, by the entry of subsidised or dumped goods into the country, and
b) when the government is of the opinion that the imposition of a special duty will not
conflict with Nigeria's obligations under the terms of the GATT.57
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As we have witnessed in many a case presented at the GATT
panels for the settlement of disputes, such discretionary protectionist legislation based
on state sovereignty, is the cause of disputes which arise with other trade parties,
especially as such legislation could be looked upon as unfairly protective and against
the spirit of free trade. This is notwithstanding the fact that such laws on tariff duties
and such duties themselves are guided by the need to realise three objectives, namely
a) revenue generation, b) correction of balance of payments and c) pursuit of inward
looking industrial policy, which was and is a necessity for developing countries on the
whole. Hence having looked into the political, social and economical bearing that has
on the relevant legislation that is passed in developing countries, in particular; one
could identify a deeper economical and practical reasoning, rather than, an on the
surface tariff or embargo being behind international trade and investment disputes
being initiated. Therefore, it was within this protectionist atmosphere on the part of
developed as well as developing countries, that any procedures of dispute settlement
was to operate in international economic relations. Thus as emphasised by Art.1 and
Art.33 of the United Nations, the methods of dispute settlement, namely adjudication,
negotiation, mediation and arbitration was to operate under these circumstances of
protectionism, where restrictions and objections were an eventuality.
This fact is particularly true of the majority of developing
countries, who are keen on protecting their national interest be it for political
advantage or for economic reasons. While one may note that the economic policy
practised by India or Nigeria for example was of a socialist nature; it makes no
difference to the argument that such economic policy necessitated by state
sovereignty, does tend to be a major factor in trade and investment disputes growing
at international level, notwithstanding the nature of such protectionism. This fact is
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particularly true of cases which involve international investment in the Middle East
and the south east Asian nations, where national sentiment and protecting one's
interests has resulted in international trade and investment disputes. While many cases
could be cited in order to justify the argument that protectionist pressures and
protectionist policies of the developing nations have resulted in international trade and
investment disputes, at present I would briefly discuss some of the more significant
and notable cases to prove the impact of direct protectionism on international
disputes. As I had mentioned in the previous paragraph, Asian and East Asian nations
are more susceptible to tariffs and protectionist policy, given half the opportunity to
do so. One such case in question was the Thailand-Restrictions on Importation of and
Internal Taxes on cigarettes (US vs Thailand) 58 , which involved the United States and
was presented to the WTO panel for resolution. According to Thailand's Tobacco Act
of 1966, importation or exportation of Tobacco, including cigarettes, was prohibited
except by license of the Thai authorities. 59 The basic idea of this practice was the
opportunity to claim higher license fees from international importers and the
opportunity to vary taxation rules in order to bolster government income.
Furthermore, this practice was also designed to protect local industry by restricting the
opportunity of importation. 6° The Thai authorities based its arguments on rather
dubious justifications. It argued that the authorisation of tobacco importation would
lower the standard of living and that such restrictions were necessary for the
protection of the health of its population. This was notwithstanding the fact that local
tobacco production was at a premium. As noted by Klabbers, the justification for such
relaxation of local industry prohibitions was that "...because this might have led to
production and consumption of narcotic drugs having effects even more harmful than
tobacco."61
 From these arguments forwarded by the Thai authorities, it is safe to say
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that the ulterior motive for such restrictions was not the protection of the health of its
population, rather the protection its own industries and the unfair restriction of
international trade, which quite rightly the United States argued at the panel hearings.
These practices were clearly, as the US argued, inconsistent with the obligations of the
GATT Agreement and resulted in the dispute being initiated, rather than any
philosophical basis for such initiation. 62 Both parties were keen to gain the appropriate
commercial advantages of the opportunity to import and export cigarettes and
tobacco, which was restricted by the protectionist policies of the Thai authorities.
The direct intervention of protectionist measures that resulted in
international disputes are not restricted to trade disputes. On the contrary, these
practices and its effects also span to international investment disputes, which involve
multinational corporations and developing nations. The disputes that arise as a result
of investment contracts could be divided into two parts, namely legal disputes and
political disputes. It is these political aspects that have given rise to protectionism and
hence disputes in most of these investment cases, especially as it involves the
consideration given to facts such as state sovereignty, protection of local industry
interests and consumer interests. As Agyemang notes "such disputes are essentially
"political" because they are often between host states and foreign investors over the
form of economic development the former should pursue; they are often policy
disputes." Protection, which I believe is for the protection of its economic and local
interests. One such case was the LIAMCO Vs The Government of the Libyan Arab
Republic63, where the government of Libya issued concessions to exploit and produce
petroleum under laws enacted in 1955. The government since then made amendments
to these concession agreements which the investor party agreed without any protest. In
August of 1973, the Libyan government announced a general plan for participation in
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the oil industry, under the Nationalisation law Nos. 66, where 51% of the company's
concessions rights were to be nationalised. LIAMCO was one of the companies
among many who were affected. A further law was passed later on, where the
remaining 49% of the LIAMCO shares were nationalised. LIAMCO argued that
political motivation may take the shape of discrimination as a result of political
retaliation, and this was the case at this point in time. LIAMCO argued that the
nationalisation was a "part of an overall program of political retaliation against those
nations whose politics were contrary to those of the Libyan regime." 64 This in a way
gave justification to the philosophical arguments forwarded for the rise of
international disputes. However, if one looks closely at the facts of the case, one
notices that such a motive is far from the truth. First, initial measures of
nationalisation were taken by Libya concerned Italian colonist settled in Libya, and
secondly, the first oil nationalisation was that of British Petroleum and American
Bunker Hunt Company on the 1 l th of June, 1973. Furthermore, in a statement issued
by the Libyan Prime minister, the motives for Libyan nationalisation was revealed,
which was predominantly protectionist in that the preservation of its oil was
paramount. This protectionist motive of the Libyan authorities is further revealed by
the fact that Libyan authorities reluctance to take part in international arbitration
arguing that
"nationalisation being related to the sovereignty of the state, is not subject
to foreign jurisdiction. Provisions of international law do not permit a dispute with a
state to be referred to any jurisdiction other than its national jurisdiction. In
affirmance of this principle, resolutions of the General Assembly provide that any
dispute related to nationalisation or its consequences should be settled in accordance
with provisions of the domestic law of the state. "65
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Hence, two issues could be deduced from the facts of this case.
Firstly that direct protectionist motives and actions are a reason for international
disputes and secondly, that local economic and social pressures for protection of a
state's local interests are a reason for protectionist stance, which results in
international disputes, notwithstanding the fact that a philosophical and political twist
to the issue could be intertwined by either party to the dispute. One other case of
similar stature was the Government of the State of Kuwait Vs AMINOIL 66, which I
believe needs discussion to prove the effect of direct protectionism on international
trade and investment disputes. In very similar circumstances to the above mentioned
LIAMCO ease(Liamco Vs Libya), the AMINOIL company was subject to a
nationalisation decree legislated on the part of the state of Kuwait. Here again the
arbitral tribunal denied any kind of discrimination on the part of Kuwait. Furthermore
it also emphasised the valid nature of the laws keeping with the international
obligation accepted by Kuwait to reduce the costs of oil production by nationalisation
and gaining higher revenue by higher tax increases. Economic development being the
motive for this protectionist measure is further emphasised by the fact that the
Kuwaiti authorities decision not to nationalise the Arabian Oil company, which at that
point in time was profit making and a asset to the Kuwaiti economy, as it was in part
ownership with Saudi Arabia. The arbitral tribunal thus denied the possible argument
that the decree was legislated only as a discriminatory decree against an American
company, which would have satisfied the theories of philosophical and moral reasons
for international disputes, notwithstanding the economic arguments forwarded.
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Conclusion:
Protectionism, as emphasised, has mainly been connected with the
protection of economic interests. But as I had discussed, state protectionism involves
not only economic facts, but also state interests in protecting their sovereign rights,
which has been evident, in the attitudes of these states, towards accepting and
enforcing awards of dispute settlement mechanisms. 67 The mixture of these economic
and political interests as state protectionism, has resulted in different individual
reasons being the reasons for international disputes, with the broader concept of
"protectionism" being the basis of disputes. Hence, various political reasons such as
the protection of state's reputation of power, sense of justice etc., has been mentioned
as reasons for state disputes, notwithstanding the fact that there are overtures of
economic facts. Secondly, pure economic facts have also been pointed as reasons for
international disputes, which had prompted protectionism to be attached to economic
facts, as I had discussed in the context of this chapter. But as I had emphasised,
unfortunately, the imposition of tariff and non-tariff barriers have involved the local
laws being invoked by states for such protection, not necessarily for economic
reasons, but also to emphasise the sovereign rights, and satisfy political pressures
representing local economic interests, which is clearly the case, when one deals with
local laws such the Trade Agreements Act of the United States 68, or the local laws in
Nigeria for example, where the concern was partly to gain the financial backing for
political office from these individual pressure groups. This political overtures in
legislating for economic benefits, has also been emphasised, in the discussed
investment disputes, where there is a clear combination of the motives being not only
the protection of economic facts, but also the emphasis of political sovereign rights,
38
thus making protectionism a more broader concept than being attached to the
protection of economic benefits.
Therefore it was within this protectionist atmosphere on the part
of developed as well as developing countries, that any procedures of dispute
settlement was to operate in international economic relations. Thus, as emphasised by
Art.1 and Art.33 of the UN Charter, the methods of dispute settlement, namely
adjudication, negotiation, mediation, arbitration, conciliation and others were to
operate under these circumstances. Hence in the following chapter I would
concentrate on the peaceful settlement methods of negotiation, mediation and
arbitration and the substantive issues which relate to these methods. As seen above,
developed as well as developing countries have made protectionism as an excuse for
the development of disputes at international level. I would concentrate on these
settlement methods taking into account the protectionist attitude of states, be it
developed or developing, which I believe has effected the approach these states take in
their participation in such settlement and the their approach towards the protection of
state interests.
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Chapter Two
Negotiation, Mediation and Arbitration as General methods of
Dispute Settlement in international Relations
INTRODUCTION
As a result of the different protectionist policies practised by different state parties on
varying social and political grounds, it has not always been feasible to resolve disputes
by legal methods. As a result of the individual political, social and trade relationships
between these parties, they are not willing in many cases, to enter into legal wrangling
over such issues. Under the auspices of the United Nations Charter, Art.33, the state
parties have agreed by being signatories to resolve such disputes via peaceful methods
such as negotiation, mediation, arbitration, adjudication, conciliation and good
offices. I would, however not discuss conciliation and good offices at present, as I
believe that they are very similar in nature, to the three main settlement methods of
mediation, negotiation and arbitration, which has been utilised in most disputes at
international level. Furthermore, one has also got to note at this juncture that
adjudication is mentioned in the UN charter as a method of dispute settlement, but its
relevance has not been high on cases of international trade and investment disputes.
Hence, my reluctance of discussing this as a peaceful method of dispute settlement, in
the context of this study. However, I would deal with adjudication when dealing with
the ICJ and its settlement process. Therefore at present, I would deal with the methods
of negotiation, mediation and arbitration as a peaceful settlement process as noted by
the UN Charter, and the varying conditions under which these method operate in
international dispute settlement. What is its necessity, one may question? It is
relevant, especially as it is these protectionist attitudes of parties, which are brought
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over to institutional forums that deal with international trade and investment disputes,
and secondly it is the satisfactory resolution of these secondary issues that, on the
whole decides their success. Therefore I would first provide a picture of what
negotiation is in international terms. The broader definition of negotiation will be
dealt in order to discuss what the necessary conditions should be for such negotiation
to be satisfactory, having consideration to the protective attitudes of states.
Though, these issues may look technical, it is in my opinion,
important to discuss these issues, when one takes into account the individual state
party's attitude towards dispute settlement. This is specially the case when one takes
into account the protectionist methods that states put in place in order to protect their
individual interest, and the interest of other social and political pressures. In
discussing the reciprocity of parties and the consent needed in case of negotiation, I
would concentrate on the standard of mutuality and the "duty to negotiate" which has
arisen, which is a contradiction to the spirit of negotiation, where the consent of
parties are to be the prerogative of states rather than being legally obliged to undertake
negotiations. With regard to the consent needed for negotiation, I would deal with this
issue, and the opportunity of parties to abuse this consent; as in the Indo-Pakistan
dispute over Kashmir, bearing in mind that there exists a norm in international law
that the parties consent is primary to any settlement process. Secondly, I would
concentrate on the secrecy involved at state negotiation, where, from the evidence
available, it is fair to say that the level of secrecy does have an effect on the
conclusion of satisfactory negotiations. This is specially the case, considering the fact
that the political and economic policy and the thinking of the parties concerned would
be protectionist in nature, and the fact that many of the negotiations in institutional
dispute settlement mechanisms are done under closed doors.
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Having discussed negotiation as a dispute settlement method, I would
further discuss what mediation is, as a peaceful settlement method in international
terms. As a result of the mediator's role being different from a negotiator and
arbitrator, it makes his/her task even more difficult, as a result of the divergent views
and positions that have to be dealt with, with respect to the disputant parties. As such,
I would first deal extensively with what is regarded as mediation in international
terms, particularly as there is the situation where a given definition could be cited as
conciliation rather than mediation, as noted by Art.33 of the UN Charter. Secondly, as
with negotiation and arbitration, I would deal with the necessary conditions that are to
be satisfied if mediation is to succeed, particularly in the face of state protectionism.
The first of these conditions that would be dealt with is the necessary consent of
parties to the mediation, particularly given the fact that the parties to the dispute are to
accept the proposals of the mediators, and the fact that the consent of the parties is
paramount with regard to the timing and nature of the mediation. The second fact that
has concerned most disputants is finding suitably qualified mediators to resolve a
dispute at hand. I would focus my attention on this fact, taking into regard the
individual positions of the states and disputes that have depended on this point of
mediation. Having discussed the necessities of mediation, I would deal with the limits
of mediation, particularly taking into account the fact that state consent and control is
a primary factor in the satisfactory conclusion of mediation, and further the fact that in
some situations, other methods of resolution may be needed to complete the
settlement process.
Having dealt with the issues relating to negotiation and mediation,
the final part of this discussion would focus on arbitration as a dispute settlement
process, taking into account the protectionist nature of states. Furthermore, a
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discussion of the basis of law at international arbitration would be dealt with, very
specially taking into account the different laws that an arbitrator could apply. This in
turn will be debated in conjunction with the issue of the applicable law as directed by
the parties to the arbitrators, and how and when the arbitrators would be able to apply
a law of their choice when the parties have not decided on an applicable law. I would
discuss the issue of a law applied by arbitrators, the relevance of which is vital in
terms of trade and investments, especially at institutional level, given the fact that the
parties provide their consent, in spite of the protectionist policy making at local level.
I would also discuss the issue of Lex Mercatoria, and how this part of the applicable
law has been utilised in order to restrict the obstructions that a state could make with
regard to the applicable law. Thirdly, I would also discuss enforcement of arbitral
awards, given the fact that states would have legislated for the protection of their
economic interests and have sacrificed this power. Therefore, I would also discuss
briefly the enforcement of arbitral decisions, which is most affected by the
protectionist nature of state practice, given the fact that states are inclined to argue
state sovereignty over any enforced settlement. These issues would be discussed in
general terms with a eye of further discussion in the next chapter, when settlement
forums of the ICSID and ICJ would be dealt with, where the protectionist attitudes of
states and ensuing practice has a effect on the suitability of such settlement process,
particularly taking into consideration on how such attitudes of sovereignty has been
practised to circumvent the consent given for arbitration.
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2.1 Negotiation as a Method of dispute settlement
2.1.1 A Definition of Negotiation:
International disputes arising between state parties or between
state parties and individuals have been referred to different methods of settlement in
the history of international dispute settlement. This has ranged from the simple form
of discussions between parties to referring such disputes to third party sponsored
arbitration/ adjudication, to which I would turn my attention later on in the chapter.
However, at present, I believe it is correct to concentrate on the simplest of all such
settlement methods; namely negotiation, as noted by the UN Charter. The Charter,
under Ar. 33(1) provides a fairly alternative list of dispute settlement methods. It
reads, "the parties to any dispute...shall...seek a solution by negotiation, inquiry,
mediation, conciliation, arbitration.. .resorting to regional agencies or arrangements, or
other peaceful means of their own choice", where negotiation is provided as one
alternative to the settlement that cou/d be undertaken by the states. Therefore, the
question begs as to what negotiation is, in international terms? Given the fact that
such importance is given to the method of negotiation, one could say that negotiations
between parties is a continuing process, where parties discuss relevant issues on a
common interest which brings benefits to both parties, where this common interests is
the subject of the dispute. The final desired result of such a process is to come to an
agreement on how and when such a common interest and the ensuing dispute should
be resolved.
This is the view presented by lkle; when he states that negotiation is a
‘`...process in which explicit proposals are put forward ostensibly for the purpose of
reaching agreement on an exchange or on the realisation of a common interest when
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conflicting interests are present." 2 Thus negotiation in its present form could be a one
on one discussion of the issues between parties to a long drawn round of talks
between parties3, under the auspices of a settlement forum such as the GATT/WT04,
in order to discuss the conflicting interests, which at the same time could be the
common interest. However, as we have witnessed many a time, the more the process
gets complicated, the more issues are encompassed in the term "negotiation". This not
only includes the resolving of the conflicting interests, but also the agenda for
negotiation, the ground rules to be applied, thus broadening of the scope of
negotiation, which have been provided in many international treaties and
declarations. 5 However, it is my belief that this definition of negotiation and its scope
is put into serious doubt, where the courts have held that mere informal discussion
could be tantamount to negotiation, because a negotiating process involves not only
the facts of the dispute as a central issue, but other facts such as the process applied,
place of negotiations, the acceptable negotiators etc, if the negotiations are to be
successful. In the Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions case(UK vs Greece) 6, Great
Britain contended that discussions with Greece had been so brief, so as not to amount
to negotiation, assuming that a broader definition should be given to the word, and
insisting according to Kass, that "...in negotiations parties must at least define their
positions and consider each others views." 7 But the court held otherwise, stating that
discussions between Mavrommatis and Great Britain had so defined the relevant
issues, thus satisfying the negotiation issue. Hence, having noted the difference in the
definition of negotiation, it is worthwhile noting the dissenting judgement of Judge
Moore in the above mentioned case, where he held that "...the government which
profess to have been aggrieved should have stated its claims.. .and the other
government should have had an opportunity to reply, and if it rejects the demands, to
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give its reasons for so doing..." 8, thus emphasising the process of negotiation; and
keeping with the idea that state officials should negotiate at international level.
If one is to take the literary meaning of what Judge Moore
said as being that state parties should open such a diplomatic process, to resolve
disputes; it seems that in some instances, the states themselves have conformed to
such broad definitions of negotiation and consultation. The UN Conference on
succession of States finds one major example of such a procedurally broad definition
in Art.41 & 42 of the Vienna Convention that was adopted in August 1978.9
According to this article "if a dispute regarding the interpretation or an application of
the present convention arises between two or more state parties, they should seek to
resolve it by a process of consultation and negotiation upon the request of any of
them.„io In an interpretation of this article, one could safely say that its motive is for
official state channels to be utilised in negotiation, which was also the express attitude
of many representatives to the conference." This is further emphasised by the fact that
a "request" by a state party is required as a pre-condition to negotiation, thus making
the informal negotiation in Mavrommatis more questionable as a proper definition of
negotiation. However, by making such definitions broad and official, in my opinion it
puts into doubt as to where we stand in terms of whether proper negotiation has taken
place to satisfy the necessities of different dispute settlement mechanisms. But, given
the fact that certain conditions are to be met, if satisfactory negotiations are to take
place, and further by satisfying such conditions, one could identify the proper standard
of negotiations, I would deal with these conditions at present.
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2.2 Conditions for negotiation: 
Negotiations involve a continuing dialogue between the states or
between states and individuals, be it in political or economic disputes. However, for
such negotiations to be successful, certain conditions have to be satisfied
notwithstanding the protectionist policy making of the states, which would bring
about a conclusion to the negotiations.
2.1.2.1 Mutuality ofparties:
The first such condition is the mutuality of parties in bringing
the dispute to negotiation and the successful completion of such negotiations, meaning
that the parties are to enter into negotiations in good faith, in order to resolve any
present disputes. As Darwin points out "...negotiations cannot settle a dispute where
one party holding an entirely reasonable and just position is faced with unreasonable
or even aggressive demands." 12 Thus it is important that the parties with divergent
views on the interest have a mutual agreement on bringing about the dispute to the
negotiating table; and further it also needs the mutual agreement on the subject matter
of negotiation. As Cheng has identified, it is imperative in international relations that
there exists good faith if any solution is to be achieved for existing disputes. 13 As the
Federal Court in the US once held, "It cannot be that good faith is less obligatory upon
nations than upon individuals in carrying out agreements." 14 The other side of this
argument is that states get involved in any form of negotiation in bad faith, with the
possibility of amending its present situation. This means that the state parties are to
amend its protectionist policy positions as mentioned in the previous chapter in order
to engaged in mutual negotiations. There are many cases in international law and
relations, where the movement by one party of its policy position, wilfully, has either
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encouraged further negotiations or has resulted in the satisfactory conclusion of
negotiations. One such case was the Disarmament negotiations which commenced in
1962 15 , where a significant change in attitude by both parties, namely the US and
Russia, brought about a newly outlined disarmament plan. 16 However, having said
that the mutuality of parties, the good will and the acceptance to move from their
original positions is a necessity to a successful completion of negotiations; one has to
question whether larger state parties would be acceptable to such mutuality, given the
fact that these states are prone to protectionism. This is specially the case, given the
fact that historically negotiation is supposed to be a "diplomatic", dispute settlement
mechanism. As Lall points out "where negotiation is frustrated and cannot succeed,
the root causes will often include the apprehension on one side that the results of
negotiation would entail a move of its international position or status." 17 Thus larger
states, as we have seen in many trade dispute cases, are reluctant to "back down", so
to speak from their original positions of economic policy making, thus dragging the
dispute to a long lengthy process, rather than enter into dispute settlement
negotiations, or for that matter, enforcing such negotiated settlements. 18 One such
narrow-minded approach of a larger state was the Torres Treaty dispute, between
Australia and New Guinea, with regard to the maritime boundary line over the
uninhabited islands. 19 Australian authorities were worried about constitutional
difficulties and local political pressures it might fue1 20, emphasising the pressures
under which such economically powerful countries were in, in negotiating with an
economically lesser significant state, such as Guinea. This also emphasised the
possibility of Australia not willing to let go of its rights under negotiating
circumstances. Thus as Burmester notes "...it was only after the adoption of an
imaginative, broadly focused approach, that a solution acceptable to all the parties
51
concerned was achieved."21 Hence, noting the fact that free will and mutuality is one
cornerstone in inter state or state-individual negotiations, be it commercial or non
commercial, and secondly emphasising the point that protectionism has a significant
effect on such mutuality and satisfactory negotiations. Having noted that mutuality is
one cornerstone in "diplomatic" dispute resolution, I believe that the fact that many
treaties as well as judges in some case law trying to impose a duty to negotiate on the
part of the states or individual parties is a sign of two other related issues. First, that
mutuality is needed for a successful negotiation to take place, and secondly that these
states may tend to deviate from participating in such negotiations or enforcing such
negotiated settlements as a result of protectionist economic policy.
I would very briefly deal with the said duty to negotiate, which
would be seen as a restriction on the freedom of the states, notwithstanding the fact
that states do consent to the treaties of their own free will and in accepting the
obligations of a international institution or treaty. This is an issue that is greatly
significant when dealing with the settlement forums such the WTO where
enforcement panel results and the time periods of such have been regulated under the
Dispute Settlement Understanding of 1994, rather than being obligatory and
dependant on the satisfactory conclusion of negotiations, which have been accepted by
the states, as was the case under Art.22 and Art.23 of the former GATT. Many state
treaties and conventions signed on different subjects ranging from disputes concerning
rivers and lakes, state trusteeships to international trade and investments duties, have
at some stage or other obliged states to consult and negotiate if and when disputes
arise, emphasising the fact that mutuality between parties is a necessity for
negotiations to succeed.22 In the Geneva Convention relating to the development of
hydraulic power affecting more than one state is one example of this obligation where
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it provides that, "if a contracting state desires to carry out operations for the
development of hydraulic power which might cause serious prejudice to any other
contracting state, the states concerned shall enter into negotiations." 23 This according
to Bourne, has influenced the subsequent thought on the obligations of the co-basin
states; where the obligations is subtly pronounced, as not to intimidate state parties,
but also to make sure that they oblige with such a duty. 24 As Bourne points out, with
regard to Art.1 para 3 of the resolution adopted by the inter American Bar
Association; "...strictly speaking, one cannot say that this provision makes negotiation
obligatory.... In practice, however, the provision will lead almost certainly to
negotiations"25, implying first the willingness to impose a duty to negotiate and
secondly the necessity of a free will gesture on the part of the parties. The second
aspect of obligatory negotiations, in my view, is to discourage parties from deviating
from achieving the goal at hand. If one takes for example the economic policy of
developed and developing nations, one could see a trend of state parties practising
protectionist policy in different fields. Hence the need in some instances for obligatory
negotiations. This fact is mirrored by Kass, who noted the importance of obligatory
negotiations in relation to Art. 22 & Art.23 of the former GATT, which provides for
voluntary negotiations. According to Kass "First, they settle many potential disputes
through mutually beneficial tariff concessions. They serve the same purpose more
explicitly in the consultations and negotiations required by Art.22(1) and 23(1) and
further that "The circumstances under which international law requires good faith
negotiations share one common element: the need for parties to co-operate to achieve
their goals."26 I believe that this statement by Kass has given credence to the argument
that there exists economic policy making of a protectionist nature on the part of the
states involved in disputes, which is geared towards gaining the best possible benefit
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for each other and secondly that there is the need for an obligation to co-operate and
negotiate with each other to achieve a common goal, i.e. economic benefits. On the
whole, one has to say that protectionism and protectionist policy making has a
relevance to the mutuality in negotiation as a dispute settlement mechanism, which is
sometimes emphasised by the provisions for the duty to negotiate in international
treaties and the case law that has hinged on the mutuality of parties concerned.
2.1.2.2 Secrecy of the negotiating process:
Having dealt with the free will or mutuality of parties, which is
necessary for a successful completion of a negotiation process, it is my contention that
the availability or non-availability of secrecy of such negotiations has quite an impact
on a successful negotiation process. In the past, negotiations have characteristically
carried on in private, and even at present, to a certain extent, in many cases, parties are
keen to settle in private", keeping with principle that negotiations should be at
diplomatic level. However, at the same time, states have in other situations preferred
to play a "public relations" game by disclosing information about the on going
negotiations with other state parties. While this practice in some instances has a
positive effect, in others, it has been criticised as having a negative effect on the
conclusion of such negotiations. As Lord Strang once said "...there is no doubt that
this public relations and discussions of the issues of foreign policy, often at awkward
moments, has a hampering effect upon the flexibility, resourcefulness and imagination
with which diplomatic operations might otherwise be more fruitfully
conducted."28What I believe Lord Strang meant by this statement, is that such
disclosure of information to vested parties would have a pressuring effect, where
international policy is concerned. This is especially the case, as we have witnessed,
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where such interests have a bearing on how and when states decide to implement trade
barriers or vice versa, in trade relations with other states, be it tariff reduction in trade
or subsidies in agricultural or textiles negotiations at international level. As Ikle
emphasises, governments feel handicapped in the pursuit of national objectives if
domestic interest groups become involved in their negotiations; unless of course the
state is making such "noises" in getting the other party arrive at the negotiating table,
which is an implication that protectionist policy making is prevalent in local politics.
Hence, states that are involved in negotiations on varying subjects have adopted the
policy which Woodrow Wilson once called; secret diplomacy, revised to suit their
purposes as well as satisfying the interests of other pressure groups.29
This exclusion of the public dimension, is being accepted as part
and parcel of international negotiations, where this process of "you scratch my back, I
scratch yours" dealings are essential for both parties who do not want to inhibited by
pressure groups, who have a vested interest in the on going process. The "ice berg
principle", according to Colosi 30; where nine tenths of negotiations are not known to
the public is being practised at many negotiations. This is seen not only at the panel
process and negotiations of the WTO, with regard to cases of economic and foreign
policy; but also other sensitive cases, with quite a success rate. One such example was
the surrendering of Argentine forces in the Falklands, where the commander in charge
wanted the photographers away until the negotiations were ended. As &le has pointed
out "once the agreement is signed, it tends to act as a fait accompli, weakening dissent
and mobilising interests groups in support of it." 31 Hence not only being able to satisfy
the opposing party by maintaining secrecy, but also making sure that the agreements
concluded, would be enforced, without the interference of parties with vested
interests. Thus in my opinion, protectionism has resulted in secrecy or the lack of it
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being material in the success of negotiations at international level, notwithstanding the
fact that in some instances the actual openness may be a more favourable option to
accomplish a satisfactory resolution.
Having noted the two most important conditions that are to be
satisfied, if international negotiations are to be successful, I am of the opinion that
these conditions would also apply to negotiations that take place at international trade
and investment dispute resolution. This is particularly the case, given the fact that
both parties concerned would be compromising their individual positions, which
would on either perspective be beneficial to them. Furthermore, I also am of the view
that these conditions do apply to the dispute settlement mechanisms of the World
Trade Organisation, the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment
Disputes, in the field of trade and investments. Hence my interest in providing a brief
insight into international negotiation as a settlement procedure, as I believe that these
conditions do have a bearing on how these mechanisms satisfy the interests of the
parties concerned. Thus having discussed the issue of negotiations, I would move on
to discuss the settlement method of Mediation, which takes dispute settlement a level
further, in involving a third party in such dispute resolution.
2.2 Mediation as a Method of dispute settlement
2.2.1 A Definition of Mediation:
Mediation is in one sense the middle ground between the simple
negotiation between parties and the full-blooded involvement of third party
adjudication, which results in the disputant parties accepting an award to which I
would turn my attention later. Thus, what is Mediation? At village level in many a
state, mediation was handled by a well respected individual who had the respect and
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authority to do so, with the blessing of the parties concerned. As Lubman states, with
respect to the situation in the former Communist China, "...Generally speaking
disputes within families were settled by elders. While the authority of the pater
familias was theoretically absolute, there was undoubtedly much mediation by older
relatives, friends, and the clan leaders-especially when the family was small. Disputes
between members of a clan were settled by clan leaders and sometimes by other
respected local leaders. Disputes within a village not coterminous with one clan were
mediated not only by relatives, friends and neighbours, but by official village
headmen and unofficial leaders, whether gentry or other respected figures." 32 Thus
third party influence ranged from simple family involvement to public adjudication, if
necessitated. The settlement was in turn kept internal, taking into account the cultural
values of the parties concerned, and secondly, it was informal, away from the
adjudication of magistrates; which in most cases does not take into account the
cultural and moral values that the parties appreciate.
In international terms, mediation is similar to arbitration, without the
legally binding nature attributed to that method of settlement. A definition could be
provided of mediation on the basis of the functions that it is supposed to achieve, as
made by the Hague Convention, when it notes that "the part of the mediator consist in
reconciling the opposing claims and appeasing the feelings of resentment which may
have risen between the states at variance" and "with the object of preventing the
rupture of pacific relations."33 However, as Merrills says "...with the mediator as an
active participant, authorised and indeed expected, to advance his own proposals and
to interpret, as well as to transmit, each party's proposals to the other" 34 the mediators
role is more difficult. Furthermore, what this means is that the consent of the parties
are needed for a party to involve itself in the dispute, and secondly that the mediator
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should be ready to provide its own reasoned proposals. Furthermore in international
terms, the mediators, as with the case in the domestic Chinese situation mentioned
above, the mediators are well equipped, though not from the local cultures of the
parties, to instigate the intervention, which is an advance on simple negotiation.
According to the UN handbook, the functions of mediation is shown to be two fold,
namely prevention and reconciliation. As the two Hague Conventions of 1899 and
1907 provides, the functions of mediation may be provided as "with the object of
preventing the rupture of pacific relations" 35and "the part of the mediator consist in
reconciling the opposing claims and appeasing the feelings of resentment, which may
have between the states at variance."36 While the reconciliation function would be
obvious in terms of the mediator providing his/her proposals for a resolution of the
dispute, the preventive function in terms of mediation is more a limitation of the
escalation of relations between the parties, rather than the prevention of the dispute
arising in the first place. As the UN handbook notes, "the function of mediation under
these circumstances may be aimed at achieving a provisional solution, such as
bringing about a cease-fire when fighting has begun or to arrange a permanent
solution, thus addressing the basic dispute." 37 While the reconciliation function is a
part of the success of the procedure, it would seem that prevention has also been a
vital function in the success of international mediation. 38 These two apparent
functions of the settlement method of mediation can be construed as a definition of
mediation meaning to be a procedure, which takes into account the arguments of both
parties in relevance to the apparent dispute, to give its own opinion on the dispute
after due consideration to the contesting arguments of the parties, with the view of
reconciling or preventing the two parties in entering into all out conflict.
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However, mediation also has to be differentiated from "good
offices", where the third party normally seeks to encourage the parties to resume
negotiations, by providing them with a channel of communication. However, here the
party does not take part in the ongoing negotiations. As Northedge points out, the
power of the mediator or mediation is wide in scope; hence allowing the mediator to
"take the thread of negotiations into his own hands"39, or in some cases to initiate
such negotiations. However, on the other side of the spectrum mediation has to be
differentiated from arbitration, which I would deal with later on. This is specially the
case, in so far as arbitration is generally thought of as proceedings on the basis of
respect of law40, where as mediation is on the other hand a process of flexibility,
notwithstanding the fact that in both instances the parties consent is necessary for
intervention.'" The flexibility in this sense is the flexibility of the mediator in applying
or considering the rules and regulation of international law, taking into consideration
the cultural aspects, which are related to the dispute in hand. This, one may point out
as being a advanced situation of mediation from the village mediation existent in
China for example; where the issue is considered void of legal regulation. Thus one
could identify the fact that mediation being a process of peaceful settlement, could
also be of different standards, at different given forms.
2.2.2 Conditions of Mediation: 
Having noted what mediation is, in contrast to negotiation and arbitration, which I
deal with in the present context; it is also important to clarify the
conditions/requirements that needs to be satisfied, if such a method is to be
satisfactorily concluded in terms of international trade and investment. Hence, I would
briefly discuss in the proceeding part of this work, the two important conditions that
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need to be satisfied in order for mediation to be successful, given the fact that both
parties concerned would have opposing views based on protectionist economic trade
policy. The first of these two conditions is the necessary consent of the parties
concerned and the acceptance of the mediators by the parties.
2.2.2.1 Consent of the parties:
It is agreed that, consent on the part of the parties to accept
third party intervention in resolving a existing dispute or a potential dispute, is a
cornerstone in international mediation. Mediation cannot be forced on parties to an
international dispute. Therefore if parties to such a dispute, show reluctance in
accepting outside intervention; it may be considered as a stumbling block to
international mediation. This is further made worse by the fact that there is no such
thing called enforced mediation. As a consequence, as Northedge points out, there
arise three scenarios, where the parties' or single party may decide not to accept third
party intervention. The first scenario is where the state concerned feels it is getting all
it wants or a substantial part of it, without the recourse to mediation. 42 This situation
arises, mainly if the party concerned feels that, it is in control of the situation,
politically, economically or militarily, and hence has no need to bend over backwards
to accept a compromise deal; which negates its hold over the issue. In most cases, this
situation arises, where the party is an economically or militarily powerful state, as in
the case of Soviet Union's intervention in Hungary in 1956. The dispute in Hungary
concerned the Soviet intentions of keeping Hungary under communist rule, whereas
the anti communists were concerned with the freedom of Hungary. As Fejto explains
"...the Hungarians were swayed by the feeling that their country had a natural right to
independence and neutrality, and did not stop to think of the consequences: 43 What
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Fejto meant by 'not thinking of the consequences', is what exactly happened, as the
Soviet's attached "...with the obvious intention of overthrowing the lawful and
democratic government"; according to mire Nagy, the then prime minister of
Hungary. The Russians, with their obvious military strength had sole control of
Budapest, the Hungarian capital; and thus did not under any circumstances want to
"down peddle" on its position. It is under these circumstances that the UN General
Secretary tried mediation, which was revoked. Not only did the government revoke
mediation by the UN, but also as Northedge states, denounced UN activity as
"unwarranted interference" in Hungary's domestic affairs.44
The second and third objections that a state could bring, in relation
to not providing its consent is if it feels that the mediator is biased towards the other
party or that the mediator is not well informed of the situation that exists. However,
while there are valid arguments for the impartiality of the mediators, these issues are
also linked to the second condition of international mediation, namely that the
mediators should be satisfactorily qualified for such intervention. 45 Hence I would
deal with these issues later on. But, for the present moment I would concentrate on
some case law, to emphasise my point that, consent of parties is invaluable to
international mediation. The Kashmir conflict between India and Pakistan is a prime
example of mediation being at the mercy of the two parties to the conflict. The dispute
concerned the legal responsibility and control of the Kashmir region. The
incompatible nature of the two parties were at such an extent, that even a Security
Council resolution; appointing a commissioner to oversee the control of the Kashmir
region by "local authorities", was not implemented. It is in this state of affairs that Sir
Owen Dixon; the UN mediator made his report on partition. But, such was the
difference between the parties' consent, that this report was rejected, notwithstanding
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the fact that the parties had accepted Sir Dixon as third party mediation, emphasising
the consensual nature of mediation as a method of dispute settlement. The situation
that arose in Kashmir, one could say emphasised the first scenario, mentioned by
Northedge, where the parties, namely India and Pakistan were in a strong position, and
were not willing to compromise. This situation was further emphasised by the fact that
the then General Secretary of the UN, U.Thant; on the 15th September of 1965, again
reported that there was no progress, after officiating as mediator in holding talks with
the parties. On the evidence leading up to the Tashkent Declaration accepted by both
parties; the only two conditions that made the parties come to a agreement was their
eventual consent and secondly the intervention of the Soviet Union, as mediator. 46 As
Merrills states "...what seems to have been the main incentive to accept mediation
here was that having used force to make the point that their respective claims would
be defended, neither side had the power to go further and impose its own solution
unilaterally."47 Hence as a result the parties accepted Russian intervention to resolve
the dispute.
Therefore, two conclusions could be arrived at from the above
scenario. First, in so far as political disputes are concerned; that consent of states is a
prime necessity in international mediation. Secondly, that the so called "political"
disputes are on the whole, based on the protection of a right, be it economic or social.
But for present, I believe it is right to say that; without the consent of the state parties,
international mediation would fail, especially given the divergent political and
economical policies practised in the world arena. Having provided a brief outlook on
consent, I would now discuss briefly, the second condition that needs satisfying if
mediation is to succeed; namely the satisfactory qualification of mediators to handle
the dispute at hand.
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2.2.2.2 Suitable mediators:
It is argued in many quarters that the second basic condition for
mediation to succeed is that the mediators should be qualified enough to take up the
position as a mediator. As Merrills points out; if the state parties concerned believe
that the would be mediator has little understanding of the position, is unsympathetic,
wholly committed to the other party, or less concerned with their interest than his
own, he is unlikely to be acceptable. Immediately, one could identify two areas, which
has to be resolved by the mediator, if the governments are to be willing to accept the
qualifications of the mediator. The first such area of concern is the fact that the
mediator should be familiar with the local cultures of the parties, and their approach to
dispute settlement. If in the case of commercial disputes, the mediator should be
aware of the practices of the parties, and as mentioned earlier, the economic
background in which such activities are practised. Some have argued that dispute
resolution, in any language, means the same thing and hence the cross-cultural
differences do not make a difference to resolving such disputes.48 Others however
have argued that, the mediator has to be conscious about such cultural differences,
while mediating in disputes between two states with different cultural backgrounds.
As Cohn has mentioned, negotiation, or for that matter conflict resolution, might be
hindered by the failure of adversaries to communicate freely, if they speak different
languages, or give different meanings to a single word. This as Cohn has pointed out,
could pave the way for great confusion. For example, in American terms "concession"
mean a process give and take, but in Arabic terms, it would mean "...retreat and
abandonment of a right". To make the matter more complex, if one takes for example
a developing country such as Sri Lanka; the meaning would be a process of giving
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relief to one's population, without expecting any retaliatory practice. Therefore, it is
important that the mediator understands the correct meaning of the language spoken,
since a simple word spoken could mean different things and cause great confusion.
As well as interpreting the language spoken, and resolving any
unwarranted disputes arising; so is the protection of face of the parties important in
some cases, particularly if such face saving is important in cultural terms. As Brown
points out "In some instances, protecting against loss of face becomes so central a
issue, that it swamps the importance of the tangible issues at stake and generates,
intense conflicts that can impede progress toward agreement."'" In most western
countries, saving face means the open, in public confrontations where "debate,
challenge and refutative, and controversy carry no threat to the ego." 5° The individual
concerned, or for that matter the state does not worry what the consequences would be
to the other party concerned. But, on the other hand, state parties in the Far Eastern
hemisphere, do not believe in open court confrontation. 51 As I have explained earlier,
in the case of China as well as Japan for instance; the community feeling is at its best,
and as such confrontation is resolved "behind close doors", so to speak. Therefore, it
is of importance, in sensitive cases, that the mediator takes into account these cultural
differences in mediating between parties. As President Carter once said, "...is that they
don't want to put forward a proposal to the other adversary and be rebuffed. Its a deep
embarrassment and a loss of face if you make a proposal and you have it rejected
publicly."52 Thus it is for the mediator to protect the image of both parties, by taking
into account, the different approaches, acceptable to parties in resolving the
impending dispute. Hence having taken the cultural attitudes of the disputant parties
into consideration; it is right to say that the mediator should then be neutral in
resolving such a dispute. This is particularly true if it concerns parties involved in
64
trade disputes at a given forum such as the WTO, where some countries favour a legal
solution and others accept a more political settlement process.
The second concern of the parties is that the conceivable
mediator would tend to be biased to and favour the other party. As Northedge states
"...One of the strongest arguments in favour of the existence within the international
community of states which are committed to neither side in the principle international
controversies of the day is that such states are available as mediators without
necessarily being suspected of bias towards one side or the other." 53 However, having
said that, it is argued by many scholars, and rightly so that countries, especially
economically powerful countries mediate as a third party in order to gain some
ulterior benefit or motive. If this is the case, it breaks the spirit of third party
mediation in principle. As Zartman notes, the larger state parties "...desire to mediate
is, however, intertwined with other motives, best described within the context of
power politics."54 What this meant was that these counties get themselves involved in
a disputed affair, simply as a way of showing their political strength over other
parties; who wait in the side lines to get involved if the necessity arrives. 55 One such
example that could be provided to illustrate this point is the Soviet involvement to
mediate in the Indo-Pakistan conflict. Pakistan has historically been an ally of the US
and China, where as India has had the backing of the Soviet Union. However, when
the Indo-Pakistan war broke out, and India particularly being under pressure from
China56, the Soviet Union took this opportunity to involve itself through its mediator;
A. Kosygin, its then Prime Minister. This pattern of Russian involvement had two
motives, namely the improvement of its relations with Pakistan, and secondly
reduction of the Indo-Pakistan conflicts. Hence making "...it more difficult for China"
to "...establish its presence close to the southern borders of the Soviet Union" 57, and in
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the process establishing its friendship with India. As a result one could question
whether the third party mediator, could remain impartial if it desires is twofold,
namely the establishing its existent friendship with one party, and secondly trying to
build a bridge with the other and in the process having a greater influence in the
region?
As Merrills has quite rightly detailed "it is some times suggested
that mediation will only be acceptable if the mediator is perceived to be strictly
neutral."58 I agree with this assumption in principle, as there is no point in the two
parties bringing the dispute to third party's attention, without impartiality. The reasons
for this being that both parties agree that they are in a no-win situation; and they want
a win-win situation respectively. Hence if the mediator is to be seen as partial toward
one state or has a ulterior protective interests in getting involved; then the situation
invariably reverts back to its original situation; especially as seen above the motives of
the mediator is ulterior to say the least. However, the other side of the argument;
propagated by some authors is that a former relationship of the mediator with one
party or a existing relationship, will imply to the other party that the relationship could
"deliver" the former party to the negotiating table, or to a possible solution. Hence
meaning that the mediator could use his/her friendship as an advantage; and that "the
closeness that implies a possibility to deliver its friend may stimulate the other party's
co-operation."59 Scholars, who endorse this theory as reality, provide many examples.
Slim, for example, states in relation to the Algerian Involvement in the Iran Hostage
crisis; that these mediators had "...the required revolutionary credentials and the
necessary international connections needed for the job." 6° Furthermore Lieb notes that
Iran and Iraq accepted Bonmedienna as a mediator; as a result of him being "...a
member of the same family." 61 I could understand these stances by parties, who want
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some particular person, who in my opinion, know the situation more than another. But
these efforts by scholars to frame these requests as mediation by biased mediators is
unacceptable, especially as mediation is supposed to depend on the consent of the
parties of a impartial, qualified mediator. If we take for example the hostage crisis, it
is an acceptable fact that no Muslim revolutionary would side with the US, in any way
or form, and that the US would not accept such revolutionaries as mediators.
Therefore, could it be said that the Algerians were accepted because they were biased
and capable of delivering the Iranians? It is my belief that, one could safely say that it
was probably not the case. Furthermore could it be said that Iran and Iraq accepted
Bonmedianna, because he was biased? The answer probably would be in the negative.
The only reason then, would be that he was a Muslim leader; thus knowing the local
situation. Furthermore, why did not the parties in the Falklands war accept the US
mediation? The reason for this situation is not that the biased nature of the US would
affect the outcome, but that the US wanted to develop closer ties with Argentina, as
with the Russian involvement in the Indo-Pakistan conflict; and that Argentina did not
want to reject any offer of mediation from a powerful neighbour. As Freedman notes
"The Argentines were generally pleased with the idea of American mediation;
securing it had been one of the original objectives behind the occupation of the
islands."62 This notion of American bias being helpful to the cause of the UK was
further diminished according to Carnevale, when "...the US presented a neutral front
and made apposite statements to the point that the British feared a unfavourable
mediated agreement" 63, especially as the US was interested in being neutral.
Therefore one has to agree that neutrality of the mediator is of
importance, notwithstanding the fact that a mediator, who has a local knowledge of
the situation may be the suitable person to handle the case at hand. Furthermore,
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though it may seem that the biased mediator is able to resolve the dispute with his/her
influence; it is my opinion that this is rather a fact of the conflict in total, as is seen in
on-going Indo-Pakistan Kashmir conflict, hence going against the views of many
authors. This is important in the case of world trade disputes, and the settlement of
such disputes by mediation, at given forums such as the WTO, where the opportunity
is provided for mediation, whether or not it is utilised in reality. This is particularly
true, as such disputes do tend to give different parties very different interests,
notwithstanding the fact that they are not directly involved in the dispute. Therefore it
is important for the mediator to be unbiased, in the case where the mediator is an
individual, notwithstanding the fact that his/her government could have an
unsuspecting interest in the issue, within the context of international mediation.
2.2.3 Limits of International Mediation
In many cases mediation, states or individual parties who are
parties to an international dispute insist that they be in control of such a dispute, rather
than leaving it at the mercy of a third party, where the involvement is more intense. As
Donelan points out "it seems to be the exception rather than the norm for disputing
states to agree to third party mediation in their affairs." 64 Even when the mediation
process has begun, if the parties believe that the mediation could not do any good, it
will take into its own hands, the resolution of the dispute as a result of the relevant
protectionist interests involved. Therefore it is important that the timing of mediation
should be at the correct time. If the offer of mediation is made too early, both parties
or one of the parties may believe that they still have a chance of resolving the dispute
in other ways: i.e. militarily, hence rebuking such an offer. On the other hand, if the
offer is made after the critical time has passed, and the parties have resorted to other
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methods, then it may all depend on whether the parties do want to resort back to
mediation after taking action, which it believes would resolve the dispute, by which
time, the whole purpose of mediation would have been lost In the Arab-Israeli war,
for example, the US and the then Soviet Union were not interested in getting
involved. Rather than get involved in the dispute earlier, according to Grieve "the two
superpowers made use of the hotline between the Kremlin and the White House to
reassure each other that they did not wish to become directly involved in the war."65
Hence the parties lost the opportunity to offer its service as mediators. However, when
the Security Council directed the Secretary General to appoint a special representative
in order "to establish and maintain contacts with the states concerned", the states were
not in agreement on any issues as a result of its divergent views, thus obstructing to
any offer of mediation. Therefore, unless the mediation is well timed or is made,
taking into consideration the interest of the parties, it would be difficult for mediation
to succeed as a method of settlement.
Another problem area of mediation is the fact that mediation may
only be able to achieve a partial solution, meaning that other sources of dispute
resolution may be needed in conjunction to resolve the dispute in hand as a result of
the state's reluctance to enforce mediated solutions.66 Furthermore; as it has been
noted, when resolving the dispute concerns future actions by the parties concerned in a
given period of time; unless the parties are willing to change their positions, the
dispute will not be adequately resolved, specially if it involves protectionist economic
policy of tariffs, subsidies etc.. As Merrills notes "even that degree of progress will be
impossible if the parties cling tenaciously to fundamentally incompatible positions-if
for instance, they are not prepared to acknowledge that a potential solution is what is
needed, rather than an endorsement of existing rights." 67 With regard to the argument
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that mediation provides only for a partial solution; many instances of such situations
could be provided; where notwithstanding the interventions of a third party mediation,
the parties had to resort to other methods of settlement. One such political dispute is
the Cyprus case extending from 1955-68, where the Greek Cypriots wanted a union
with Greece, free from being a colony of the UK. Thus EOKA, which represented the
Cypriots, demonstrated against British rule. The Turks who had ceded the island to
Britain opposed self-determination, where as Greece wanted self-determination for the
islanders. Though after more negotiations between the Greeks, British and Turks, a
agreement was signed in London, in 1959 to declare Cyprus a sovereign state and
allow self determination between the two communities; such a proposal did not
materialise. Thus as fighting broke out, the UN Security Council, not only appointed a
mediator; but also recommended a UN force to "prevent a recurrence of fighting and
contribute to the maintenance and restoration of law and order." 68 Thus the UN forces
were stationed until 1968, as a result of both parties, being very "trigger happy" to
battle each other, notwithstanding the efforts of Gabo Plaza Lasso, or Sakari
Toumioja, who were appointed mediators, by the UN Secretary General to ensure a
peaceful resolution of the affairs. This emphasis on other pressures being in place to
substitute mediation, if necessary; which is a drawback on this method of settlement.
As seen in the Palestine dispute of 1945-49 for example, though mediation was
attempted by the UN mediators between the Arab states and Israel, heavy fighting
ensued between the parties resulting in more territory being in the hands of the
Israelis. The consequence of this was that parties depended on a political settlement
via the UN conciliation commission; where, as Donelan notes "inconceivable
differences emerged."69
 This therefore emphasises the fact that mediation on its own
does not work in practice, especially, if the parties are still willing to fight their
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corner. As Touval mentions "left to their own devices, the parties may fall out of an
agreement just as it is being made or implemented."" Hence effectively putting on the
shoulders of the mediator to ensure that this possibility is diminished. This means that
it is up to the mediator to see that the future implementation is seen to. This also
emphasises the limitation of mediation, in providing a partial solution, if such future
implementation is not looked at, especially if the parties have a right not to dither
from their respective individual positions.
Having dealt with the more third party orientated mediation as a
dispute settlement process, one conclusion that one could come to is that
protectionism in a broader sense than pure economic protectionism does have a
bearing on the satisfactory conclusion of any mediation process. This is particularly
emphasised when one notes the different circumstances, where obstructions were
made as a result of either party to the dispute, not being prepared to oblige with the
work of the mediator or not being happy with the suitability of the mediator. In most
cases, the main reason for such restrictions was a result of states being protectionist
towards their own interests, which however derailed the mediation process. Having
dealt with these issues, I would next deal with the issues that arise in arbitration as a
settlement process in state relations and in particular trade and investments, where
third party involvement is more prominent than the above mentioned peaceful
settlement processes.
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2.3 Arbitration as a method dispute settlement
2.3.1 A Definition of Arbitration:
In the preceding part of this research I have discussed the
other peaceful methods of international dispute settlement, where the parties are
allowed more freedom and discretion entering into such settlement and reaching an
appropriate decision. In the following part of the chapter, I would discuss the issues
relating to arbitration as a method of peaceful settlement. What is arbitration? While
Art.33(1) of the UN Charter provides arbitration as a method of peaceful dispute
settlement, a definition of what arbitration is not provided. However the Hague
Conventions of 1899 & 1907 for the pacific settlement of International disputes, have
provided that the object of international arbitration as the settlement of disputes
between states by judges chosen by the parties themselves and on the basis of respect
of law.71 The International Law Commission expressed a similar view when it said
that arbitration was "...a procedure for the settlement of disputes between states by a
binding award on the basis of law and as the result of an undertaking voluntarily
accepted."72 Two points can be grasped from these definitions. First, it emphasises
that the parties are allowed the freedom to choose, with restrictions on drawing back
on such decisions made, which is in contrast to protectionist policy, and secondly, the
legal nature of such settlement in contrast to other methods reviewed such as
negotiation and mediation. As pointed out by Behrens "the proceedings are adversary
in nature, and the dispute is settled on imposed terms."73 Hence, it was an alternative
to actual judicial settlement, but at the same time, the focus being on legal disputes;
which in most cases invokes a right of one party being violated by another, or a legal
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obligation not being fulfilled by a certain party in accordance with treaty provisions to
which it is a signatory.
However, having noted the definition provided by various
sources; one question that springs to mind is the fact that this is a method of peaceful
settlement, and hence whether it is applicable to "non-legal" disputes or political
disputes between state parties? According to Gray "arbitration is seen as an equitable
means of settlement, but its object is the settlement of disputes by the application of
legal rules, principles and techniques, and not simply reach a equitable result." 74 What
this meant was that legal disputes with political elements, which tend to promote an
equitable result are not within the gambit of international arbitration. However, it is
my contention that, though these disputes, which could be termed as legal, at the same
time also involve a political decision making aspect for reasons of protecting one's
interests. One example of this political nature of any legal dispute brought to
arbitration is the Rann of Kutch75 case involving Pakistan and India, where tension
were high, and the parties involved accepted a result where both parties were in a win-
win situation.
In this case, the parties involved, namely India and Pakistan, argued
that a borderland named the Rann of Kutch, was an integral part of its lands, and
hence was owned by either nation. India argued that the land owned by the then Rao
of Kutch, was a part of Indian state sovereignty, notwithstanding the fact that he
himself lost these possessions beyond the Rann. India argued that, notwithstanding the
fact that the area concerned was invaded by the Sind rulers who were the natives of
Pakistan, that the Rann of Kutch was still a part of India. On the other hand, Pakistan
argued that by invading these lands, the Sind rulers had established sovereignty over
these lands. Furthermore, Pakistan also provided evidence of acts of individuals, such
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as cultivation, grazing and fishing to emphasise its position. But, India argued that
such activities did not prove sovereignty, rather that these activities were supported by
the administration. Thus, these issues caused great political controversy because both
administrations were willing to give different interpretations of the historical issues
concerned with regard to where and who owns the sovereign rights to area of Kutch,
and secondly because Pakistan in particular was not willing to accept international law
as the governing law of relations between the ruling powers and native states. Thus, as
a result, the arbitrator had to consider whether equity could be used as applicable in
this case, as opposed to utilising only international law principles. Unfortunately, in
this particular case, the states were not in agreement as to authorising the arbitrators to
apply equity to the disputed facts. As noted by Merrills, this technique of using the
equitable principle "...has been prominent in arbitration's concerning territorial and
boundary disputes; when the best solution may sometimes be difficult to justify in
strictly legal terms."76 In the Rainbow Warrior case( France Vs New Zealand) for
example, The General Secretary of the UN, while acting as a conciliator and arbitrator
again emphasised the political nature of these disputes where the ruling was told to be
"equitable and principled" and was taken after respecting and reconciling the differing
positions of the individual parties. What this meant was that the different political
positions of the states were taken into account after individual consultations with
either party, prior to a decision being given on the issue at hand. 77 This emphasised
the fact that disputes brought to arbitration, be it a state or individual right, involves to
a certain extent a political decision making aspect by the respective states on the basis
of protecting their interests, and the fact that arbitrators in some cases have tried to
resolve such disputes in par with the legal dispute on the basis of resolving the legal
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dispute in fair way to the parties concerned, although such political issues would be
cloaked by the fact that a legal facts are to be resolved by arbitration.
Furthermore, it would seem that arbitration as a means of resolving
political disputes or legal disputes with political implications, has been advocated in
some treaty laws as well as by arbitrators themselves78, who with their given
discretion, have resorted to giving emphasise to such political fact. Thus in the Rann
of Kutch case(India Vs Pakistan), the arbitrator holding that Pakistan was entitled to
territory, justified the argument saying that "...it would be inequitable to recognise
these inlets as foreign territory. It would be conducive to friction and conflict. The
paramount consideration of promoting peace and stability in the region compels the
recognition and conformation that this territory, which is wholly surrounded by
Pakistan territory, also be regarded as such." 79 However, in a contrasting case, the ICJ
has reaffirmed this view that only disputes or parts of a dispute that could be resolved
according to a basis of law or according to a judicial process is in the realm of its
jurisdiction. It noted that "legal disputes between sovereign states by their very nature
are likely to occur in political contexts and often form only one element in a wider and
longstanding political dispute between the states concerned" and thus rejected the
view that "because a legal dispute submitted to the court is only one aspect of a
political dispute, the court should decline to resolve for the parties the legal question
at issue between them."8° In my view, if one is to say, as Gray has, that only legal
disputes are resolved by arbitration according to international law, then there is
virtually no necessity for arbitrators to make decisions, taking into consideration
political elements, which should not have any relevance to the legal issues at hand.
Unfortunately, it is under this political cloud that all activity; be it financial, trade or
territorial is conducted; thus making the appeasement of these protectionist interests
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relevant, which it seems has been recognised in some cases at least, in resolving cases
according to equitable principles or the recognition of such principles. As a result, if it
is only the legal issues that arbitration is concerned with, then I do not believe that
arbitration would be successful, given the fact that the parties mutually agree for
arbitration to gain a win-win rather than a judicial court settlement. As Behrens has
mentioned, to counteract this "win-lose" situation in arbitration, "there is, however, a
clear tendency of states to expand the scope of arbitration matters, especially with
regard to international economic relations"81 , hence emphasising the fact that
protectionist aspects are existent in a dispute and has to be resolved in toe with the
legal dispute. Therefore, one could safely say that the arbitration has got to take these
issues into account if the principle object of mutuality of parties is to be satisfied.
2.3.2 Conditions of Successful Arbitration: 
Having dealt with the definition of international arbitration, and
different interpretations provided, I would presently deal with the necessary conditions
that I believe need satisfying, if arbitration is to succeed, particularly given the fact
that states are always keen on protecting their subjective interests, even at dispute
settlement proceedings of consensual nature.
2.3.2.1 The selection and authority of arbitrators:
The Hague Convention, in emphasising the objectives of
international arbitration by Art.15, also signifies the necessary conditions of
international arbitration. According to Art. 15, "International Arbitration has for its
object the settlement of differences between states by judges of their own choice, and
on the basis of a respect for law"82, thus emphasising "the autonomy of states" and
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"the respect for law", as bases of dispute settlement by arbitration. However, state
consent has been the dominant base for many arbitration's, be it ad hoc or institutional
arbitration such as the WTO, where the parties are implied to have sole control over
the affairs of such tribunals. As pointed out by Fox, "even when the arbitration
tribunal has been properly constituted and has opened its proceedings, a state may
block progress by failure to appear.. .refusal to appoint or agree to the appointment of a
substitute."83 Fox appears to provide state control of the whole proceedings,
notwithstanding the fact that "arbitration" by its definition itself is utilised by the
states concerned, with the assistance of a neutral third party, be it an arbitration panel,
as in the case of the WTO, or in ad hoc arbitration's. Hence, the selection of
arbitrators takes centre stage, because without the impartial selection of arbitrators, the
proceedings of such are of no significance.84
As mentioned before in many a case the mutuality of parties is
an important part in dispute settlement. Hence, even in arbitration the parties, after
extensive negotiation, would decide on the membership of the arbitral tribunal. In the
majority of cases, the arbitration agreement between the parties will provide that the
members will be a three or five panel, with an equal number from both parties, and a
additional arbitrator, who in most cases will be the president of the arbitration pane1.85
In some cases the parties make such arrangements, more elaborated, giving names of
such arbitrators, prior to the start of the proceedings, as happened in the Iran-US
arbitration tribunal. 86 As one could conclude from this agreement for example, the
necessity of an unbiased third party is of utmost importance, if one is to gain a
satisfactory decision. Therefore unless the parties have decided on its own as to who is
going to be arbitrators or has stipulated that a certain set of rules would apply to a
given arbitration", it is vital for parties to decide via treaty as to the composition of
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the arbitral tribunal. Without being biased towards developing countries; I believe it is
essential that this be taken into account at commercial settlement forums such as the
ICSID and WTO which does provide for arbitration as a method of settlement. This is
especially true, when one notices the obstructions that one party could bring about for
such appointment, especially if either state believes that the arbitrator is biased
towards the other.
In the Sapphire Arbitration award, 88 Sapphire petroleum Ltd.
requested arbitration from the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) and selected its
arbitrator. However, the request to select its arbitrator was rejected by NIOC; thus
prompting the president of the Swiss Federal court to appoint an independent sole
arbitrator. 89 In this case, the agreement between the NIOC and Sapphire Petroleum
indicated that the IRCAN was to act as an agency for both parties and was to be in
control and management of oil production activities. Furthermore, as with any
international corporation, Sapphire assigned its rights and obligations to Sapphire
International, to which no objection was made by the Iranian government.
Furthermore, under the Iranian Petroleum law, the agreements for oil production were
subject to any decision to transfer such property and rights to the Government of Iran,
where "the surface owner having no right other than that of receiving the value of his
land, of which he may be dispossessed under the principle of eminent domain."90
Furthermore, this law also emphasised the fact that operators are enjoined from
assigning their rights and duties to others, which made the Sapphire action illegal
under Iranian law. As events panned out, the NIOC argued that Sapphire international
did not inform it sufficiently of its contracting activities, which it had done at several
meetings.91 Thus NIOC actions were evidentiary of protectionist actions of state
controlled organisations, which had a seemingly discretionary control over
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international investment, justified by the local laws of the state. Hence, it was this
attitude on the part of the NIOC, that was taken to the administration of arbitration
and the appointment of arbitrators, where it refused to appoint its arbitrator on the
basis that Sapphire Petroleum has assigned its rights to Sapphire International and
could not invoke the arbitral clause. This was rejected by the President of the Swiss
Federal court in appointing a sole arbitrator. This emphasised the necessity of an
unbiased third party involvement or the necessity of treaty laws to defuse obstruction
based on such protectionist policy, which is reflected by other commercial rules which
authorise the appointment of alternative authority, if by chance the prior authority has
defaulted on appointing arbitrators.92
This is further made clear by the Westland Case(Arab
Organization for Industrialisation vs Westland Helicopters), where objections were
made by the respondents on the jurisdiction of the tribunal, based on local laws and
the interpretation of citizenry based on such laws. 93 Here the governments argued that
the particular company named Shah Goli was an Iranian company registered as such
and did not have the right to sue the Iranian government. According to the Iranian
government, "Only a portion of Shah Goli's shares of stock belong to a West German
corporation while the rest of its stock belong to Iranian nationals. Such a corporation
is an Iranian national according to the Iranian Commercial Code as amended, and
according to the claims Settlement Declaration nationals of Iran may not sue the
Government of Iran before the Tribunal, under its private law provisions." 94 However,
the Basic Project Agreement stated that, "Whereas, because (Starrett, S.A.) is an
expatriate corporation and cannot own land in Iran and build and sell high rise
apartment dwellings thereon as contemplated by the agreement of the parties
expressed in exhibit II and therefore cannot perform its obligations under exhibit II,
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and Whereas, (Shah goli) (being Iranian joint stock company) can perform the
obligations undertaken by (Starret, S.A)in Exhibit H• 95 Having agreed to this
provision, then the government proceeded to have its cake and eat it, when it suited its
needs, by hiding under the veil of local laws. The only justification for such
obstructions was the protectionist nature of state dealings, which was concerned with
its local interests, rather than any valid contractual breach. One may question the
relevance of the appointment of arbitrators and the authority of such arbitrators to
settlement of disputes. I believe that the relevance of an unbiased, independent third
party is essential in commercial arbitration, and I intend to emphasise the significance
of such, when considering the settlement methods of ICJ, ICSlD and the WTO in the
proceeding chapters.
2.3.2.2 Basis of Law:
A procedural fact that takes precedence in an arbitration process,
is the law to be applied in such proceedings. In most cases the parties direct the
tribunal on the law to be applied, and this express direction by the parties, has been
given precedence, over other sources of law; keeping with the principle of supremacy
of state consent. This has been confirmed by the fact that an approach accepting this
rule has been followed by many conventions. The European Convention on
International Commercial Arbitration, for example, provided that" the parties shall be
free to determine, by agreement, the law to be applied by the arbitrators to the
substance of the dispute. Failing any indication by the parties as to the applicable law,
the arbitrators shall apply the proper law under the rule of conflict that the arbitrators
deem applicable. In both cases, the arbitrators shall take account of the terms of the
contract and trade usages."96 Hence, when the parties contract or come to an
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agreement, what is expressly stated is accepted as the applicable law. Where two or
more states are in dispute, the dispute is said to be in the realm of public international
law, because such a law only recognises states as being subjects of its applicability.97
However, as international relations involve not only states but private parties under
international trade and investment agreements, the applicable law at the same time has
moved from the exclusive axis of public international law to the applicability of
private international law principles. Therefore, one could specify three sources of
applicable law, which could be either the Public international law, which is applicable
when two states enter into agreement and municipal law or what is called Lex
Mercatoria, which could be applied in mixed arbitration proceedings where a private
party has entered into contracts with a state. In most cases the tribunals are directed to
use the Public international law, while in others the tribunal implies that this should
be applicable. As Merrills points out, in the Taba case(Egypt vs Isreal), the
compromis contained no reference to the applicable law, but merely asked the tribunal
to decide the location of the boundary pillars "of the recognised international
boundary.98 But the tribunal took upon itself to apply the international law, implying
that this was the motive of the parties. While this is in the general area of international
arbitration, it has some significance to international trade and investment disputes,
particularly as it is institutionalised and having its own set of rules and further it is
supposedly based on the consent of the parties, emphasising the contradictions that
arise at international level.
As the party's choice has been given precedence, it is said that
the parties are allowed to direct the tribunal to apply any other law than international
law. Hence, parties are able to direct the tribunal to apply relevant municipal law in
the process, of their choice. As once was said, "any contract which is not a contract
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between states acting alone in their capacity as subjects of international law, is based
on the municipal law of some country"99, meaning that foreign investors should be
governed by municipal law; notwithstanding the fact that they would have agreed on a
different applicable law. It is a fact that parties are allowed to use a municipal law as
an applicable law. Nevertheless, it has also got to be said that the arbitrators are
allowed to decide on the municipal law via the assistance of a court or in combination
with another law, which is most likely to be the International law. This combination
was emphasised in the Trial Smelter case(US vs Canada)'°° , where the stipulated
municipal law was supposed to be complemented by the International law and
practice. However, the question begs here, with regard to international trade and
investment, which is in the realm of private international law; as to what happens if
the municipal law is biased towards the local interest. This is specially the case, taking
into account the fact that the individual states are prone to making protectionist
economic policy and legislating for such, as emphasised in the previous chapter? As
pointed out earlier, there is a risk that the state party might amend its rights and
obligations to the detriment of the other party, as emphasised in the Sapphire case.
This is further compounded by the fact that the defendant to the dispute has the
opportunity of arguing that the municipal law was the agreed law, and that it stands
supreme according to arbitration theory, thus negating any opportunity of protection,
as emphasised in the Serbian Loans case(France Vs Serb Croat states)'° Hence on
this account, one could say that protection of one's own interests, be it political or
economical does have an influence on the legal basis of arbitration. While it is
generally accepted that in the realm of public international law, states apply such laws
at the insistence of the state parties; it is also a agreed fact that in commercial
arbitration between states and private individuals, in the realm of private international
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law, the usage could extend to what is called Lex Mercatoria, 1 °2 the general principles
of International trade law.
I would briefly discuss this area, as it is an important factor
in its relevance to trade and investment dispute settlement. Public international law,
while regulating the activities of states, is accepted as not being applicable between
private parties or between a state and a private party in the event of disputes. On the
contrary, as mentioned above, Lex Mercatoria could be used as the applicable law in
these circumstances. According to Prof. Lando, when the clear laws are not
ascertainable, the arbitrator to a dispute "applies the rule or chooses the solution
which appears to him to be the most appropriate and equitable. In doing so he
considers the laws of several legal systems. This judicial process, which is partly an
application of legal and partly a selective and creative process, is here called
application of the Lex Mercatoria." 1 °3 Thus according to Lando, while a exhaustive
list of the elements of this law cannot be provided, the main elements of this Lex
Mercatoria is identified as being the Public International Law, Uniform laws, The
General Principles of law, The rules of International Organizations and customs and
usages of traders.'" It seems that Prof. Lando has implied the fact that Lex Mercatoria
could be a part of the applicable law to disputes between states, if some of the key
elements of this law is namely the Public International Law and General Principles of
Law. 105 At the same time General principles of law, in its usage is what is called a
"safety net" for parties to arbitration, where the tribunal would make use of these
principles to correct a mistake in the application, for example, the municipal law. It is
in other words, the common use of principles of what is fair and reasonable,
notwithstanding of the fact that the parties have agreed to a different law to be
applied. As Prof. Lando emphasises, the general principles of law in this environment
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would include principles such as pacta sunt servanda, and the principle that a party
may terminate a contract in the case of a breach by the other party. Thus, emphasising
the importance of a given commercial contract. As Collier notes, "the choice of
general principles of law as the applicable law offers effective insulation from
unilateral changes in municipal law, but at the same price of certainty"106, and it
seems that this has been accepted as law in many cases. 107 Could we then deduce from
this fact that the Lex Mercatoria could be used as a safety net from the application of
other legal systems. From the definition provided of Lex Mercatoria, by Prof. Lando,
it would certainly seem the case that this is so. What this means, I believe, is to be the
instant application to a case in order to balance what is fair and reasonable, in the face
of protectionist pressures of state legislation. This has been the practice in many cases
of commercial arbitration, which in some cases have been high profile, where the
ICC, ICSID is the given forum of dispute settlement. However, one has got to
question the likelihood of states agreeing to such a usage of law, given the fact that
generally states are sceptical of law that is contrary to the protection of its interests.
This is specially the case if the parties could argue that the general principles apply
notwithstanding the fact that a commercial contract was based on a different law.
Thus it is within these limits that the ICSID and other modes of settlement operate,
where the situation is even made worse by the fact that the dispute would have to be
resolved under these institutional rules. Therefore, given the confusion that could be
caused by such a differentiation of the applicable law and the practise of arbitration
tribunals, in dealing with the issue of applicable law, I believe that this provides a
basis on which the practice of the ICJ, icsrp and the WTO could be discussed in
depth.
84
2.3.2.3 Enforcement of arbitral awards:
In contrast to other peaceful mechanisms, arbitration
results in a decision being handed by an arbitration tribunal or panel to the parties
concerned. As Behrens notes "arbitration results in a decision which is legally
binding.
means is that such decisions should be suitably enforced by the parties concerned. In
consequence, the winning party would have to have access to the courts of the losing
party and the willingness of such courts to enforce such awards after taking due
consideration of national economic and social policy and ensuing laws. However,
such access is subject to the freedom of such parties in restricting such access,
particularly if a state party is insistent in enforcing its sovereign rights. Thus, the
success of arbitration could be judged in making a balance between the autonomy of
the state parties to change its laws or enforce such awards and secondly being
independent of such state intervention and judicial intervention. As Fox notes "these
two bases, the autonomy of the parties and the judicial supervision of the state, as
sources of the authority of arbitration are given varying weight in national legal
systems in relation to domestic arbitrations." 1 °9 Here, the capacity of an injured party
claiming or enforcing an award is varied according to the degree that the other state is
prepared to claim sovereign immunity and protection of public policy.
In international terms and international commercial arbitration,
vast improvements made in successful enforcement of arbitral awards was due to the
fact that the states were complying with such obligations under the axis of
international conventions between states and under the axis of the New York
Convention, when one of the parties is a private commercial institution, as in disputes
brought to the ICSID forum."° By this convention for example, the agreement of the
" 1 " If one is to accept that an arbitration decision is legally binding, what this
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parties to arbitrate is given effect and any awards of the panels are to be executed in
any interested state. In effect, an arbitration award given in one state is to be given
effect in the local courts of the other states or in an interested third state party.
However, the difficulty arises, when one is to balance these international obligations
with the national political pressures which "continue to create uncertainty as to the
ultimate foundations and source of authority and have produced tension which are still
in process of being resolved." 111 As in Private international law, in theory, the state
divests itself of sovereign immunity and the right to enter into international
obligations. Furthermore, according to theory, by agreeing to such convention, a state
using its sovereignty agrees to be judged by the terms of the agreement to arbitrate
sacrificing its immunity. Thus the states would have to subject international
obligations in satisfying the interests of its pressure groups and local interests. As a
result of this local political element, the consent of states in enforcing arbitration
awards or legislating for such enforcement has been qualified. Furthermore, this
qualification of enforcement of arbitration awards has also been mirrored in the
opinions of the local courts, who had to deal with local national policy such as
nationalisation, anti-trust laws, labour laws etc., which is based on the states argument
of state sovereignty. Thus, it is up to the states to enforce such awards based on good
faith, in contrast to resorting to legal methods of settling disputes; and this has been
further encouraged by the ICJ, where it has held that parties are free to pursue any
other non-judicial methods of settlement, while engaging in proceedings before the
court. 112 Keeping with this fact of state sovereignty and immunity, obstructions have
risen to the enforcement of arbitration awards.
The norm of sovereign immunity until recently was
supposed to be absolute, in terms of the local courts jurisdiction on arbitration matters.
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However, in the recent past, such absolute immunity has been watered down implying
the fact that the states engagement in international trade is done with the
understanding that by doing so it consents to be judged by the respective local
jurisdiction. Hence, the modification of absolute immunity. According to Fox, "the
commercial transaction is the best known non-immunity exception." 113 What this
means is that arbitration involving a commercial transaction is subject to local courts
jurisdiction, notwithstanding the fact that it could concern a act of state, which is in
the realm of public law and further the fact that a government would oppose local
adjudication on such acts as a result of it being a part of its public policy. If one takes
for example, the UK State Immunity Act of 1978, it provides for non-immunity of a
state involved in proceedings in the local courts, which concerns arbitration.
According to the provisions of this act, "where a state has agreed in writing to submit
a dispute which has risen or which may arise in arbitration the state is not immune as
respects proceedings in the courts of the UK which relate to the arbitration."14
Similar provisions providing for state immunity are prevalent in other states, where
international arbitration involving a state is made subject to the jurisdiction of the
local courts. 115 On one hand one could say that this is in keeping with the restrictive
nature of international obligations that states are parties to, with respect to
international dispute settlement. This varies from national constitutions 116 extending
to regional and inter-regional conventions. 117 Notwithstanding these obligations and
the commitment on the part of the states, as Delaume notes "the pressure of the state
as a party to the dispute gives a particular coloration to the arbitration process." 118 The
reason for this is the fact that the state acts in the public realm as mentioned above.
Thus states involved in disputes would act not only in a private law realm, but also in
the public law jurisdiction. As the 'protector of the public interests', the states
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legislate for the protection of such interests. Such legislation and practices include anti
trust laws as well as protectionist practices such as nationalisation, which goes against
the spirit of liberalisation.
Economic development in developed or developing countries and
investment in these countries depend on the agreement of the parties with regard to
the situation, which facilitates such investment. Thus one part of this equation is the
state acting on its prerogative as the public authority to either facilitate such an
investment atmosphere or to obstruct for such. This not only is true for such
investment and trade but also to dispute settlement and enforcement of settlement
methods. Unfortunately, as we have witnessed in the oil concession cases, the case has
been in the negative when enforcement was at issue. Moreover, this has been enforced
further by the fact that states while having included stabilisation clauses to prohibit
breach of contract, has unfortunately done the same arguing immunisation and the
right to nationalisation. In the AMINOIL case, the Arbitration agreement noted that
"the law governing the substantive issues between the parties shall be determined by
the Tribunal..." and further that "the final award of the tribunal shall be binding on
both parties who thereby expressly waive all rights of recourse to any court, except
such rights as cannot be waived by the law of the place of arbitration."119
Unfortunately, the same agreement included a stabilisation clause, which AMINOIL
argued was all embracing and included nationalisation, which restricted the state
practice. But the arbitration tribunal deferred from this view, holding that such a
stipulation restricting nationalisation should be limited and that such a nationalisation
is within the rights of the state. This was only one example of many other cases before
it, where the tribunals had agreed that state sovereignty would prevail,
notwithstanding the validity of stabilisation clauses. The tribunals have held that the
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nationalisation's were lawful, but entitled the companies to compensation. However,
while compensation is some consolation for the companies, it does not differ from the
fact that, the states have the opportunity to invalidate any enforcement provisions of
an arbitration agreement, by arguing state sovereignty, which negates the proper
enforcement of the obligations therein.
state sovereignty has negated the satisfactory enforcement of arbitral awards.
Conclusion:
Having discussed the substantive issues with relation to
negotiation, mediation and arbitration, it is my view that these settlement mechanisms
and substantive issues are effected by protectionism, which is relevant to the
discussion of any settlement institution. One such example would be the WTO, where
the parties having provided their consent to these institutions, are at the mercy of its
regulation, notwithstanding the fact that these states are interested in protecting their
own interests. Secondly, I believe that without such discussion of the merits and
difficulties that arise with regard to the substantive issues, it is difficult to understand
the arguments of the parties which in most cases are shrouded in protectionist
economic and social policy, when a international dispute is brought to its attention, at
institutional level. Furthermore, these issues are put into further turmoil by the fact
that these institutions are under a specific legal basis, thus negating any clout that the
parties might have under the notion of party consent or control of the settlement
process. It is argued that the legal basis might pressure parties into consent rather than
these procedures being obligatory, as seen in general settlement process of
negotiation, mediation and arbitration, where the parties have the opportunity to argue
sovereignty and protectionist policy making on such a basis. It is on this basis that I
120 Hence, on this perspective, the argument of
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would discuss the substantive issues such as jurisdiction of the institution, applicable
law of the process and the enforcement of institutional awards, which relate to
institutional settlement procedures for trade and investment. I believe that
protectionism, which has had a bearing on general dispute settlement, has a similar
effect on institutional procedures, which could have an adverse effect on the
protection of state interests, particularly when there exists debate and controversy on a
given phrase and the interpretative difficulties with respect to that phrase. It is
keeping this perspective in mind that I would proceed to discuss the institutional
settlement process, namely the ICJ, ICSID and very specially the World Trade
Organization, especially as it is my belief that protectionism does have an effect on
the satisfactory completion of these settlement processes, as a result of the
interpretative difficulties they individually face, and the contradiction between state
consent and state protectionism.
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Chapter Three
The Dispute Settlement methods of The International Court of Justice,
The International Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes
INTRODUCTION
As mentioned in the previous chapter, the attitude of individual
parties towards international dispute settlement has been varied, as a result of the
protectionist attitudes of the parties involved in international disputes. It was these
attitudes and policies, which guided the parties' approach towards Arbitration,
Negotiation and Mediation as settlement mechanisms of peaceful nature. As a result,
these mechanisms in general have faced numerous objections and obstructions with
regard to issue such as jurisdiction, applicable law and enforcement. It is within this
umbrella of general peaceful dispute settlement processes that international dispute
settlement for International Trade & Investment has emerged in the form of the
International Court of Justice, the International Center for the Settlement of Investment
Disputes and the World Trade Organization, among many.
Therefore, in the context of this chapter I would deal with the ICJ as
the prime institution of international judicial settlement. The ICJ is based on consent of
the individual state parties. Furthermore, it is a settlement process of disputant state
parties, not involving individuals. However, the emphasis on 'consent' was to be taken
with regard to the protectionist thinking of the states involved, especially as these policies
and thinking influenced the party's standing on issues such as jurisdiction, applicable law
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and enforcement. Furthermore, I would also take into account this dichotomy in thinking
of the parties involved with regard to which type of disputes that should be within the
jurisdiction of the courts; which has caused debate as to whether the ICJ is suitable for
the settlement of trade and investment disputes. Furthermore, the discussion would also
focus on the enforcement of ICJ decisions, particularly taking into account the
jurisdictional restrictions imposed on such ICJ enforcement, which has to be balanced
with the interests of states, who are keen on protecting their economic and political
interests.
Secondly, I would focus my attention on the International Center on the
Settlement of Investment Disputes (Icsrp), which I visualize as a "second tier"
settlement process, where the state party's monopoly as disputants has been broken. The
norm of the ICJ procedures are emphasized in the fact that state parties were recognized
as being the subjects of public international law. However, with the increase in
international investment and the increase in interests of the parties concerned, it
necessitated a better mechanism, which encapsulated these interests. This was of
particular importance in the field of international trade and investment, given the fact that
states were inclined to be protectionist when it involved an interest of an economic
nature. This was specially the case, when these disputes involved developing countries
and multinational corporations, in the field of international investment, where the
interests of the respective parties were in great contrast to each other. It is my belief that
one has to deal with this kind of dispute, if we are to make a satisfactory comparison with
the WTO, which is concerned with the public international law sphere. Thus my interest
in the ICSID and its procedures.
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Therefore the ICSID as a settlement mechanism in the field of
international investment is interested specifically in the interests of individual investors
and the member states of the ICSID convention. Therefore, within the ambit of
international law, the interests of individuals, which was not the recognized norm of
international relations under the realm of the above mentioned ICJ. Therefore, while
discussing this exception in the realm of international relations with regard to ICSID and
its beginnings under the ICSID convention, I would make an effort to apply this in
important issues such as Jurisdiction; applicable law and enforcement with regard to the
inherent protectionism of inter state relations. This I believe not only has a relevance to
the interests of individual investors but also of the developing countries, especially as
these investors operate under the legal framework of the individual states. Hence my
main focus would be on the ensuing problems as a result of this objections and
obstructions, notwithstanding the legal backing of the ICSID convention. I believe that it
is of importance to deal with these issues at present, given the fact that I would deal with
the WTO settlement process in the future, as a comparison to these settlement methods.
This is particularly the case, as there are differences with respect to the attitude taken by
states towards settlement in the public and private international law spheres, and secondly
The differences in the applicable law to such disputes arising at the different levels, and
thirdly, the bearing that protectionist economic policy has on these disputes.
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3.1 The International Court of Justice dispute settlement and substantive issues: 
In modern legal history, the beginnings of third party dispute
settlement or arbitration, could be tracked down to the Jay treaty of 1794 between the US
and Great Britain. Here the parties decided to settle disputes, which arose by the
composition of mixed commissions. Though this method could not be emphasized as
non-partial third party arbitration, the commission was intended to function as tribunals.
Moving on from this the Geneva tribunal case was a further step in the ladder towards
third party judicial settlement until the promulgation of the Hague Treaties of 1899 and
1907. 1 While not dwelling too much in the pre-1899 history of international third party
settlement, I would concentrate on the gradual development of the ICJ system within the
political spectrum of the United Nations.
The parties to the first Hague conference were interested in peace
and disarmament, that so much so, it ended up discussing dispute settlement. Furthermore
the 1899 treaty conference, in particular concentrated on the gap filling of the
international arbitration system, where it necessitated the reduction of political obstacles
in reaching agreement on the composition and procedure of arbitral tribunals. Thus, the
1899 and 1907 conventions made provision for the institution of the Permanent Court of
Arbitration. While, according to Rosenne "...the institution is misnamed, for it is neither
a court nor permanent"2, it was nonetheless a further step in the progress of third party
dispute resolution; where the contracting parties nominated their representatives to sit on
the panel of arbitrators to decide a given case. One has to emphasize these first steps in
particular, bearing in mind that in later years, the PCU and its successor, the ICJ involved
98
identical methods of settlement. This is emphasized by the comments made by, then
contemporary political figures, who opined that third party settlement should be used
worldwide and be fair on all parties concerned. As Secretary of State Root once said,
these judges.. .should be so selected from the different countries that the different systems
of law and procedure and the principle languages shall be fairly represented." 3It seems
that these principles have been a barometer of the development of the UN Charter and
the ICJ Statute. However, while the PCOA, was developed as a first step; it was not
without its problems, as a result of the political thinking and protectionism in dispute
settlement, as shown in the previous chapter. Keeping with these sentiments the major
problem with the PCOA was that it was non-obligatory. As Art.38 of the Hague
Convention states "..In questions of a legal nature, and especially in the interpretation or
application of international conventions, arbitration is recognized by the Contracting
powers as the most effective and at the same time the most equitable means of settling
disputes which diplomacy has failed to settle: 4
 But, having said that, it was not
obligatory to use this system, thus emphasizing the consent of parties concerned, and this
situation was further complicated by the fact that at that particular time there existed no
permanent international machinery to enforce such decisions taken. Nevertheless,
notwithstanding these problems faced by parties concerned, the great impetus taken by
the states from the establishment of the PCIJ was evidenced in the amount of treaties
concluded and the use of this mechanism by these state parties. Thus this encouraging
move towards institutionalization of dispute settlement, via judicial and arbitral methods
was brought a step forward when the League of Nations was established through the
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Peace treaty of 1919 and the PCIJ was inaugurated in 1922. The Council of the League of
Nations was given the responsibility to formulate plans to establish such an institution.5
After reports being presented to the assembly of the League and
further drafts being presented by a committee of jurists to the Assembly; the Statute of
the PCIJ was adopted as being officially the "constitution" of the international court, thus
providing it with the necessary independence from the political institutions. 6 Thus, as the
official publication of the ICJ stated "The PCIJ was thus a working reality" 7, where the
obligations of the parties in resolving disputes, once they had accepted the jurisdiction of
the court was implemented, according to set rules of procedure; by a permanently
instituted mechanisms. The Court acted in such a judicial manner that as Rosenne states
"the court never became tainted with the 'Geneva spirit.' 8 What this emphasized was the
fact that the court was independent of the other institutions of the UN system,
notwithstanding the fact that there existed a relationship on a administrative level. The
court was strictly built to deal with the legal issues of a given dispute, notwithstanding
the political overtones of that dispute at hand. This emphasized the fact that parties need
not necessarily be a party to the League, but could be a party to the statute, thus allowing
it to make use of the judicial expertise of the court. As we would see in the discussion of
the ICJ, this independence of the court has been accepted as a cornerstone of its
existence. From the statistical evidence available, one could say that the PCIJ was a step-
stone in the working of the ICJ with regard t its judicial involvement. 9 Furthermore, while
noting the fact that eminent judges have doubted its significance in the settlement of
disputes other than being a `bullwork of peace', it is my opinion that notwithstanding the
little work that was done, it has provided the ICJ with the necessary impetus to deal with
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the majority of international disputes of various nature. To this I turn my attention at
present.
Notwithstanding the fact that the activities of the PCIJ were
temporarily halted as a result of the Second World War; these court procedures were
revived under another independent judicial organ capable of resolving transnational
disputes, namely the ICJ. As Schlochauer points out "in view of the importance of the
role that the PCIJ has come to play, the opponents of the 'axis powers' were in agreement
during the latter part of World War 2 that a system for the peaceful settlement of disputes
should be set up after the war." 10 The emphasis here was laid on the peaceful settlement
of disputes; which obviously involved negotiation, mediation and arbitration. However, it
was also stressed that there should be a judicial organ capable of overseeing the legal
aspects of a given dispute. Thus the Dumbarton Oaks proposals were agreed to by the
representatives of the United States-United Kingdom-Soviet Russia-Chinall , and was
further taken for discussion at the San Francisco and Yalta conferences respectively. At
that juncture, though the proposals for compulsory jurisdiction was rejected, the principle
of consent of states was accepted as being the basis of its institution, with the idea of
providing a continuation of the PCIJ, though the UN had no connection or proceeded
from the League of Nations. Having said that, the ICJ itself is not considered to be part of
the other political organs of the United Nations. On the other hand the ICJ statute itself is
considered to be an integral part of the UN charter, but not incorporated in it; thus
facilitating access to the courts for states who are not members of the UN. While this
emphasized the legal character of the court, it also emphasized political character of the
UN, hence allowing states the discretion to be parties to either or both parts of the United
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Nations. This character of the UN and the atmosphere in which the ICJ works was
reaffirmed in the Reparation case, when it was said, "it must be added that the
organization is a political body charged with a political task of an important character."12
In contrast however, Art.92 of the Charter has promulgated the legal character of the ICJ,
in order to define the boundaries of the respective institutions. What this means is that the
parties to the dispute could argue the legal aspects at the ICJ, without being hindered in
pursuing the political arguments at the political institutions, even if the dispute involves
any political decision making aspect. As the ICJ stated in one case " a choice amongst
them could not be based on legal considerations, but only on consideration of
practicability or of political expedience; it is not part of the courts judicial function to
make such a choice." 13 However, though the ICJ, as with the PCIJ at the earlier instance,
is endowed with dealing with the legal issues; on the other hand all administrative details
relating to the ICJ is administered by the political institutions of the UN. One important
administrative function in particular, performed for the court by the political institutions
of the UN is the election of judges. I4 The ICJ is composed of 15 judges, selected
irrespective of their nationality. The General Assembly and the Security Council of the
UN elect these judges. Furthermore, the salaries of the judges and the conditions under
which they are given retirement pensions are fixed by the UN General Assembly. Under
Art. 16 of the Charter, it is noted that the judges may not "exercise any political or
administrative function or engage in any other occupation of a professional nature", with
the intention of fulfilling the independent function of these judges. However, as we have
witnessed in the Nicaragua case, judges in most cases are inclined to be politically biased
when the issue concerns their nation's interests, notwithstanding the charter provisions,
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thus emphasizing the political inter dependence of the ICJ, as a international dispute
settlement mechanism.
Hence, having identified the inter-dependence between the legal
organ of the UN and the political institutions, I would at present turn my attention to two
contentious areas with regard to ICJ dispute settlement. The first issue is whether the
parties have the right to seise the court for the settlement of the dispute; which in other
words is whether the court has "jurisdiction" to resolve such disputes. The second issue is
whether, after having resolved the issue of jurisdiction, the court decisions could be
enforced via the state parties, who in many cases are inclined to argue for the protection
of their political independence, as seen in the above chapter with regard to the
participation of parties in peaceful settlement procedures and the enforcement of policies
which involve the political and economical aspects of protectionism.
3.1.1 Jurisdiction of the ICI and relevant issues:
The court's power to decide disputes are defined in the ICJ
statute and known as the court's "contentious jurisdiction." 15 As mentioned above, only
states could be parties to this "contentious jurisdiction", thus restricting any opportunity
of any other subject of international law being party to a dispute, with access to ICJ
facilities. According to the legal basis of the court's jurisdiction "all cases which the
parties refer to it and all matters specially provided for in the charter of the UN or in
treaties and conventions in force" 16, could be brought to the attention of the court. This,
as I would like to emphasize, does not restrict the court's competence to deal with
political disputes per se. To this issue I would return later. There are various points at
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which the parties could seise the court, with of course the consent of the parties, in
keeping with the above mentioned third party dispute settlement. As Schlochauer
mentions "jurisdiction can be accepted ante hoc, ad hoc and post hoc." 17, where the
parties by consent could first, accept the compulsory jurisdiction of the court by treaty18,
agreed prior to any dispute arising. Secondly when the dispute arises, by agreement or by
declarations of the parties. 19 Finally seising the court unilaterally, without agreement,
allowing the other party to accept such jurisdiction under the doctrine of "forum
prorogatum." This is similar to the municipal legal procedure than international peaceful
settlement of disputes as provided by the UN Charter. As the Charter notes "the parties to
any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of
international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation,
arbitration, judicial settlement.. .or other peaceful means of their choice."2° This
emphasizes consent of parties in recourse to any method of settlement. On this account
one could say that on the basis of the imbalance of political power of the developing
countries and the developed nations for example; this process of unilateral complaints
could be beneficial to the developing country's interest. However, having mentioned a
technical benefit to a state on presenting their case to the world court, there also seems to
be debate as to the interpretations on the jurisdiction of the ICJ.
First, with regard to the cases that could be presented to the court; it
is said that the court has jurisdiction over cases, which the parties refer to it. As the ICJ
statute states "the jurisdiction of the court comprises all cases which the parties refer to it
and all matters specially provided for in the charter of the UN or in treaties and
conventions in force"21 , which obviously does not distinguish between legal and political
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disputes, creating a debate on the competence of the court. But, this provision has been
overridden by Art.36 (3) of the UN charter which states "...in making recommendations
under this article the security council should also take into consideration that legal
disputes should as a general rule be enforced by the parties to the ICJ in accordance with
the provisions of the statute of the court."22 This provides a general rule that only legal
disputes are "justiciable", which has been confirmed by the ICJ in cases presented for its
decision.23 However, the problem arises in the fact that; many disputes brought to the
attention of the ICJ is not clear cut in the sense that it would in many cases be a
combination of legal and political facts, as we have witnessed in many economic fact
related disputes. This is mirrored by Schlochauer who notes, "even legal disputes can
have political elements that so strongly affect the vital interests or the reputation of a state
that it is reluctant to refer the matter." 24, meaning that any economic activity undertaken
by a state also involves the practice of states on the basis of its right of sovereignty. This
fact is emphasized in many a case, where the defendant state argues that the dispute
involves political factors, which rejects the competence of the court. If I may concentrate
on the cases brought before the ICJ with regard to the treatment of aliens, one could see
that it involves legal rights and obligations and political facts, which are intertwined. One
may question my reasoning in concentrating on the treatment of aliens. However, the
fact remains, as mentioned by Prof. Jaenicke that " both courts have never had the
opportunity to pronounce themselves on such important legal principles of international
trade as most favoured nation treatment and non-discrimination."25 This is especially the
case, if one takes trade to mean international transport, export of goods etc. Thus, the
only path in which the ICJ has got involved in solving commercial disputes between
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parties is via its involvement in the "treatment of aliens" cases, which however involves
political decision making by the respective state on aspects such as the protection of
sovereign rights and the right to reserve its national jurisdiction over such issues, which
in themselves are legal rights. One such example was the Anglo-Iranian Oil Co.case(UK
Vs Iran),26 where the Iranian government argued that the treatment of the British
company was under its jurisdiction and an exercise of its sovereign rights. The courts
noting that the dispute concerned a alleged violation of international law by the breach of
the concession agreement and a denial of justice, held that "it cannot be accepted a priori
that a claim based on such a complaint falls completely outside the scope of international
jurisdiction."27 But having looked at the circumstances of the case, the court rejected the
argument that the individual company had standing before the international court, thus
implying that investing companies have to seek relief in the domestic courts of the
invested state. Unfortunately, it would seem that this is the final conclusion that the
courts had come to in most cases that concerned the protection of "alien" interests and
diplomatic protection of investing companies.28
This was further emphasized in the Nicaragua case(US Vs
•Nicaragua)29 , which provided for the different outlook that different countries have on a
given dispute, which also gives one a idea of how difficult it is for the court to decide on
the interpretation it has to give to a dispute. In May 1984, the court granted an interim
order rejecting the US request for termination of proceedings initiated by the Nicaraguan
government. Thus pending a final decision the court ordered the US government to
"immediately cease and refrain from any action restricting, blocking or endangering
access to or from Nicaraguan ports, and in particular the laying of mines."30 From the US
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point of view, this order accompanied by the addendum was more political rather than
being legal and this was an overreaching of its jurisdiction, on the part of the ICJ. As the
department of state said "...the conflict in Central America...is not a narrow legal
dispute; it is an inherently political problem that is not appropriate for judicial resolution.
The conflict will be resolved only by political and diplomatic means- not through a
judicial tribunal. The International Court of Justice was never intended to resolve issues
of collective security and self defense and is patently unsuited for such a role."31This
attitude taken by the US not only emphasized the fact that the US did not recognize the
ICJ as being the correct institution to deal with what it considered to be political facts and
disputes, but also provided a insight into the protectionist nature of states who indulge in
ICJ dispute settlement. More importantly it presents a prime example of the
diversification in thinking, on the part of the disputing parties with regard to the
jurisdictional capacity of the ICJ, and the fact that these perceived economic activity also
involves a political decision making factor. In my opinion this problem arises as a result
of there not being any clear cut definition of what is and what is not a legal dispute,
especially when a given dispute involves a mix of political and legal aspects. One may
have to question this issue as either being a oversight on the part of the construction of
the statute or being a deliberate attempt to leave the judges with discretion to decide on a
given dispute.
According to McWhirmey there are different judicial policies,
which the courts make use of justifying the political exceptions to their jurisdiction.32
These judicial policies applied by the courts in justifying a "political questions" exception
to their jurisdiction are threefold. First, the courts would use judicial policy if they feel
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that the issues of debate are technically difficult or difficult to comprehend for the
ordinary judicial process. Secondly, the courts justify their "political question" exception
on the basis of a consideration towards the constitutional bases of the other executive and
legislative institutions. According to McWhinney, "The contemporary trend with the
International Court ....is...toward a new notion of complementarity and of positive
cooperation in common World Community problem solving."33 The third judicial policy
is based on the fact that the particular issue before the court may be simply too big in
political terms, for the judges to be able to handle it without themselves becoming
embroiled in partisan political controversy, thus making exceptions, in making "political
questions" a part of its jurisdiction. My question is that, if this were the case whether this
would clear the path for states to bring cases with political facts to the attention of the
ICJ, as Nicaragua did in the above case? Mcwhinney argues that if it accepted that most
disputes are inherently political as well as legal, then "the criteria for separating the
justiciable from the non-justiciable, the exercise of Court jurisdiction from its non-
exercise, become essentially pragmatic in character." 34 Does this mean that the court
would be under obligation to deal with disputes which has a combination of legal and
political aspects, in contrast to what has been said in the Nuclear Weapons case for
example? But at present this avenue has not been consistently applied by the ICJ,
supplemented by the differences in how states look upon at a given dispute. Given the
nature of most disputes which involve a interest of a developed and developing states,
and have a political aspect to it; one would have to wonder whether a developing
country's interest would be protected, given the imbalance in political and economic
capacity, and the protectionist attitudes of states concerned.35 Nevertheless, having said
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that, one has to appreciate the positive side of the ICJ cum Security Council jurisdiction,
which to a certain extent negates the obstructive element of the legal dispute requirement
under the UN charter and the ICJ statute law. There is no obstacle to the simultaneous
submission of a dispute to the Security Council and the court, provided their individual
functions are respected. This parallel jurisdiction is in itself unique, especially as most
other settlement mechanisms have either methods of peaceful settlement, namely
negotiation, mediation and conciliation or judicial settlement as a last resort of settlement.
The benefit of these parallel methods is more obvious, if a developing country's interest
is at stake; in particular if the politically more powerful nation decides to withdraw its
consent to ICJ jurisdiction. 36 As the court recalled in the Nicaragua case(US vs
Nicaragua), "...the fact that a matter was before the Security Council should not prevent
it being dealt with by the court and that both proceedings could be pursued pani passu"37 ,
obstructing to any measures of reservations as mentioned above. Without involving
myself deep into what would be called internal politics of the Security Council, one could
say that this dual opportunity is favorable towards the interests of the developing
countries. This is specially the case; as the court is, it seems, prepared to resolve any legal
questions, in order for the larger political questions to be resolved by peaceful methods,
as discussed in the previous chapter.38
While dealing with the issue of jurisdiction, I would briefly deal with
the question of compulsory jurisdiction, which has given cause for debate. Ar. 36(2) of
the Statute states that "the state parties to the present statute may at any time declare that
they recognize as compulsory ipso facto and without special agreement, in relation to any
other state accepting the same obligation, the jurisdiction of the court." 39 What this
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specifically means is that state parties could accept the jurisdiction & competence of the
ICJ, with or without the consent of other parties to a treaty, prior to any dispute arising.
Once the states have accepted the jurisdiction of the ICJ without reservation, these same
states could invoke the jurisdiction of the court unilaterally as a result of the previously
made declaration. However, this is all well and fine, as long as it is theory. But in
contrast, when one concentrates on practice, it paints a different picture, which
undermines the above mentioned theoretical arguments. As Schlochauer notes, states may
exclude from the compulsory jurisdiction of the court, legal disputes which affect their
vital interests, which on the other hand could be the very issue that the other state is
depending under action brought to the ICJ. This practice of reservations has given cause
for concern and for extensive scrutiny, when states make or try to make reservations once
a dispute has risen.° As the defense advisor to the US government, Judge Sofaer
concedes "it was the American government's unhappiness with the ICJ preliminary
rulings in Nicaragua, in 1984 that provided the chief motivation for the administration
reviewing our acceptance of the court's compulsory jurisdiction."4 ' This, in my opinion is
a rather strange justification by an imminent personality of Judge Sofaer's stature, of
making reservations, which gives credence to the fact that political decision making
affects economic activity based on protectionism that results in dispute settlement.
Furthermore, this also shows the supposition of the US thinking, in that it assumes first,
that an ICJ judgment should be favorable to itself, rather than being impartial and
secondly, that protection of its local interests should be given priority over others. With
regard to the developing country's interests, on which I am concentrating at present; one
would have to question the practical security that developing countries gain by entering
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into treaties with either the developed world or for that matter, the other developing
countries. This is particularly true, if these countries try to enforce reservations when they
like, at the time they like; arguing that a given dispute is not to be tried under ICJ
jurisdiction.42
3.1.2 Enforcement of ICJ decisions:
Having briefly treated the issue of jurisdiction, it is my contention that
the enforcement of such ICJ decisions gives further cause for concern, notwithstanding
the fact that such decisions are consented to by state parties, given the fact that states are
naturally inclined towards the protection of its own interests. With regard to compliance
and enforcement of ICJ decisions, Art.94 of the charter and Art.59 of the statute are key
when emphasizing the extent of the state obligation. Art.94 reads as "each member of the
UN undertakes to comply with the decision of the ICJ in any case to which it is a party"43
and" if any party to a case fails to perform the obligations incumbent upon it under a
judgment rendered by the court, the other party may have recourse to the Security
Council."44 Furthermore Art.59 of the Statute states that "the decision of the court has no
binding force except between the parties and in respect of that particular case." 45 These
two articles coupled with Art.36 of the statute emphasizes the remedial competence of the
ICJ, and how successful such competence might be, specially if one takes into account
the politically charged atmosphere in which such remedies are to adhered with. The
decisions of the ICJ are legally binding, which means that since the states have consented
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to the jurisdiction of the ICJ, it is liable to adhere or accept its decisions, without
exception.
However, as one could foresee, not many states would be willing to
accept such decisions; in many cases arguing that such issues are within its internal
jurisdiction or that the ICJ has overridden its jurisdiction in entertaining political rather
than legal disputes. It follows from the fact that the decision is binding on the state as
such that it is binding upon all the organs of the state, meaning that the state has to prove
that it is not in a state of non-compliance, but that it has complied with the judgement to
the extent that compliance is possible. However, if non-compliance arises, it is even made
worse by the fact that in such situations, the state which is aggrieved, has no other
judicial remedy to fall back on. This is particularly the case, as the statute provides that
"the judgment is final and without appeal in the event of disputes as to the meaning or
scope of the judgment, the court shall construe it upon the request of any party." 46 Thus
the states only have recourse to the Security Council, if state parties do not adhere to
recommendations of the ICJ, apart from actions taken under the basis of self help.47
Under Art.39 to 42 of the UN Charter, the Security Council is provided with the power to
take measures, which requires the recalcitrant state to comply with the legally binding
decision of the ICJ, if not compliance is not forthcoming. These measures could vary
from the Security Council calling upon the parties to comply with provisional measures,
as noted in Art.40, to calling upon the members of the UN to take measures that do not
involve measures of force. These could vary from trade embargoes, to the Security
Council taking such action of armed force, "...as may be necessary to maintain or restore
international peace or security." 48 Two issues are at stake at this juncture. First, is the fact
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that the Security Council in taking any measures in order to persuade compliance by the
recalcitrant party has to take measures only to give effect to the judgment of the ICJ,
meaning that any rights of such a recalcitrant party has to be respected at all account.
What this again emphasizes is that, such measures of the Security Council, in most cases
should be persuasive rather than being aggressive, hence protecting such country's rights
of sovereignty, with which comes the right to adjudication and making decisions on
whether to comply with judgments on international organizations. By all means one may
argue that such sovereign rights are abrogated by the state once it ratifies the UN Charter.
Nonetheless doubts are cast on this issue, as to whether the Security Council is capable of
resolving the unresolved problem of enforcement, on this perspective, specially when the
protective interests of a state is at stake, be it a developed or developing nation.
The second issue is the fact that the Security Council would only
get involved in the dispute, if it deems that the dispute would led to the continued threat
to world peace and security. 49 With regard to this issue of Security Council involvement
depending on their being a threat to world peace and security, I would like to question the
suitability and practicability of such a condition, considering the fact that in most cases it
is the investor from a developed country or that government itself that invests in the
developing country. Realistically I could not foresee a country such as Sri Lanka taking
on the US on a war situation or enforcing trade embargo's, as a result of the US
government or one of its investors having breached its trade agreements. The only
opportunity that the ICJ has got involved in international trade issues is where it had dealt
with the protection of aliens. The first aspect in protecting aliens is the fact that in most
cases, these investors would be protected under diplomatic protection, hence obstructing
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to any developing country arguing against any action. But on the other hand, as read in
some case law of the ICJ, which involves the protection of aliens, the courts have argued
and given decisions for the invested country. What in most cases the ICJ has emphasized
is that the invested country (in this case I would pre-suppose to be a developing country),
has sole jurisdiction over any disputes arising, thus rejecting first that it would have any
competence to deal with the issue and secondly that these perceived economic activities
also involve political decisions made on the basis of state sovereignty. As happened in
the controversial Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co.Ltd. case(Spain Vs Belgium)5°
with regard to aspects of diplomatic protection of aliens; the court held that "...a state
may exercise diplomatic protection by whatever means and to whatever extent it thinks
fit, for it is its own right that the state is acting." It also noted that "...should the national
or legal persons on whose behalf it is acting consider that their rights are not adequately
protected, they have no remedy in international law."51 Thus emphasizing the principle of
sovereignty and more importantly in my opinion disregards any agreement to the
contrary; which the states have agreed in order to forward any such cases to the
jurisdiction of the ICJ, and Security Council if necessary, emphasizing the fact that policy
decisions which involves economic and political facts are a primary concern in dispute
settlement. If one builds on what Prof. Jaenicke mentioned in respect of ICJ competence
in trade matters, one would have to conclude that claiming a decision, let alone enforcing
ICJ decisions, in this particular category of alien protection would be complicated to say
the least. On one hand, this decision has not recognized the right of an individual to argue
his or her case against a state at international level. But, on the other hand, it is my view
that it has inadvertently protected the interests of states, on the basis of sovereignty,
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which in the perspective of the state, is good as getting a ICJ judgment enforced. This
was in a way emphasized in the case of Socobel Vs the Greek state(Belgium Vs Greece)52,
where the plaintiff argued that the judgment of the PCIJ constituted a title, ipso facto
binding on Belgium on the defendant and exempt from the formality of exequator in
Belgium. As noted by Rosenne "...the plaintiffs stressed that it was inconceivable that a
judgement delivered by the ICJ in a case between states should require an exequator from
a Belgian tribunal"53 , meaning that an international treaty or agreement should have
direct effect on member countries. But the tribunal decided that this was not the case,
since Socobel, in its view was not a party to the case between the state parties, and further
because the UN charter restricts only state parties being able to seise its jurisdiction.
While in hindsight, this benefits a developing country for example, it is also keeping with
the norms of ICJ competence, where the individual is not duly protected, notwithstanding
the fact that in many instances, it is the individual who invests under the auspices of trade
agreements signed to by his or her government and the host state. This not only plays
right into the protective nature of states but also a justification of such a status, where the
real picture of international trade and investment is unfortunately not taken into account.
Having noted the merits and limits of the ICJ as a mechanism for settling disputes of a
trade and investment nature, given the protective nature of states concerned, I would
follow to discuss the issues with regard to dispute settlement in relation to the ICSID at
present, where the individual is and his/her interests are the focus.
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3.2 International Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes and its
Substantive Issues:
3.2.1 The conflicting interests of the parties concerned in investment disputes and the
evolution of dispute settlement mechanisms:
While the World Court was in prime position to resolve international disputes, via its
judicial mechanism, as was mentioned earlier, it was equipped to resolve international
disputes "head on" so to speak. This was specially so; when it came to international
investments; principally as these disputes, while dealing with trade issues, also involved
political aspects, via the interests of developing countries, who were in most cases the
benefactor. Therefore, first I would briefly deal with the interests of developing countries,
and the protectionist attitude prevailing in these countries, because I believe that these
attitudes affect the effectiveness of the ICSID. As I had discussed in an earlier chapter,
states, in particular developing countries, tend to look upon any investment or any
interference by international organizations with a certain amount of contempt. The reason
for this stems not from any discriminatory attitude towards international investment at
international trade level, but an attitude towards protecting its national interests. As
Snyder points out "the principle current problem in protecting foreign investment arise
chiefly in newly developing nations. These nations, most of them newly independent are
highly nationalistic and sovereign." 54 It is this sense of protectionism and independence,
which has brought about the conscious approach to international investment. However,
unfortunately the contradiction in this thinking remains in the fact that developing
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countries posses the necessary human and natural resources, but lack the capital and
technological know how, which the foreign investors could provide for harnessing of
such resources. It was this kind of contradiction, as seen in the case law referred in
chapter one, be it at state level or state/investor level that is brought to international
dispute settlement, be it peaceful or judicial methods.
Thus a compromise has to be made between these protectionist
motives of developing countries and the potential investor, at the level of international
investment dispute settlement. As a result, one also has to identify the motives of the
international investor as well. It is possible for different people to give different
interpretations on the motives of the international investor. As Sonarajah has pointed out
with regard to international community and its aims of investment, "the transfer of
control over natural resources to the state in order that such resources may be used to
further the developmental goals of the poorer countries" 55 was of prime importance.
However, while one could argue that governments of developed countries would be
concerned with international development, I find it difficult to imagine that MNE's
would be concerned with the development of developing countries rather than doing
business for a great range of profits. Hirsch puts this in more subtle terms when he notes
that, "...one outstanding feature of investments for economic development is that one
party to the transaction is usually a sovereign state, whose interests, rights and obligations
significantly differ from those of private actors in the international economy." 56 While
the governments of developing nations will take political action towards economic
improvement under the pressure politics and social development, the MNE's on the other
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hand will concern itself for example with the extraction of some sort of natural resource
from the host state; hence providing for the disputable position to arise.
For example, one has to take the case of Sri Lanka and the
involvement of foreign owned companies in the textile export trade. The government of
Sri Lanka is concerned with the social development of the population in the free trade
zones and the political benefits in the election to office; while the individual companies
are concerned with its profits; invariably reducing its production cost; thus reducing the
benefits given to its individual workforces. 57 The investor would want leniency on the
part of the host state; in terms of financial benefits, infrastructure facilities and especially
legal leniency; the host on the other hand would want to control the power that the
investor would have in abusing such benefits. The main medium by which the host
country could achieve this is through its control of the law. The government being
sovereign over its territory the investment is made would have the right to implement or
revise legislation, which would have an adverse affect on the investment, 58 or for the
betterment of such investment organizations. 59 Thus as a result disputes would arise
which would not be feasible to be resolved by national courts, in particular, as the
international investor would invariably look upon such a local law as being bias towards
the host state. This is voiced by Hirsch when he states that "in the absence of a special
international forum for the settlement of the dispute, the only remedy available to the
investor on an international level is the diplomatic protection extended by its own
state"60, thus emphasizing the view taken by potential investors.
Hence it was important that an international mechanism was initiated
in order to take into account these considerations of the two parties while resolving the
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ensuing disputes. This trend of distrust has even resulted in the trial advancement of an
international contract law to be constructed between the developing state parties who
pursue protectionist policies, and the individual investor, in order to defuse such distrust.
What the protagonists of a "international contract law" has advocated is that, as a result
of the existence and continuation of a relationship, the parties would acquire rights,
which would be irrevocable, hence creating a legal relationship. But as Prof. Sonarajah
argues; this argument was created under colonial times; thus negating any justification, as
a result of those circumstances. His argument is that the change of such circumstances,
and the strength of developing countries at present in flexing their sovereignty has
devalued such a argument of a international contract law; meaning that the parties have to
decide between themselves which law to apply, and how to resolve such disputes. What
this means is that, notwithstanding the existence of such commercial relationships, and
arbitral rulings; as a result of the espousal of state sovereignty by these developing
nations and its protectionist policies, it is difficult to create a international contract law.
Thus it was important to create a international organization to deal with investment
disputes at international level, if such disputes arise as a result of commercial
relationships between states and investors.
As a result of these differences between states and individual
investors, there existed only two methods by which such disputes could be settled
international law, namely mediation and arbitration, as discussed above. As the World
Bank once said, the bank "...concluded that the most promising approach would be to
attack the problem of the unfavorable investment climate from the procedural angle, by
creating international machinery which would be available on a voluntary basis for the
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conciliation and arbitration of investment disputes." 61 Nevertheless, one also had to keep
in mind the protectionist nature under which these procedures were to operate as I had
emphasized in the previous chapter. Thus it is under these circumstances of arbitration,
that I would concentrate on the prior methods of settlement of investment disputes before
the ICSID mechanism, briefly, and move on to discuss the ICSID in detail. The earliest
arguments for arbitration as a mode of settlement was enunciated in the Institute of
International law in 1875, which was taken a step further by the Hague Conventions as
mentioned earlier. 62 Though, as mentioned earlier, the definition of arbitration did not
contain its usage in international trade investments; this situation was resolved to a
certain extent by the London Court of Arbitration, which provided that it "...maintain a
comprehensive panel of arbitrators...classified according to professions and trades of
high standing ...and the court is in a position to call upon the services of acknowledged
experts for whatever disputes may be submitted." 63 This meant that it was willing to
entertain disputes of a commercial and investment nature. This was further advanced by
the ICC, which provided arbitration in "...business disputes of a international
character."64This was followed by the American Arbitration mechanism, which obtained
permission from the PCOA to notify its members that the premises and the organization
of the court were available for arbitration of disputes "between a contracting nation and a
non-nation party."65
 It is at this juncture that I would discuss the ICSID, which involves a
steady improvement on the dispute settlement mechanisms of a international nature;
which has involved the single individual, rather than being restricted to inter-state
settlement, as in the instances of the ICJ, as discussed above.
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3.2.2 ICSID and its Procedures of Settlement:
The "Convention on the settlement of investment disputes between states and nationals of
other states", or simply known as the Washington Convention, was formulated and
entered into force in 1966, as part of the progressive development made in protection of
private investors who dispute with the relevant state parties.66 As a result, the
International Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) came into being
as the newest member of the World Bank. 67 As mentioned earlier, the parties involved in
any trade or investment relations would have doubts and suspicions of each other, very
specially if it is a state party who has the capacity of changing it's legal structure when
the necessity arises keeping with its policy of protecting its own interests. Thus, it was
and should be the settlement forum's philosophy to undertake a balancing act of
appeasing both parties taking into account the individual circumstances. The ICSID is
based on this sort of thinking as it "seeks to assist in developing a favourable climate for
the investor.. ,,68 To the executive directors of the IBRD, it was the thought of promoting
national confidence and stimulating the flow of private international capital, which
instigated the initiation of the ICSlD process. 69Thus, in order to achieve this goal, it had
to take into consideration the investment interests of the investor, and the protectionist
nature of the state, which had a bearing on satisfactory solution of disputes.
3.2.2.1 Structure and Process:
The ICSID convention has created the Center as an
international, independent agency of the World Bank, with separate legal capacity.
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However, the Center itself does not involve itself in arbitration or conciliation, which is
undertaken by the conciliation commission or Arbitral tribunals." Thus the Center acts
only as a place of registering the complaints of the individual parties. The individual
parties would nominate four members to be appointed as arbitrators, if the necessity
arises, to arbitration panels. Thus, as with any other settlement process, ICSID is based
on the consent of the parties to be willing to participate in the settlement process. 71 While
the arbitration panels deal with the settlement of the dispute, the ground work for such
initiation of proceedings are provided by the administrative council, and very specially
the secretariat, which is involved in carrying on the day to day business of the center. The
Secretary General, as the principle officer of the secretariat has the power to register a
request of arbitration or not; thus giving him the power to initiate or prevent arbitration,
which I would deal with when discussing the jurisdiction of the ICSID in the following
part of this area. This is in addition to other services that the secretariat provides in
facilitating the arbitration process. Having very briefly outlined the process which
facilitates the arbitration process of the ICSID, I would discuss the substantive aspects
such as the jurisdiction, applicable law and enforcement. This I believe is important in
emphasizing the bearing of protectionism on ICSID settlement and secondly, making
comparisons with the World Trade Organization dispute settlement mechanism.
3.2.2.2 Initiation & Jurisdiction of the Center:
Three conditions have to be met for the ICSID to have
jurisdiction in order to conciliate or arbitrate in investment disputes. As Art.25 of the
Washington Convention has stipulated, the first such condition, is the written consent of
122
both parties to the dispute. This is, as I had mentioned earlier is keeping with the general
rule in international dispute settlement, where the mutuality of parties is a necessity in
order for such settlement to succeed. However, in the general international settlement
process, such consent of state parties is subject to the sovereignty of states, where they
have the right to withdraw their consent from ad hoc arbitration, mediation or
negotiation. However, the World Bank committee, has taken this mutuality one step
further in stipulating that such consent is irrevocable; meaning that, once ratified, the
contracting parties cannot withdraw from such consent and are bound by such a decision.
This provision is of such importance that it has even been described as the "cornerstone
of the jurisdiction of the center."72The significance of this consent is further fortified by
the convention, where the parties are not allowed to escape its obligation, even by
denouncing the convention. In the perspective of a state party, one could say that it
contradicts the norms of state sovereignty and restricts the state from taking action
against a recalcitrant investor. As Hirsch notes, a state could provide its consent via
national legislation, which in the context of irrevocable consent means that the state
cannot repeal such legislation if the investor has given his/her consent.
Questions have been raised in some instances, where the state
has consented to ICSID arbitration through legislation, and the investor has not
consented, whether the center has jurisdiction. Taking into regard the fact that both
parties have to consent for center jurisdiction to arise, it would seem in these
circumstances that the effectiveness of the center, as a settlement process would be
jeopardized at the initiation stage itself, rather than at a enforcement stage. Having said
that, in one particular instance, the arbitral tribunal of the ICSID decided that it had
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jurisdiction after both parties had given consent, not in particular to the icsrp but to
arbitration in general, which the tribunal took as to mean consent to ICSID,
notwithstanding the fact that the state arguing that it had not specifically agreed to resolve
that particular dispute via ICSID tribunals. 73 This is further compounded by the fact that,
though technical that whatever mode the parties agree, the consent provided for ICH)
settlement should be in written form rather than being implied, which would seem
restrictive. Unfortunately the ICSID does not speak of implied consent, where a party's
actions could be construed as consent, assuming that both parties would agree in writing
to such settlement in the future. As mentioned earlier, the problem of states invoking state
sovereignty, hence having the right to legislate or repeal such legislation which could
invalidate consent, has been a restriction on any form of dispute settlement. As evidenced
in the nationalization disputes, the ICJ has accepted the states right to legislate for such or
repealing of legislation.74 Thus given the fact that implied consent is not acceptable to
ICSID, and the fact that the state's right to legislate and repeal legislation is recognized,
one has to question the written consent provisions of the ICSID if the state decides to
revoke such laws.
The second part of deciding the jurisdiction of ICSID, is the
nature of the dispute that could be brought to the attention of arbitration panels. The first
part of Art.25 (1) of the convention sets out the second condition for the establishment of
the center's jurisdiction: that the dispute submitted be a "legal dispute arising out of an
investment". Thus the two elements that need discussing are that 1) the dispute be a legal
one and 2) that it arise directly out of an investment. With regard to the first issue of an
"legal dispute", the expression has been used to make clear that while conflicts of rights
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are within the jurisdiction; the conflicts of interests are not. The dispute must concern a
breached right or obligation, 'or the nature of extent of the reparation to be made for
breach of a legal obligation." 75 However, strangely enough, as Hirsch notes, the
convention does not define these terms and intentionally left this matter to the future
rulings of the center's tribunals. Thus questions have to be asked as to what these legal
obligations are? Are they contract based or are these connected with natural justice? No
clear-cut definitions have been provided to date. This it seems is a case of "passing the
buck" by the executive directors, who refrained from providing a definition of what
exactly a "legal dispute" is, as it involves other social issue, which one party might not
regard as a legal dispute. This is especially the case where it concerns the interests of
states, and interests groups such as employees, other business interests, whose rights may
be effected, but which is not a part of the investment agreement, and where the state is
concerned with protecting such interests. Thus one could say that the ICS1D convention
has once again left to the parties, the agreement of these issues, and the discretion
involved in making these decisions, notwithstanding the fact that it is dispute arising out
of a legal right or obligation that they are to resolve. Given the evidence available on the
nature of the parties' motives towards protection of its own interests, one has to question
the ambiguity of this provision. While this issue on its own might seem unfair or
imbalanced towards, not only the interests of the two main parties, but as well as the
other social interests, I would deal with the second qualification on providing ICSID
jurisdiction at present, which would shed some light on the reasoning behind the lacuna
in interpretation.
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The second qualification of Jurisdiction Ratione Materiae is that
the "legal dispute should be investment related". However, strangely enough, a definition
was not provided on what "investment" is and its substance. The executive director's
report states that the committee does not attempt to define the term "investment" in light
of the essential requirement of the consent of the parties, meaning that the parties are
allowed to innovate on what investment might be, improving with times. 76 As Stark notes
"...the broad purpose of the convention correspondingly require that an expansive
meaning be given to the term `investmene." 77Thus being with the motives and spirit of
the convention, of satisfying the interests of the states and the investor. I believe that this
discretion given to the parties, not only facilitates consent, but also provides the parties
with the opportunity to paint a clearer picture of what a "legal" dispute would be,
specially when it concerns a investment, be it fmancial or material in terms of the
agreement between the two parties. Thus being a plus point to the merit of the ICH)
dispute settlement mechanism.
The third condition in claiming the jurisdiction of the ICSID
mechanism; is that the dispute should be between a state and a national of another state,
or in other words, the Jurisdiction Ratione Persone should be international, rather than
domestic. Thus the main issue with regard to proving that the ICSID forum has
jurisdiction, is to prove that the investor is a national of another state. While to the naked
eye this may be easier to identify, taking into account the complex nature of commercial
relations in the business world, it becomes very difficult to prove or becomes debatable,
as seen in many cases. 78 As mentioned by Delaume, within the framework of the
Washington Convention, the nationality of a corporation is determined on the basis of its
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siege social or place of incorporation. Consequently, a business association incorporated
in contracting state A and investing in contracting state B is eligible to be a party to an
ICSID clause and use ICSID facilities.79However, though this is the perceived practice
and theory; it is qualified in the sense that "...judicial person incorporated in the Host
State can still be regarded as the national of another state because of foreign control."8°
This is the case in many international corporations doing business in developing
countries, where the day to day commercial activities are carried out via a subsidiary
company rather than the parent company being directly involved in such activities;
notwithstanding the fact that the parent company holds the majority share holding in such
subsidiaries. This was a major issue, among many, in the Holiday Inns Vs Morocco
case81 , where Swiss and U.S. companies entered into an agreement with the government
of Morocco to construct and operate four hotels through subsidiaries, incorporated in
Morocco. As a result of a dispute arising, it was submitted to the ICSID requesting
arbitration not only in their name, but also on behalf of their subsidiaries. The Morocco
government, as a result of its suspicions of the company's activities, got the company to
sign a guarantee noting that it will "assume all responsibilities of guarantors to warrant all
commitments and liabilities and the true and complete fulfillment of all obligations."82
Though this would have or would be interpreted as being an agreement between a parent
company and a government; the irony was that these companies were hardly in existence
at the time, thus allowing the government of Morocco to argue that, there was no such
agreement. Furthermore, this also resulted in the government being able to argue that it
was not subject to ICSID arbitration. This, coupled with the fact that such consent should
be express rather than implied, showed the inadequacies of the system. This is especially
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true, when one takes into account the facts in this case. The government of Morocco was
allowed to argue that it had not agreed to treat the subsidiaries as foreign nationals, as a
result of the companies not being in existence at the time of the alleged agreement being
formulated. Thus one could argue, in my opinion, that while the opening to the center's
jurisdiction has and is more liberated than the ICJ, in keeping with world development
trends, it is also correct in noting that this opening has been, to a certain extent, restricted
by technical difficulties of interpretation, which the parties could turn into loopholes in
their favour, as seen in the above case law. Assuming that the parties have claimed the
jurisdiction of the center, the next issue at stake has been the applicable law to investment
agreements and ensuing disputes.
3.2.2.3 Applicable Law in ICSID arbitration:
As mentioned earlier, the issue of applicable law has been a
controversial aspect in international arbitration, be it ad hoc or institutional. As
previously discussed in the preceding chapter, the issue is which law, be it international,
local or Lex Mercatoria should be applied to a given arbitration. While the parties could
agree that the ICSID has jurisdiction after the agreement on the above-mentioned issues,
the next question would be, which law governs the investment agreement and dispute? As
I had noted while discussing the ICJ and its settlement process, the starting point of
international dispute settlement is that international law should govern only disputes
between states, meaning that domestic law should govern disputes between states and
individuals. As Giardina notes, this was the law handed down by the PCIJ in the case
involving Serbian loans (France Vs Serb Croat States), where the "relations between
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states and the nationals of other states are necessarily governed by a municipal legal
system and that this system is presumed to be the national system of the contracting
state."83 Obviously, the argument by its critiques is that the national legal system, very
specially the systems of developing countries; would not be equipped to deal with
investments of international character. Furthermore, as with the other instances, the
second debate is that, having control of such legislation, the state has the opportunity of
changing such laws to the detriment of the investor, which is based on the norms of
national sovereignty and the protection of its local interests, be it economic or social
interests. On the other hand, arguments have been proposed to the effect that,
international convention rather than national law, should regulate such international
relations, where the states would sacrifice its sovereign right to enact and change the laws
governing international investment and dispute settlement."
The settlement mechanism of the ICSlD, it seems, has accepted the
first solution, whereby the arbitration tribunal would consider the laws of the host state as
the applicable law, if the parties have failed to specify such laws. 85 However, the
qualification to such application is that such national laws have to be applied with regard
to the international laws applicable in such a host state. Art.42 states, in the absence of
agreement between the parties, the tribunal "...shall apply the law of the Contracting
state party to the dispute (including the state's rules on conflict of laws) and such rules of
international law, as may be applicable."86Furthermore as mentioned by Dr.Broches, the
executive director's report makes clear that "international law" in Art.42 is to be
understood in the sense given to it by Art.38 of the Statute of the ICJ, which is in contrast
to what the Trial Smelter case had advocated, as mentioned in the previous chapter. It is
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at this juncture that the whole issue of applicable law gets complicated, especially when
one has to balance the competing interests of investors and states, especially when one
has to consider the social and political basis under which these parties enter into
international relations. Hence, the first question to be asked is, which interpretation is to
be given to the applicability of international law? Is it to be hierarchical or is it supposed
to just complement national law, thus protecting the state party's sovereignty and leaving
open the investor to the risk of such laws being changed by the host nation on the basis of
sovereignty, as noted in the Trial Smelter case? There have been various theories put
forward by theorist of law, where international law is looked upon as either being a law
governing state relations, or being a supranational system of law regulating contracts
between states and foreign nationals." According to the positivist theory, international
law was looked upon, as a law applicable to sovereign states and other entities were not
allowed juridical status under such a law. According to the positivist doctrine, it was
perceived that "contracts cannot be the subject of international disputes since
international law contains no rules respecting their form or effect." 88 Thus, private parties
who were under contract with a state or state institution were governed by municipal law
according to this school of thought, which was confirmed in a number of cases brought to
the PCIJ in the early 20th century. 89 In contrast to this, the efforts were made to create a
"international contract law", where international law principles such as puctu sunt
serranda are to be assimilated into contracts between states and individual parties.
Hence, as noted by Prof. Sornarajah, "...the general thesis began to appear that the
parties, since they had the right to choose the system of law to govern the settlement of
disputes arising from the contract, may choose international law or the general principles
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of law as the law according to which disputes should be settled." 9° But at the same time,
as evidenced by the jurisdictional limitation practiced by the ICJ, the "positivist"
approach to international law was that, an agreement between a foreign national and a
state was not the concern of international law, but of the domestic law of the foreign
state. This was mirrored by what Lord McNair once said, "...this system is an
international state system-jus inter gentes"91 , referring to international law as part of state
relations, not involving nationals of either state.
This division was further extended by the fact that states were in
favor of an application of national laws, which did not infringe on its state sovereignty
and its social and political motivations, which resulted in a disputes arising, as
emphasized in the previous chapter. However, as a result of these interested parties being
eager to attract the best possible investments and profits, there have been initiatives to
construct a "international law of contract" 92, which would restrict all institutions of
sovereignty and social pressures. It is within this context that the ICSID has developed
Art.42, which is to regulate such relations and disputes. However, doubts have to be cast,
as to whether such an interpretation would break the spirit of ICSID, considering the fact
that both parties have agreed to such jurisdiction, in order to get fair benefits.93
Nevertheless, it seems that in some case law, which advocates international law as the
applicable law, the basis on which such a position is taken, is the protection of the
individual investors interests. A passage of a given award indicates this philosophy,
"Such a solution seems particularly suitable for giving the guarantees of
protection which are indispensable for foreign companies, which undergo considerable
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risks in bringing financial and technical aid to countries in the process of
development... "94
While I do agree and appreciate the fact that these investors do bring in
investment of a considerable nature, it is also my opinion that these tribunals have
misconstrued the economic ability of these companies in defending themselves, and does
not appreciate the fact that these states are to a considerable length dependant on these
companies for economic development. This not only puts them in a disadvantageous
position but also necessitates the protection of their interests.
However, on the other hand, Art.42 could be interpreted to state that
national law is to be the applicable law, with international law complementing such
application; thus providing the Host State an advantageous position over the interests of
the investor. The importance of this was emphasized in the AGIP SpA Vs Government of
the Peoples Republic of Congo. 95 Here the arbitration tribunal, keeping with the
investment agreement, applied the national law supplemented by the international law,
which was to fill the gaps of national laws. The international law vis-à-vis the national
applicable law had two possible roles: supplementary and correcting. Furthermore,
arbitration tribunals have also held that the law of the Host State was the applicable law,
rather than being supplemented by international law, as was the case in the Klockner
Industries et al Vs Republique Unie du Cameroun.96 In this case at hand, referring to
Art.42 of the Convention, the tribunal noted that it should apply the law of Cameroon,
including its rules on the conflict of laws. This further complicated issues at hand,
especially as the parties at hand are to enforce such awards in their territory, as if they
132
were judgments of their own courts. 97 This meant two things. First, it emphasized the fact
that state practice and policy would have an effect on the settlement and secondly, gave
credence to the argument that ICSID has not satisfactorily dealt with this issue. This
situation is further complicated by the gap left by ICSID, which has not taken into
account the "Lex Mercatoria", which has been used as a safety net in commercial
arbitration's. Lex Mercatoria is defined as a selective process of the arbitrators that
considers the law of several legal systems, which apply to commercial disputes.
Arbitrators more frequently use this source of law in international disputes, where clauses
to this effect are inserted in international contracts. As mentioned in the previous chapter,
Lex Mercatoria is accepted as a safety net for parties to a commercial dispute.
Unfortunately, it seems that the ICSID has not adhered to this source of law. The only
option that the ICSlD Convention provides is that the parties are allowed to agree on a
specific law. However, the second part of the equation does not come into being if the
parties choose such a law. Thus invalidating this option of agreeing on a "lex
mercatoria", in such situations. Hence, questions have to be asked, as to what route
tribunals should take, at 'cap settlement, with regard to applicable law, as a result of the
dubious nature of Art.42 and its interpretations. This confusion not only causes problems
of what law to be applied; but also differentiates between which rights need protecting;
which in my opinion is against the motives of ICSID, and with respect to protecting the
interests of either the investors or the states, it would be seen in the negative.
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3.2.2.4 Enforcement of ICSID awards:
Once the parties have agreed that the ICSID has jurisdiction,
and that the law of the host nation or another applicable law applies, the next issue that
gives cause for concern is the recognition and enforcement of such awards. It is at this
stage that the importance of sovereign immunity is well documented, when the state
parties argue immunity from enforcement, absolute or restrictive98, which translates into
a few problems from the investor's point of view, given the fact that there is evidence of
state protectionism at international relations. However, on the positive side of ICSID
arbitration, the execution of awards is an important aspect of 'cap arbitration,
distinguishing from other forms of commercial arbitration. This significance is achieved
by Art. 54, which notes that
"Each Contracting state shall recognize an award rendered pursuant to this
convention as binding and enforce the pecuniary obligations imposed by that award
within its territories as if it were a final judgment of a court in that state....",99
This0 emphasizes the res judicata effect of ICSID awards. This
effect has two consequences. Firstly, that the decision of one tribunal has a binding effect
on future tribunals, as it is binding in all states, and secondly, it obstructs to the host state
arguing immunity at recognition level of the award, where no executor procedure is
needed, thus leaving no choice for the host state to enforce such a binding decision.
Notwithstanding such a positive outlook at recognition level, the ICSID Convention, in a
sense balances out the justice meted to both parties; in the context of Art.55 which states,
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"Nothing in Ar.54 shall be construed as derogating from the law in
force in any Contracting state relating to immunity of that state or of any foreign state
from execution",m°
Meaning that the law in place of arbitration governs the manner in which
the execution is to be carried out. Given the fact that no derogation or modification is
allowed of the laws of enforcement of the host state, one could say that this protects the
state sovereignty of host states. This, according to some authors, could be distinguished
as immunity from jurisdiction being separated from immunity from execution according
to the provisions of the Convention, which is mirrored by the national courts, which have
upheld absolute immunity in favour of the state in cases of execution. While these two
provisions could be to the merit of the ICSID arbitration with regard to the protection of
state interests; one also has to note that problems arise as a result of the practice of state
sovereignty and national court practice as evidenced in the previous chapter, and
secondly as a result of interpretation problems present in the ICSID convention. Thus I
would deal with these issues, having first briefly looked at the national laws of
arbitration, which has a great impact on execution of ICSID awards.
Different countries, be it developed or developing have to a certain
extent developed laws which have exempted themselves from arbitral awards which, in
most cases differentiate jurisdictional from execution. However, as Bernini notes
"socialist countries do not make this distinction since they do not stray at any point from
the absolute immunity theo which is in contrast to most open economy states. The
American law mirrors this acceptance of a restrictive immunity theory for example,
where enforcement by means of execution measures against foreign state assets located in
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the U.S. is permitted. 1 °2 As mentioned in the previous chapter, a further example is the
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, where the immunity from jurisdiction and
enforcement is made dependant on certain conditions based on the commercial nature of
the state's property; where state property is "...or was used for the commercial activity
upon which the claim is based" 103 , as is the norm practiced by the U.K. State Immunity
Act of 1978. While these laws are the more prominent in international relations, one has
to emphasize the fact that this is not limited to developed country immunity laws, but also
to other legal systems which prefer state sovereignty over international dispute settlement
obligations. Thus one could conclude that the states are in control of how and when it
accepts the recognition and execution of arbitral awards against state assets; with its own
exemptions and conditions being set up in order for the enforcement of such arbitral
awards. Ironically, in the perspective of the investor, this basis of voluntary compliance is
accepted by the icsrp convention, where the actual execution of arbitral awards, is not
mentioned, rather giving primacy to enforcement laws of the host state. 1 "This is in
contrast to the WTO, where the implementation of panel reports are overlooked by the
DSB, and are to complied with promptly or within a reasonable time period to be agreed
by the parties. 105 Furthermore, this obligation of compliance is supplemented by the fact
that it is to be achieved by negative consensus, thus restricting the opportunity for
obstruction.
In the context of the ICSID, this incoherence is not only
restricted to theory, but rather it seems that this diversity in state immunity practice has
been emphasized in case law, where the inadequacy of ICSID provisions are restated.
One such important case witch concerns arbitral award enforcement is the B & B Vs
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Congo106, where the plaintiff company petitioned the court of first instance in Paris, to
give recognition as a result of a dispute arising. However, as illustrated by Delaume;
while the court granted the petition, a reservation was attached which read as "...we rule
that no measure of execution, or even a correlating measure, can be taken pursuant to said
award, on any assets located in France without prior authorization" 107, meaning that host
state immunity is safeguarded. Hence it seems that even the courts in a developed state
such as France have, and are, hesitant to apply the doctrine of immunity from execution
unless the state assets are used for commercial purposes, which was at the behest of the
host state. This in itself is a huge burden to prove and in many cases, beyond the capacity
of individual investors. This was also the situation in the LIAMCO case(LL4MCO Vs
Libya), where the President of the court held that "since it is not immediately possible to
segregate the funds or property intended to be used for a sovereign or public activity and
those relating to a simple economic or commercial activity subject to private law, it has
not appeared appropriate to us, in the absence of prior investigation, to allow a situation
to occur that might interfere with the sovereignty of a foreign state by means or measures
of compulsion exclusive of any notion of country and international independence." 108 The
courts in this case gave precedence to the fact that a state might be acting in a public
capacity and as such is not liable, rather than its commercial capacity, where it could be
held responsible for its activities. This stance taken by local courts, not only mirrors the
difficulty of enforcing a award when a state is involved, but also emphasizes the nature of
state defenses, when it involves culpability for its actions. Hence, this emphasized the
difficulty that investor's face and the difficulties of enforcing ICSID obligations, 109 if
there is going to be a differentiation by national courts of this practice of state
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immunity. 110 Bence, in a sense of certainty and justice, that the convention is supposed to
provide, one could say that it has not satisfied the expectations of the investors, if not
only in theory, but in practice; where the courts have accepted the immunity of the
sovereign states. On the other hand, the host state could benefit, in the sense that it has
the opportunity of arguing its use of sovereign immunity as a result of ambiguities in the
interpretation of convention provisions. 111 However; on the other hand, to the merit of the
ICSlD convention, this seeming advantage to the host state, has been reduced by the fact
that; notwithstanding the non-derogation of national laws of enforcement, the host state
could be held responsible and obliged to enforce the arbitral award. 112 Thus if a
Contracting state, which is party to the dispute invoked immunity within its territories to
prevent enforcement, it would be considered to be in violation of its obligations and
vulnerable to sanctions of the convention. While this is to the merit of the convention; the
problem would be whether in practice this would be feasible, considering the differences
in economic, political and monetary capabilities between the developed and developing
nations, and secondly, whether developing countries would even consider such an option.
Thus, having considered the merits and demerits of the ICSID
Dispute Settlement process, and its effect on developing countries and its interest, one
would have to say that its effect has been a mixed package. Given the act that parties to
the convention, in particular the state parties, are capable of implementing protectionist
measures as legislation, and the difficulties in enforcement, one would have to say that
the effect of the ICSID is restricted notwithstanding the consent of both parties
concerned. But at the same time one would have to say that to the merit of the ICSID, it
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has done its utmost in protecting the individual investors interests, which is a turn around
in contrast to the norms of international law.
Conclusion:
In conclusion, one could identify a certain improvement on the part
of international dispute settlement, starting with the International Court of Justice to the
ICSID, as an international mechanism, beyond the norms of historical international
relations, particularly with respect to the jurisdiction of the mechanism and the justiciable
disputes. While the settlement mechanisms have brought about a huge improvement in
the protection of the interests of investors as well as the developing nations, with the
increase of legal regulation and obligations, these have however, been subject to the
consent of parties involved, which is the norm of international law. But, at the same time,
the success of these instruments have been subject to the consent of the parties and the
above mentioned protectionist attitudes, which is attached to such consent, as shown in
the previous chapter. This is emphasized in both institutions, notwithstanding the fact that
the ICJ is a judicial institution. Notwithstanding this consensual factor, the fact remained
that there existed interpretative difficulties with respect to all substantive issues of dispute
settlement, namely, jurisdiction, applicable law and enforcement provisions. The
interpretative difficulties have been further complicated by the fact that, in the case of the
ICJ in particular, there has been a reluctance to get involved in international trade and
investment disputes. This has even been the case, in respect of the ICSID, where there
has been debate with regard to the interpretation that could be given to the jurisdictional
questions which were to be answered, if the system was to satisfactorily operate.
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Unfortunately, given the fact that states are generally protectionist
and concerned with the protection of their sovereign and economic rights, these
interpretation difficulties have given rise to difficulties in the completion of the
settlement process. This has particularly been the case in substantive issues such as the
jurisdiction of the institution, applicable law and enforcement of awards etc., especially
as these institutions are based on state consent and consensual relations. This has further
been complicated, as I had shown above, in situations, where the individual parties have
argued for the application of different laws, or the courts have had reservations about
enforcing the award because it contravenes national policy, thus making the effect of
these mechanisms debatable. This was evident, particularly in the case of the ICSID,
where the interpretative difficulties/ question with regard to enforcement, has allowed
states to object to enforcement using their local immunity legislation, which emphasizes
the restrictive nature of the system, when faced with unwilling protectionist state
attitudes. Therefore, having discussed the merits and demerits of the other international
trade and investment dispute settlement mechanisms, having regard to the protectionist
nature of states, I would proceed to discuss the World Trade Organization dispute
settlement mechanism, and the substantive issues with respect to this mechanism of the
WTO in the following chapters, with an eye on making a comparative analysis of the
three mechanisms.
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Chapter Four
The Dispute Settlement Mechanism of the World Trade Organization
INTRODUCTION
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade was a new
beginning since the ITO Charter in reorganising the regulation of international trade.
However, as was in the case of the ITO, the basis of GATT resolving any trade
disputes was the consensus of the parties involved, which was headed by the US,
hence resulting in the agreement to keep the GATT as informal as possible. As a
result of this informality, the GATT did not provide a separate set of rules for
resolving trade disputes apart from Articles 22 and 23, which were to apply to
violation and non-violation cases. Nevertheless, as clearly identified if such a
procedure was to work, it necessitated the dedication and commitment on the part of
the contracting parties to adhere to such obligations. But as noted in many a case,
there existed a distinction in the attitude of the parties concerned with reference to the
GATT agreement and more specifically to the dispute settlement mechanism as a
forum for resolving trade disputes. Where as some trade blocks headed by the EC
accepted and were more inclined to accept a diplomatic arena for reconciliation,
another camp headed by the US tended to appreciate a more legal background for
such dispute settlement. Hence there arose an immediate breach in the basis on which
the GATT was to exist, namely consensus. I would thus deal first with the existent
basis of the GATT/WTO from its inception under the UN Charter, and the reasons for
such a consensual basis, as a first step in the discussion of the present GATT/WTO
system of dispute settlement. In discussing this issue, I would deal with the reasons on
why the United Nations decided to protect the trade between states, and how the
145
Sponsoring Parties to the United Nations achieved this objective. Secondly, I would
discuss what steps the states took in terms of the UN charter in protecting
international trade, particularly focusing on the stated objectives contained in Article
1 of the Charter. To this end, I would deal with briefly with Article 55-57 of the UN
Charter, which I believe to be the relevant provisions, under which all institutions that
I have discussed have been initiated. Furthermore, a brief outline will also be made of
the negotiation rounds that were undertaken by the Contracting Parties to the
GATT/WTO under the axis of the above mentioned articles, in order to emphasise the
fact that protectionism and the protectionist attitude was a key in the success of trade
liberalisation efforts during this period.
In order to resolve any shortcomings in the GATT dispute
settlement system, that arose as a result of this dichotomy of thinking, improvements
were made since 1947, which for a start involved the initiation of the panel procedure
in 1952, and the more recently the Understandings of 1979 and 1989, which were
developed to legalise and codify the system that existed prior to 1979, where the
dispute settlement process was mainly to work under the axis of Art.22 and Art.23 of
the GATT. Nevertheless, notwithstanding such innovations made by the
Understandings of 1979 and 1989, which involved a "right to a panel", the panel
procedure under the GATT was, as with its predecessor, not without its deficiencies.
These deficiencies existed in situations, such as initiation of the procedure,
composition of a panel, the consensus necessary in establishing a panel and the
adoption of panel reports etc., where one could identify the political clout that
countries such as the US and the EC has on such legal rights. I would strive to
emphasise that this was a result of extant protectionism, and the fact that GATT was
virtually based on consent and the goodwill of states to the dispute.
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As a solution, in order to negate these deficiencies, the
Uruguay Round Trade negotiations came into effect in 1995, where such changes
were made by the 1994 Understanding and more importantly, which involved merits
and demerits on a legal point of view. There has been clear developments on the part
of the Uruguay Round agreements in order to streamline the resolving of disputes
arising in international trade. Some of the changes made by the Uruguay Round
Agreement are namely, The establishment of the appellate body, The time limits for
resolving disputes, Authorisation and adoption of reports on the basis of negative
consensus, Composition of panels being regulated by specific time limits and the right
of publicist and specialist of trade law to be panellists. Taking into consideration these
changes that have been made since the inception of the 1994 Understanding, I would
analyse as to how these changes have effected the existing practice of contracting
parties to the WTO, specially taking into consideration that super-powers as well as
developing countries have to adhere with such legal regulations, and more importantly
considering the protectionist attitude of states which are parties to disputes. I would
also take into account the case law that has emanated from the WTO panels in asking
my self as to whether the WTO dispute settlement has been a improvement on the
prior GATT system with regard to the applicable law, adoption of reports and the new
appeal process, which is thought to be a merit of the new system, particularly taking
into account the protectionist attitude still existent among states.
One important fact I would deal with regard to the new WTO
system is the implementation of WTO panel reports. It is my belief that in considering
whether the WTO is a improvement on the previous GATT system, one has to look at,
First the Surveillance of the Implementation of recommendations and rulings and
other alternative arrangements, and Secondly the view held by the countries towards
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such a Dispute settlement system reports which require immediate implementation.
Therefore, I would deal with the effectiveness of the mechanism in respect of the
adherence of states to WTO panel implementation. I would deal with these facts in
order to clarify whether these practices negate any effectiveness such legal
improvements that have been made by Art.21 and Art.22 of the dispute settlement
mechanism. I believe that such improvements are worthless, unless proper provisions
are made for realistic implementation of panel reports, which involve major trading
blocks, and the economic & political protectionism that is existent among states, be it
developing or developed.
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4.1 The Basis of GATT/WTO initiation under the United Nations
Having discussed the other dispute settlement mechanisms with
regard to international trade and investment and the merits and demerits of these
mechanisms, I would follow on to concentrate on the origins of the GATT/WTO and
the ensuing jurisprudence of this mechanism within this chapter. The devastation of
World War II brought about a togetherness to resolve these problems. Hence the
inauguration of the UN and associated organisations, that was to be regulated by the
Charter that was accepted at the end of discussions at different conferences. As
economic depression had been a part of the devastation and a cause of World War 2,
the UN Charter provided for the improvement and liberalisation of economic
activities under the axis of Articles 1, 3 and 55-57. Thus the establishment of
specialised agencies to deal with economic liberalisation noted by Art.57. Hence
proposals were made to establish the ITO as the regulatory authority of trade
liberalisation. However, as I would emphasise, these proposals did not succeed as a
result of the inherent protectionism within the sponsoring states, in different sectors.
With the breakdown of negotiations to establish the ITO, as a result of protectionism,
discussions were initiated to develop the GATT as the regulatory authority of
international economic activities, via a succession of trade negotiating rounds.
Among the trade negotiating rounds, ending recently in Doha,
Qatar, was the Kennedy, Tokyo and Uruguay rounds which has made a large
difference to the liberalisation motives enumerated by the UN via Charter provisions.
These rounds have concentrated not only on the reduction of tariffs, non-tariff barriers
on trade, but also the liberalisation efforts in agriculture and services sectors
respectively, which have been to a greater extent been the sectors prone to restrictions
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imposed by individual states or economic blocks. While great efforts have been made
to stick to the liberalisation philosophy of the UN Charter, I would emphasise the fact
that this liberalisation philosophy has been qualified by the protectionist nature and
standing of states during these negotiating rounds. I hope to emphasise the fact that,
while there is a clear motive for trade liberalisation and clear evidence of such, such
efforts have not gone far enough as envisaged by the philosophy of the UN Charter,
and hence a philosophy of qualified liberalisation, based on the protection of self
interests.
4.1.1 Devastation of World War II: 
The Second World War had different implications for different
countries, be it economically or in its social standards. While it is argued that the war
had effected the United States beneficially in increasing its growth and commercial
output, it was the other side of the coin for some others. If one takes into account
some of the German controlled European countries, developing states and socialist
minded European states such as Italy; the economic effect was a disaster. In short, the
European economic situation, in general was far short of the economic prosperity
anticipated by the Hitler led war machine. Countries who had depended on
manufacturing industries were crippled as a result of a shortage of raw material and
manpower. Furthermore, these industries were further disabled by the fact that there
was no export market left as a result of the war. With regard to financial aid being
available for these industries via government loans, this avenue was rendered non-
existent as a result of governments facing budgetary deficits and a shortage of foreign
exchange reserves, compounded by high inflation levels. As Aldcroft notes, "as far as
the chief productive assets, labour and capital, are concerned, European losses and
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damage as a direct result of war were greater than in 1914-1918. 1 This synopsis was
more evident, when one takes into account the situation of European agriculture
industries in the aftermath of the war. Most of the Eastern European countries were
dependant on agriculture as a mode of export earnings, but were severely disrupted by
the war through damage to land, damage to livestock and equipment, as a result of
German occupation. While on the whole, the sharp fall in agriculture was not as badly
effected as manufacturing industries, it was nonetheless far from modest. While the
effect on agricultural industries in Western Europe was substantial, the real disruption
was caused to industries in Eastern Europe and occupied territories, where the
production was severely reduced. 2 While eastern countries were severely effected by
the war, this situation did not however exonerate other western states from destruction
of agricultural industries. France for example, experienced a near 50% reduction in
domestic production, and with it a reduction in national income, which amounted to
approximately 20%. It was a similar story in other western states, where the national
income was reduced as a result of the reduction in agricultural industries.3
This crippling effect on agricultural industries coupled with the
destruction of manufacturing industries saw a general reduction in the productive
capacity of European nations on a whole. This shortage in raw materials, food and
man-power was not only instrumental in the reduction of the overall productivity of
these nations, but was also a part of a larger problem. As a result of the devastation
caused by the war, the European nations were unable in the immediate aftermath to
reconstruct their shipping facilities, inland transport systems etc., which hampered
their ability to engage in international trade or to pay for imports, coupled with it's
inability to pay for these imports.4 Thus, one could say that in general Europe was in
shambles after World War II, be it economically or socially, where the inflation rates
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were increasing daily, public debts were increasing and international trade was at a
standstill. It is this fact in mind that the nations were brought forward to resolve
another crisis looming, where aid was needed to reconstruct Europe as a whole. Thus
one could safely say that historical escalations be it economic or social, has played its
part in bringing the nations together in negotiating international conventions to
resolve such disputes in the future. The most important of these mechanisms was the
United Nations and associated organisations, which arose as a result of the
devastation of the great depression and World War II. In the context of this research,
the important organisation to concentrate would be the International Trade
Organisation (ITO) and GATT, which was supposed to improve international trade
relations and avoid destruction in a trade environment. Thus I would turn my attention
to this aspect at present.
4.2 The United Nations and the protection of international trade: 
The origins of the United Nations could be dated back to the
historical attempts made by nations to construct an organisation that could harmonise
and protect the interests of nations who are willing to toe a peaceful path in
international relations. This is made clear by the fact that the main stimulus for the
construction of the UN arose as a result of a devastating depression and war, which
ruined interstate relations. However, at the same time anther ulterior motive in the
construction of the UN was the control of countries, which were identified as the
common foe to international peace. This was emphasised in the wording of the
Moscow declaration which announced that "...they recognise the necessity of
establishment at the earliest practicable date a general international organisation,
based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all peace loving states, and open to
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membership by all such states, large or small, for the maintenance of international
peace and security" 5, meaning that any 'rogue states' so to speak, should be restricted
in military or economic activity which would go against the ideals of international
peace brought about by allied nations. 6 Thus keeping with these ideals of international
peace, the major powers were further involved in negotiations in the US, at
Dumbarton Oaks, with the intention of developing a blueprint for the construction of
the United Nations. While the proposals to come out of the Dumbarton Oaks
conference was not the charter itself, it was a stepping stone for further discussion in
the future. According to the proposals, the purposes of the Organisation were as
follows: 1). To maintain international peace and security; 2) to develop friendly
relations among nations to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal
peace; 3) to achieve international co-operation in the solution of international
economic, social and other humanitarian problems, and 4) to afford a centre for
harmonising the action of nations in the achievement of these common ends. 7 It was
agreed at the Dumbarton Oaks conference that the new organisation would consist of
a general Assembly where all members would be represented.
Furthermore, there was also to be a Security Council, where the
major power brokers were to be represented, with the responsibility of peace and
security attached to such representation. This was a further emphasise on the control
that the sponsoring governments had on the establishment and running of the United
Nations. Furthermore, this control and power was intensified by the fact that, for the
first time in the history of international relations, a proposal was approved to place
armed forces at the disposal of the Security Council in its task of preventing war and
suppressing acts of aggression. 8 While the Proposals were initiated towards
determining the structure of the UN, the opportunity was also taken to make
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arrangements for the establishment of new specialised agencies, 9 which would deal
with international economic activity, under the patronage of the United Nations.
Nevertheless, the parties involved in the Dumbarton Oaks discussions were unable to
negotiate procedures for voting, which was left for the Yalta conference, which was a
thorny issue to be resolved between the major trading parties. Notwithstanding the
differences in thinking, the major parties of the US, Britain and the USSR, decided
that important decisions regarding enforcement measures should be taken
unanimously; which was with the keeping of the philosophy of the sponsors of the
United Nations, that minor issues of procedure and state disagreements should not be
a thorn in the attainment of international peace, security and economic prosperity.
President Roosevelt, in one of his final statements to congress, prior to his untimely
death emphasised this idealogy when he declared, "this time we shall not make the
mistake of waiting until the end of the war to set up the machinery of peace. This
time, as we fight together to get the war over quickly, we work together to keep it
from happening again."10
In keeping with this ideology, forty five nations were invited to
the San Francisco Conference, and the Conference itself invited a further four nations
to attend, bringing the pioneer nations of the United Nations to fifty, who gathered at
the city of the "Golden Gate." The emphasise of the San Francisco Conference, was
the preparation of the final Charter of the UN, which was signed on the 26 th of June,
1945, in order to give credence to the proposals enumerated at preceding conferences
called at Dumbarton Oaks, Tehran and Yalta. On a political front, the San Francisco
conference built on the proposals of the Dumbarton Oaks proposals, by agreeing on
the structural institutions of the United Nations. While the Conference agreed on the
proposed charter and the structural novelties of the United Nations, the two most
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important novelties of the United Nations system was the abandonment of the
unanimity principle and the protection of economic and social interests. While the
majority vote rule was of great significance in the political proximity of the United
Nations, in the context of the focus of this piece of research the most important aspect
of these novelties was the greater emphasise on economic and social objectives of the
UN enumerated in the Charter. 11 This was a direct result of the League being focused
on this field, that was taken forward by the ECOSOC, as a separate organ of the
United Nations.
It was within this context of this organ and its authority that the
specialised agencies worked, and was co-ordinated. But at the same time, the
activities of the ECOSOC was responsible to the General Assembly, and was to work
under the authority of the General Assembly. What this meant was that the ECOSOC
and the specialised agencies were to work within the jurisdiction provided to it by the
charter and according to the provisions of the charter dealing with economic activity.
Therefore, having concentrated on the gradual development of the UN on the basis of
protecting peace and security, I would concentrate on the basis of protection of
international trade and economic activity, as well as the promotion of such activities,
within that general mandate given to the United Nations.
4.2.1 Charter Provision relating to Economic & social Co-operation and Specialised
Agencies: 
Article 1 of the United Nations charter states that,
"The Purposes of the United Nations are:
To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take
effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace,
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and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to
bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and
international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations
which might lead to a breach of the peace" and,
Article 3 notes;
"To achieve international co-operation in solving international problems
of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and
encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without
distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion;"
The above mentioned two articles emphasises the nature of the
objectives of the UN, as a regulatory institution, where the ambitions are not only to
protect the world peace by controlling aggression by states such Germany in the
Second World War and more recently, Iraq in the Gulf war. The emphasise given to
the protection of economic and social interests represents the identification by the UN
of the destruction caused by World War II and previously the depression, as
mentioned above. Furthermore this ambition is given more credence by the fact that
such economic prosperity is supposed to be achieved by "international co-operation".
The interpretation to this could be twofold. First, that all countries are to be
represented as sovereign equals in international relations, meaning that non-justifiable
occupation and abuse of resources by one country of another is prohibited. Secondly
that these countries are restricted from objecting to any form of international relations
by the enforcement of trade barriers, keeping with the principle of trade liberalisation.
One could say that this was a direct response to the objectionable pre-war practices of
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the states who were more cautious and protectionist, with all justification, after the
devastation of the great depression of the 1920s-30s. While the first interpretation of
these objectives might seem political than economics based, the second strand of
thinking with regard to the protection of economic and trade rights is more emphatic
in the way that the UN has progressed in specifically identifying as worthy of
protection, given the fact that there is a political decision making fact that results in
such restrictive economic practices. This is clearly the case when one takes into
account the distinctive articles dealing directly with economic and social co-
operation.
4.2.2 Articles 55, 56 & 57 of the UN Charter: 
Article 55 of the UN Charter states;
"With a view to the creation of conditions of stability and well being
which are necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations based on
respect for the principle of equal rights and self determination of peoples, the United
Nations shall promote:
a) higher standards of living, full employment, and conditions of
economic and social progress and development;
b) solutions of international economic, social, health and related
problems; and international cultural and educational co-
operation..."
As with Art.3 mentioned above, Art.55 emphasises the need of
the United Nations being involved in the protection and promotion of economic and
social rights of peoples of the world order. While Art.3 noted the necessity of gaining
the co-operation of the world order in protecting these rights, as an ambition of the
157
United Nations; in contrast Art.55 notes that it would "promote" such protection. The
wording of this article could be given different interpretations, particularly if
promotion is construed to be the interference by the UN in domestic affairs of the
nations concerned, taking into regard the different positions taken by the parties to the
Charter on this particular issue. Leaving aside this issue for a moment; the objectives
of the article once again emphasises in detail, the necessity of protecting the
employment, international trade, finance, communications, transport facilities of the
nations concerned. 12 The importance of this article is further emphasised on a
developing country's point of view, by the fact that Art.55(c) notes that these
objectives are to be achieved with respect to and with observance of human rights
without discrimination "...as to race, sex, language, or religion." 13Thus it was within
the ambit of these limitations that any institution was to act, or any measure taken by
the parties were to operate.
Article 56 of the UN Charter notes;
"All Members pledge themselves to take joint and separate action in
co-operation with the Organization for the achievement of the purposes set forth in
Article 55"
As Goodrich notes, the procedure to be taken by the members to
confirm with the objectives are twofold. First, they are to take action, either
individually or by bilateral negotiation or convention, or secondly, they are to co-
operate with the appropriate organs of the UN, in satisfying the purposes in question.
As I had mentioned earlier, the United Nations, according to Art.55 is in a process of
"promoting" the mentioned objectives. Thus if the purpose of Art.56 is to make the
nations concerned obliged to take action in conformity with the provisions of the
158
article, one has to question as to what extent this provision would be taken in making
the countries concerned in taking the appropriate action, especially taking into
account the fact that the objective of the UN was to "promote", than "enforce" such
actions? Goodrich states that the co-operation with the UN organs "...does not mean
that recommendations of these organs become binding but it does obligate Members
to refrain from obstructionist acts and to co-operates in good faith in the achievement
of the purposes of Article 55 ."14 If this is the interpretation one is to offer with regard
to UN obligations, it could give way to further questions. First, one could question the
usefulness of such a interpretation, specially given the fact that it is these same
protectionists practices that the UN was to avoid, 15 and secondly, the usefulness and
the jurisdictional problems that the specialised agencies would face, given the fact
that there is the opportunity for these states to obstruct to the jurisdiction of these
agencies. Therefore, it is within these boundaries that Art.57 operated when it stated
that;
"The various specialized agencies, established by intergovernmental
agreement and having wide international responsibilities, as defined in their basic
instruments, in economic, social, cultural, educational, health, and related fields,
shall be brought into relationship with the United Nations in accordance with the
provisions of Art.63"
Thus the specialized agencies were autonomous and were
functional according to the needs of the area of protection, where the areas were
within the gambit of employment, economic and social arena. It was within this
context that I would focus on the International Trade Organization (ITO)/GATT,
where the area of protection was focused on international trade and investments.
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4.3 The ITO/GATT negotiations in the regulation of trade:
4.3.1 The negotiations for establishment of ITO:
Keeping with the provisions of Art.55 mentioned above, the
United Nations emphasised as one of its ambitions the promotion of "higher standards
of living, employment, and conditions of economic....progress and development".
While the establishment of other agencies for the promotion of employment and food
shortages and development had been covered; the establishment of a central agency
for the protection of trade and investment rights has had; one could say "a rocky ride"
from the beginning to the end of its negotiation period. On the 18 th of February 1946,
the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) decided to call an International
Conference on Trade and Employment "for the purpose of promoting the expansion
of production, exchange and consumption of goods" 16 and to draft a charter for an
International Trade Organization. While the ECOSOC was preparing a conference for
the drafting a charter for the ITO; the U.S. in a way, had already began negotiations
with the British in order for the establishment of the ITO. This was done through the
Washington Loan Agreement, where the parties agreed on certain financial and trade
preferences and restrictions. The results of these bilateral negotiations were
incorporated in a document titled the Proposals for expansion of World Trade and
Employment, as US plans for the establishment of the ITO." These plans were
presented to the Preparatory Committee, which was set up in order to oversee the
drafting of the convention.
It is said that these negotiations were a result of the different
strands in thinking, encouraged by the United States, at the time of proposing the
development of the Charter. The first strand of thinking was the emphasis on the
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reduction of tariffs, where the US Congress delegated the President with the power to
enter into reciprocal agreements to reduce tariffs. 18 The second strand of thinking was,
is said to be a part of the first strand of thinking. Jackson states that " The second
strand of thinking during the Second World War period stemmed from the view that
the mistakes concerning economic policy during the inter-war period (1920-1940)
were a major cause of the disasters that led to the Second World War." 19 Jackson
argues that states were persuaded by the economic instability and destruction of the
Great Depression and the Second World War, to take part in the establishment of
institutions to protect the economic interests of the states concerned. Thus the logical
assumption one would make is the expectancy that the states concerned in protecting
these rights would encourage the establishment of these institutions by its political
support at any stage or in form of enactment of legislation.
The Havana Conference in 1948 completed the draft ITO
charter. As I had mentioned earlier, the Charter was born of the Washington Loan
Agreement of 1945, but had its origins in two other documents, which emphasises the
agreement between the US and the U.K., which culminated in the ITO charter. 2° One
of these documents was the Atlantic Charter agreed upon nine years earlier, which
noted;
"They (the President of the US and the Prime Minister of the UK)
will endeavour, with due respect to their existing obligations, to further the enjoyment
by all States, great or small, victor or vanquished of access on equal terms to the
trade and to the raw materials of the world which are needed for their economic
prosperity."21
This was followed by other mechanisms of trade expansion such
as the US Lend-Lease agreements, between the U.S.-U.K. and the Soviet Union, the
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creation of the United Nations Relief Rehabilitation Administration(UNRRA) in July
of 1946 followed by other bilateral agreements between state parties. 22 The
cornerstone of these agreements and mechanisms running up to the ITO negotiations
was the co-operation in international trade. Thus the ECOSOC adopted a resolution
calling for an international conference on Trade and Employment to consider the
creation of the ITO. Thus a Preparatory Committee consisting of representatives from
19 countries was established for this purpose. At the same time, the US provided its
proposals for the ITO to the first of these meeting held in London. Thus the
Sponsoring parties to the ITO charter summoned four preparatory meetings in
London, New York, Geneva and Havana respectively in order to complete a draft
charter for the ITO. The main of these meetings was the one held in Geneva, where
the negotiations were "threefold", where the objectives were, a) the preparation of a
charter for the ITO, b) negotiation of a multilateral agreement to reduce tariffs and
finally drafting 'general' clauses for the regulation of obligations with regard to tariffs
in trade. As Jackson notes, "the second and third parts together, constitute the GATT-
the General Agreement on Tariff and Trade." 23 Thus it necessitated a commitment on
the part of the parties concerned, be it political as well as economical, in satisfactorily
achieving these objectives. Nonetheless, the proposed ITO failed to get off the ground
for reasons of protectionism, which had dominated international trade relations, which
has also been the case in most of the GATT/WTO rounds, as could be emphasised by
the prolonged negotiations on different areas of contention between the parties.
4.3.2 A brief outline of the key negotiation rounds undertaken by GATT states: 
The first key negotiating round undertaken was the Kennedy
round of negotiations, where the key issue of negotiations was based on the reduction
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of tariffs. At the same time, the parties were also concerned in the reduction of non-
tariff barriers imposed by the states or economic blocks on specific areas of concern.
This was specifically true of areas such as agriculture; which was subject to numerous
non-tariff barriers, and cause or trade friction. While decisions were taken by
Contracting Parties for the reduction of tariffs and non-tariff barriers in agricultural
products for example, the fact remained that the states were allowed to forward
exceptions lists to such liberalisation proposals, which meant that countries such as
France could continue with the imposition of such barriers. Unfortunately, the GATT
Agreement seemed to have been ignorant to this fact by allowing states to continue
with these practices, which was not rectified by the negotiations undertaken at the
Kennedy round of negotiations, thus leading to disputes arising between these
Contracting Parties. Furthermore, from a fairness and liberalisation viewpoint
advocated by the UN Charter; it seemed that the Kennedy round did not fully succeed
in its motives, particularly from a developing country perspective, considering the fact
that these nations had no other way of resolving such disputes which arose as a result
of these restrictive practices, apart from the negotiation and power based Art.22 & 23
provisions of the former GATT, which was not the motive of Art.55-57 of the UN
Charter. It was this kind of conditional liberalisation, which was a movement away
from the initial liberalisation motives, that was also evident during the Tokyo round of
trade negotiations held during the 1970s. Following on from the decision to reduce
tariffs; the major parties however were more concerned about the existing trade
systems of each other, particularly the Common Economic Tariff & Common
Agricultural Policy of the EC and the Tariff systems of the US. To the credit of the
round of negotiations, in order to facilitate the liberalisation process, the Contracting
Parties decided to agree on 9 special agreements and 4 "Understandings" dealing with
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non-tariff barriers. Keeping with ideals of liberalisation, these codes were focused on
the reduction of these barriers and the initiation of dispute settlement mechanisms for
each area of conflict. Notwithstanding these improvements made towards progressing
with the liberalisation plan, it was the situation with regard to subjects such as
agriculture which was cause for concern, especially as the Contracting Parties could
not agree on a non-tariff code for this area. Unfortunately, while the major
Contracting states disagreed on each others agricultural policies and restrictions; the
effect of there being no non-tariff code effected not only developed states, but also
developing nations, who based their economies on agricultural exportation. While the
Tokyo Declaration focused on the differential treatment for developing countries, as
part of the improvements made at these negotiations; the fact that the developed
nations were not agreeable to initiate a code for agricultural products, also questioned
the motives and the success of the Tokyo round as part of the liberalisation process
undertaken within the axis of the GATT.
While progress was made during the Kennedy and Tokyo rounds
to further liberalise international trade and services, it was also the case that these
initiatives were still restrictive and not to the level expected under the UN system.
This was certainly the case, given the fact that unless these restrictive practices were
eradicated, the situation arose, where the states were still to be involved in dispute
settlement under Art.22 provisions that favoured the economically powerful nations.
Hence, it was under these situations that the Uruguay round of negotiations was
undertaken. As the Ministerial Declaration noted "negotiations shall aim, by
appropriate methods, to reduce or, as appropriate, eliminate tariffs including the
reduction or elimination of high tariffs and tariff escalation. Emphasise shall be given
to the expansion of the scope of tariff concessions among all participants." 24 With this
164
mind, the bulk of the trade liberalisation rules and regulations are contained and
defined in four annexes attached to the GATT 1994. 25
 As it was understood, the
General Agreement and the whole package were to be accepted as an all or nothing
package and that the agreement must be accepted as a whole. To the merit of the
Uruguay Round results, it restricts the opportunity of states differing from the
obligations of trade liberalisation, as a result of this "whole package" of liberalisation
measures. As Demaret states "The Uruguay round puts to an end to the GATT 'a la
carte' which resulted from the Tokyo Round." 26
 However, as with keeping with the
previous negotiating rounds, exceptions to the liberalisation process was included in
certain agreements and some agreements were left as being optional for agreement.
Given the restrictive nature of trade practices, as evidenced by the disputes brought to
the attention of the DSM27, it was questionable whether these issues would be
satisfactorily completed during this round with the consensus of all parties concerned.
Strangely, it was the same area of agricultural products and the reduction of tariffs
and non-tariff measures which was the major concern of the states. This was even
made worse by the fact that exceptions were agreed to the side agreement which
concerned agriculture. Given the fact that different states were not agreeable to the
reduction of their respective protectionist positions on agricultural products, questions
even arose as to whether the negotiating round could be completed as a result of the
numerous breakdowns that occurred during this period of negotiations.28
Notwithstanding the fact that improvements have been made with regard to areas such
as Trade in Services and government procurement, which were identified as a areas
where market access and the regulations on service providers had been limited; the
fact remained that even these agreements were agreed with exceptions or loopholes
which allowed states to continue these restrictive practices.29
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The basis of the birth of the GATT/WTO was the eradication of
protectionism and the restriction of depressive effects as happened in the 1920s-30s.
The GATT, since 1947 and the WTO from 1995, has been the organisational
framework under which the liberalisation motives have been undertaken. However,
over the years and several negotiating rounds, it has been clear that the states involved
have been sceptical and protective towards their interests in these multilateral
negotiations. One such contentious issue of discussion has been the dispute settlement
mechanism, which was activating under Art.22 and Art.23 of GATT until 1994 and
the DSU since then. The law regulating the panel procedures, the time limits, the
implementation, surveillance has been the issue of negotiations over the recent years,
as a result of the restrictive or intruding natures of GATT panel reports on the
continuation of these anti-liberalisation practices. Certainly, this has been a debatable
issue over the multilateral negotiating round, as a result of different states envisaging
the dispute settlement as either being negotiation based or adjudicatory in nature or as
having direct effect or not in member states etc. Therefore, I would focus my attention
on the Dispute Settlement Mechanism of the GATT/WTO, with close attention on the
initial liberalisation motives of the United Nations and the GAT'T/WTO, to which the
Dispute Settlement mechanism gives or has the potential to give impetus, by
upholding the principles of liberalisation by negating any anti-liberalisation measures
or holding responsible states which practice such measures.
4.4 The GATT system prior to 1994 and its deficiencies
The GATT 1947 was based on consensus, and as such dispute
settlement, as specified by Art.22 & Art.23 was mainly based on conciliation and
negotiation, rather than adjudication, which would involve proper implementation and
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given primacy to a international agreement over national legislation. However, as a
result of the Dichotomy in philosophy with regard to the Dispute settlement on the
part of the US and states from the EC, the GATT system has been a compilation of
consultation and legal provision emphasising the dichotomy in thinking. Therefore
within the section of this Chapter I would deal with the provisions of Art.22 & Art.23
of GATT and the development of the GATT dispute settlement through the
Understandings of 1979 & 1989. Furthermore, I would also, however, emphasise the
deficiencies GATT system which resulted as a consequence of the above mentioned
dichotomy, which I believe resulted in the GATT system fading into disuse, and gave
birth to the new WTO dispute settlement mechanism.
4.4.1 Different philosophies and its nature towards GATT: 
4.4.1.1 Legalism Vs Pragmatism:
Different countries take a different perspective on dealing with
disputes that arise with its trading partners. According to analysis made by Young for
example "historically some countries, particularly the members of the European union
have preferred a more diplomatic, flexible or equitable approach to dispute resolution
in the context of GATT" 30, in contrast to the litigious approach of the Americans.
Among the reasons given, one important reason for such apathy towards legalism on
the part of the EC is that, "the US is a federal state and the latter is a federation of
states", which has to "accommodate the different policies of all countries
concerned"31 , thus emphasising the concern for its individual policies. Hence, as Mora
notes "it has traditionally defended the non-adjudicative character of GAIT dispute
settlement and the need to resolve disputes through diplomatic techniques." 32
 As a
result the ideology surrounding the EC, historically has been one of negotiation and
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conciliation, rather than a "rule oriented" approach accepted by the US, where the
invocation of the GATT dispute settlement procedure is more regular. 33 This is
emphasised by the negotiations for individual topics at the Uruguay round of
negotiations. In one instance for example, early in the negotiations, the United States
proposed that a institution of binding arbitration be applied as a supplement to the
existing procedures of negotiation and conciliation, which according to the opinion of
the US delegation was for the resolution of "harder cases." 34
 Furthermore in another
instance with regard to time limits, the legalistic instincts of the US was emphasised
when it proposed a free hand for retaliation for the injured party in response to
intentional delays, without any form of negotiation or conciliation between parties to
resolve such delays.
The US has been a defender of a more legalistic
philosophy where the agreement is that "...rules and thus expectations will become
much clearer and more predictable if GATT dispute resolution is characterised by rule
based decisions rendered through an adjudicatory dispute resolution process." 35 This
perception on the part of the US has reflected the differences in the approach and the
respective legal systems. Among the reasons provided for the expectation of such a
legalistic dispute settlement procedure are namely, the litigious nature of the US
culture, and more importantly the power that Congress has on any trade decision that
is made by the executive , which has to be authorised by congress according to the
constitution.36
 However, as much as we are made to believe that this existing legalism
is the prime reason for the US accepting a judicial process, it is also my belief that
protectionism and protectionist attitudes have taken a large part in the decisions made
in the panel process being effective at national level. This fact is justified by the fact
that the United States Congress enacting the Trade Agreements Act of 1979, which
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was essentially to modify any local legislation in order to encapsulate the MTN
agreements of the Tokyo round. While the US accepted that such changes were made
in order to "amend existing law to provide means for effective use of the dispute
settlement processes agreed to in the MIN, and to reflect US determination to make
vigorous use of such processes" 37, in the same breadth, the US was not hesitant in
protecting, what it considered to be its sovereign right to the "enforcement of US
rights in matters beyond the GATT's authority." 38 Thus subjective authority was
provided to the President of the US to authorise action in order to enforce such rights
or to eliminate action of other states, when the US believed it to be against its
interests. 39 While one could argue that such a enactment of the 1979 Act was a one
off, such a argument was falsified by the continued legislation of the United States,
which was keen on protecting its sovereignty and international commerce. This was
emphasised by the enactment of the Omnibus Trade and competitiveness Act of
19884°, while the Uruguay Round of Negotiations were approaching the Mid-Term
Review, where the US was party to such negotiations. This piece of legislation not
only superimposed further regulations, but also seemed to clarify the subjective
meaning of unjustified and burdensome activities indicated under ss301 of the Trade
Agreements Act of 1979, hence justifying the argument that the US was interested in
protecting its interests, while at the same time being involved in trade negotiations.41
This act brought into action what was called the "super 301", where the focus was
mainly on foreign nation's treatment of US exports, while previously it was
concerned with foreign imports into the US. Furthermore, this act also gave more
discretion to the trade representative to designate the 'priority countries' and taking
action against them, emphasising the continuing protectionist attitude of the United
States:42
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As noted by many, GATT is based on economic consensus
between the contracting parties, rather than an obligation to comply with the legal
rules developed under the GATT dispute resolution procedure. Working with the tools
peculiar to their own profession, the GATT diplomats have developed a approach
towards law which attempts to reconcile, on their own terms the regulatory objectives
of a conventional legal system with the turbulent realities of international trade
affairs.43
 However, as noted by many a author a erosion of consensus with respect to
GATT obligations was seen in the late 1950s and 1960s, as a result of the dichotomy
between legalism and pragmatism; which was one important reason as to why the
GATT, at that point in time, became ineffective in resolving trade disputes. This was
clearly identified in the case of Cuban Restrictions on Textile Imports (US Vs Cuba),
where the US refused customary bilateral consultations and in addition asked for
immediate authority to retaliate, in contrast to the negotiating stance taken by the
other Contracting parties. 44 This negativity towards the GATT Dispute Settlement
Mechanism was directed mainly as a result of the differences in opinion on whether
the GATT legal obligations should be adhered or left in the hands of diplomats. As
seen in the Chicken war and the US- Export Subsidy on Tobacco(Malawi Vs US) 45 ,
the argument was in choosing a diplomatic settlement or complying with GATT legal
regulation. In the Tobacco case for example the US position as quoted stated that,
"The language of Art. 22 made it quite clear that the invocation of that article was not
a hostile procedure nor a litigious one; nevertheless, psychologically and politically it
could risk having the appearance and therefore might impair the objective of a
friendly and collective approach to problems of common concern to the international
trading community. "46
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Hence the advocacy of a legal approach on the basis of
protecting the status quo of trade relations, which was in contrast to the EC position of
diplomacy. As Hudec very correctly notes, this "confrontation syndrome" 47 had not
only derailed the progress of the GATT dispute settlement, but also emphasises the
fact that at the early stages of the GATT, the parties involved in the GATT were more
interested in protecting the domestic interest, rather than adhering to a single third
party judicial system. I believe, This was what the US was advocating in the case
mentioned above. But in advocating such a protectionist attitude the US believed that
taking a legalistic attitude was better than a diplomatic approach as accepted by the
EC. This attitude was clearly illustrated when a US delegate, speaking on both legal
and other kinds of violations had this to say, ".... There are many commitments in the
charter, some of them general, some of them specific. But if any of these commitments
are violated, there is only one sanction that can be applied. And that, in crudest
terms, is retaliation by another state... We have asked the nations of the world to
confer upon an international organisation the right to limit their power to retaliate.
We have sought to tame retaliation, to discipline it, to keep it within bounds. by
subjecting it to the restraints of international control, we have endeavoured to check
its spread and growth... "48
Thus emphasising firstly that the administration considers
the GATT as a rule imposing third party adjudication system and secondly the fact
that the United States has usually been the leading proponent of this legalistic view.
The desired effect is that the rules and obligations will be much clearer, if GATT
dispute settlement is governed by rule based decisions provided by an adjudicative
process°, coupled with sanctions imposed either unilaterally or as a result of
multilateral negotiations. However, notwithstanding the fact that the motive of the US
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in this respect was to add pressure necessary to obtain compliance with GATT rules,
and stop stronger parties from negotiating an unfair advantage, it is also right to say
that this has further enhanced the protectionist attitudes, as a result of the US trying to
enforce GATT through unilateral trade actions via ss.301 of the Trade Agreements
Act of 1979 or the Omnibus Act of 1988. The impact of the Unilateral nature of these
pieces of legislation is capped by the then director General of the GATT, when he
noted, that the amendments were "the single trade policy initiative which had most
galvanized the attention of the international trading community."50
In contrast, Europeans argue that rights and obligations of the
GATT, "...are the result of a delicate balance of economic interest reached after a
process, often lengthy and difficult, of negotiation. This delicate balance between
sovereign states cannot appropriately be dealt with in a formalized legal
framewore l and hence can only be devised by diplomacy. Different actions taken at
different points in time by the EC countries emphasises the diplomatic approach
preferred by the EC, which can be exemplified by to two facts. First the birth of the
EC and its practice of centralising its decision making to a single court, and secondly
the concern of these states of the campaign by developing countries for more
protection, which was a more "uncontemplated by, and decisively unsettling for the
original GATT."52 The EC was established under the Treaty of Rome which provided
a composite set of institutions to deal with trade issues which arose within the EC,
thereby reducing the involvement of these countries in the GATT dispute settlement.
The goal of the EC was to develop a common market policy rather than playing, what
I would call a "diplomatic mind game" with regards to international trade with the
other super powers, namely the United States. Hence the reduction in GATT activities
in the 1960s and early 1970s involving the EC could be attributed, as Murphy notes
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"...to the fear that GATT findings on the use of agricultural subsidies, if imposed upon
the EC, could entail serious reform of its policies." 53
 As if in confirmation of this fact,
as seen in the Oil Seeds case(US Vs US), the moment the subsidies were challenged
by the US, the EC resorted to diplomatic negotiation within the GATT framework in
order to protect its common market policies. This was the first priority of the EC,
notwithstanding the fact that it was a member of the GATT, emphasising also the
concern to continue with its protectionist policies. This apparent stance of the EC
states on the nature of GATT/WTO dispute settlement has been quite evident at
different stages of the negotiations where the delegation has opposed any legalistic
codification of the system on the basis that such codification would lead to "results
opposite to what we are all aiming at. „54
 Such objections have ranged from the early
1970s to the present, where at different negotiating rounds the EC had presented
proposals, which indicate its willingness as a economic block, to embrace negotiation
as a settlement procedure to international trade disputes, in contrast to a more legal
procedure. A prime example of the EC stance was exemplified with regard to
adoption of panel reports, where the EC proposed in 1988 that, in order to facilitate
the full consensus of the parties for the adoption of reports, which it supported, the
states involved should be given "political” disincentives to obstruct adoption. What
this meant was that negotiation and mediation should be given precedence at political
level in order to resolve disputes and "thrash out" these "political" incentives or
disincentives, which provides the necessary consensus for adoption. It is this
dichotomy that evidently had a effect on the GATT dispute settlement mechanism,
which is proven by the volume of cases that was brought to the attention of the panel
process. Therefore within the proceeding section I would deal with the Pre-1994
GATT dispute settlement mechanism, and its deficiencies, taking into consideration
173
the above mentioned philosophical dichotomy, towards protecting trade liberalisation
against protectionism.
4.4.2 Dispute Resolution in the GATT: 
As noted by the Director General of the GATT, the general
nature of the GATT, "...is a multilateral treaty that lays down rules, accepted by over
120 states, for the conduct of international trade relations. GATT has been the main
forum for the liberalisation of trade barriers and for the settlement of trade
disputes. "55
Hence one could deduce from this fact that the GATT
disputes settlement procedure, whatever form it takes needs to satisfy specified goals
in order to satisfy or rather achieve the goal of trade liberalisation. As Davey notes
two goals take centre stage if the dispute settlement mechanism is to achieve the
GATT goals. First, it has to resolve disputes where one party alleges that another has
violated the provisions of the General agreement by practising protectionist practices
and secondly, it has to compel compliance of such obligations by the parties
concerned. 56
 This is confirmed by Malinverni when he states that, "..with regard to
international economic organisations that the primary objective of dispute settlement
procedure is not to decide who is right and who is wrong, or to determine a states
responsibility in the matter, but to proceed in such a way that even important
violations are only temporary and are terminated as quickly as possible. "57
While taking into consideration the above mentioned above
goals, I would proceed to deal with the pre 1994 GATT dispute settlement system as
follows.
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4.2.2 Article 22 & 23 of GATT:
GATT became engaged in the activities of dispute settlement
almost as soon as it opened its doors. However as correctly mentioned by Mora, "A
primary problem...is there exists no official definition of a GATT dispute or a GATT
dispute settlement procedure" 58 rather such a dispute and settlement of such a dispute
was covered by Art.22 and Art.23 which provides for a procedure of "sympathetic
consideration" and "consultation"59 by the Contracting Parties in order to resolve such
"nullification" or "impairment" of GATT obligations. The whole purpose of the
former GATT process was to get the parties with grievance together, in order to deal
with their individual grievance, in relation to international trade. The process was
wholly diplomatic/politics based, which was in contrast to adjudication of the ICJ.
This I believe has been the basis on which the GATT dispute settlement has been
practised, in accordance with the above mentioned dichotomy of philosophy of the
major trading blocks.
Third party adjudication in the GAIT on the other hand, was
not its greatest trade mark. In reality it did not mention adjudication by panels, rather
it was based on rather weak procedures for conflict resolution, and Art.22 & Art.23
was an indication of such persistence with conciliation and consultation. According to
Art.25(4) of the GATT agreement, "...Except as otherwise provided for in this
agreement, decisions of the Contracting Parties shall be taken by a majority of the
votes cast." 60 This provision presumably covers Art.22 & Art.23 above mentioned.
However, notwithstanding the original letter of the agreement, as noted by Davey,
consensus has been the overriding principle in GATT practice since its inception until
the adoption of the Uruguay round text 61 , which confirms the procedure provided to
for by Art.22 & Art.23.
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4.2.2.1.0peration of Article 22
Art.22 provides that,
"...Each Contracting Party shall accord sympathetic
consideration to, and shall afford adequate opportunity for consultation regarding
such representations as may be made by another contracting party with respect to any
matter affecting the operation of this agreement. The Contracting parties may at the
request of a Contracting party, consult with any contracting party or parties in
respect of any matter for which it has not been possible to find a satisfactory solution
through consultation under paragraph 1"
While important changes have been made to this first phase
where a complainant must inform the Director General of the GATT in case of any
consultation under Art.22, where the purpose is to allow the Director General to
notify all contracting parties and see if any one else wants to join in the consultation62,
which emphasises a point of due process; the emphasis on conciliation and
harmonisation of views is still very much present, though it is with minimal effect.63
4.4.2.2 Operation of Article 23:
Art.23 is the second phase of the two phase consultation
process explicitly provided for by the GATT 1947, in order to resolve disputes in
differing circumstances. The circumstances under which this article could be invoked
are threefold, and are as follows,
a) the failure of another Contracting party to carry out its obligations
under this agreement, or
b) the application by another Contracting parry of any measure,
whether or not it conflicts with the provisions of this agreement, or
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c) the existence of any other situation..."
As noted, Art.23 not only empowers Contracting parties to
deal with GATT infringements, but also with measures which are not in conflict with
GATT as "non-violation measures", which I believe to be in the realm of political
wrangling, which is in keeping with tradition of negotiation. Hence the scope of Art.
23 is extremely wide, and explains the functions that the drafters wanted it to fulfil,
which was interpreted by Pescatore to be, "...the central concept of the GATT dispute
settlement mechanism is not primarily violation of the General Agreement, or of
obligations assumed thereunder. It is curtailment in the broadest sense of the word, of
the benefits flowing from the agreement, or of the objectives pursued by the entire
agreement or by individual provisions of it."65
As noted by Vermulst, this statement was made by
Pescatore, even before the adoption of the Uruguay round text, and hence one has to
question the width of such non-violation impairment, especially if the objective of the
GATT is to "...restore, with the minimum interference with trade, the balance of
concessions and advantage between the parties in dispute." 66
 The concept of non-
violation impairment is not a easy one to deal with 67, especially as the GATT
agreement under Art.23 does not provide for a definition of what it calls "...the
existence of any other situation" 68, and secondly because it does not violate GAIT
provisions, hence bringing such provisions into the realm of political negotiations and
consultations, rather than adjudication. Furthermore, it also gives credence to the
wide concept of protectionism, which it seems is accepted as a norm which goes
against the ideals accepted by GATT. Hence, it seems then that the drafters wanted a
procedure of dispute settlement for claims of a judicial nature, that the GATT
agreement is being violated, thus satisfying the needs of the US, but also wanted a
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procedure for settling more general grievances, even in the absence of a violation,
which I presume to be by discussion, thereby satisfying the needs of the EC led
Pragmatists.
4.4.3 Development of the GATT and settlement process until 1994: 
Since conciliation and consultation as provided by Articles 22
and 23, was the basis of GATT dispute settlement, such a process developed through
culture and before 1952 as a result of such a basis, it had developed the practice of
referring legal disputes to working parties69
 who crucially were represented by the
principle interested parties on all sides to the dispute." Hence the target was gaining
agreement between the parties at all times. As Hudec notes, "...agreement was
critical. Without it, working parties could only report on the reasons for
disagreement." 71 This reflects the nature of the pre-Tokyo round dispute settlement
mechanism which was more of a third party adjudicatory mechanism, where the
parties agreed to discuss the disputed facts, which prompted some authors to note that,
"..GATT methods, particularly in its first decade, should be taken as a model of
conflict resolution"72 and correctly so, as working parties were never intended to
render decisions on legal issues. However on a political spectrum, this method of
conciliation was bound to fail, as being satisfactory from the point of both parties to
the conflict, because some parties, especially the US were more responsive to a
legally backed resolution system, where as others accepted diplomatic resolution of
disputes, as a result of protecting one's own interests.73
However, as a result of a upsurge in complaints brought to
the GATT74; at the seventh session in 1952, the change from 'working parties' to
'panels' was initiated, which works a present GATT dispute settlement. According to
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the Chairmen of the 7th session "...it had been agreed.. .to establish a panel to hear the
various complaints that might be referred to it by the Contracting parties during the
present session." 75
 The change made in 1952 was twofold. Firstly as noted by Hudec,
the members of the panel did not comprise any of the parties to the dispute, and
secondly it provided a sense of impartiality, specially as the panel had the opportunity
of deliberating on the dispute concerned and providing its decision in an report to the
Contracting parties. 76
 Furthermore, this situation was enhanced by the fact that the
secretariat of the GATT began to play a stronger role in selecting the members of a
panel, and as Hudec notes "Among the other observable differences, one of the most
striking was the tendency to 'legalize' things a bit more." 77 But then again in the
Sardines Case the chairmen of the panel in a reply to a complaint stated that the
"...success of the panel depended largely on the co-operation of the parties to the
dispute",78, thus emphasising the fact that notwithstanding the 'tendency to legalise',
the GATT dispute settlement would depend on the goodwill of the parties concerned,
and further emphasising the fact that there existed a tension within the closed doors of
the GATT between Contracting parties on whether the GATT should be legalised or
not.
4.4.3.1 Dispute settlement in the GATT since 1979:
Though the working party system was changed to a more
adjudicatory system of panels in 1952, as a result of the above mentioned
philosophical dichotomy and the consequences thereof, the GATT dispute settlement
was not widely utilised by the Contracting parties until the Tokyo round negotiations
codified the dispute settlement process through the 1979 Understanding. 79
 This
Understanding was further supplemented by the Non-Tariff barrier agreements which
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were negotiated with regards to specialists subject matters, that contained their own
dispute settlement procedures. This brought out a fragmented system of dispute
settlement in the Tokyo round, where in some cases the understanding was explicitly
applicable to the agreements and in others it was not. 80 The Non Tariff Barrier codes
contained either explicit or implicit provisions concerning dispute settlement.
Furthermore, the code regulations for dispute settlement were more in keeping with
the negotiation and conciliation provisions of Art.22 & Art.23. For example, the Anti
dumping code and the Subsidies Code contains rules where the disputing parties are
to have consultations for a minimum of thirty days before requesting review by the
committee. If the matter is not resolved within 30 days, any of the parties could
request a panel. However, the dispute settlement process was fragmented to such an
extent that the Government Procurement Code does not allow such a right, but allows
a right for a panel only after three months from the request for consideration by the
committee. On the other hand, these procedures were totally different from the
procedures of the Bovine Meat Agreement, where no provision for panel procedures
were initiated. On the contrary, the only provision for settlement was to be "consistent
with the rules and principles of the GATT." 81 The Understanding, while of uncertain
legal status, basically confirmed and refined the customary practices that had
developed during the prior two decades. First and foremost the Understanding
confirms the consultation and conciliation provisions of the GATT 1947, when it
obliges the parties to "undertake to respond to request for consultations promptly."82
Though it seems that the Understanding is more inclined to the diplomatic approach
accepted by the EC led countries, such fears were eradicated to a certain extent when
the procedure provided for by the Understanding granted a legal right to the parties
concerned with respect to the request for and the establishment of a panel. Under
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Art. 10, "It is agreed that if a contracting party invoking Article 23:2 requests the
establishment of a panel to assist the CONTRACTING PARTIES would decide on its
establishment in accordance with standing practice",
thus reaffirming the 'right to have a panel' instituted in
order to refer such complaints to the Contracting Parties, which was a improvement
on the Art.22 & Art.23 procedures of the 1947 GATT. This right has to be taken
account of by the Contracting parties, and a panel of 'preferable governmental'
members should be approved, and more importantly as required by the Understanding
such a; "....panel should be constituted as promptly as possible and normally not later
than thirty days from the decisions by the CONTRACTING PARTIES." 83 The
improvements made on Art.23 by the Understanding at this point are twofold. First,
by emphasising that the members of the panel are to governmenta1 84 and furthermore
by stating categorically that that "...it is understood that citizens of countries whose
governments are parties to the dispute would not be members of the panel concerned
with that dispute", the Understanding emphasises the fact that it appreciates
impartiality and fairness and it is further inclined towards a adjudication process.
Secondly another improvement on the 1947 GATT, on the part of the Understanding
is the fact that it requests for a set time limit on the establishment of the panel, which
one could imagine is to reduce the inordinate delays created in such constitution of
panels. Furthermore to facilitate such a motive the Understanding requires that
the "...Director-General should maintain an informal indicative list of governmental
and non-governmental persons qualified in the fields of trade relations. ,,85 thereby
reducing the opportunity for disputing parties to give an excuse of not being able to
find a suitable person to represent their interests in such a dispute.
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The panel which is constituted on the approval of the
Contracting Parties would make an "..objective assessment of the facts of the case and
the applicability of the conformity with the general agreement"86, and would issue a
report which has to be adopted by consensus by the Contracting Parties "within a
reasonable time period."87 While emphasising the time factor with regard to the
adoption of the panel report, one other important factor which facilitated the
customary practice of Art.22 & Art.23 is the necessity of `consensus' 88, according to
which the council adopts panel reports. As Noted by Pescatore "consensus comes
close to unanimity or mutual agreement; but it is not simply unanimity. It is rather, a
state of non-objection, a resigned let-it-go." 89As one could appreciate, Art.23 or for
that matter, the Understanding, does not provide for a definition of what 'consensus'
should be. Therefore, if one is to accept what Pescatore notes as a 'non-objection' as
being consensus, then it is right in my opinion to state that the Understanding had
resorted to a diplomatic approach, while making advances in the legal sphere, thus
emphasising the different philosophies adopted by the US & the EC, which is in both
instances based on the protection of their local interests. The reports of the panels,
adopted by the Contracting Parties, will be given prompt consideration and
recommendations made will be kept under surveillance by the Contracting Parties,
until suitable efforts are made to remedy the situation that brought about the
complaint. According to Art.22 of the Understanding, in case of recommendation not
being implemented, "...the contracting party bringing the case may ask the
CONTRACTING PARTIES to make suitable efforts with a view to finding an appropriate
solution"90 , thus highlighting, what Beal calls, the question of "GATT being a
contractual arrangement among the Contracting Parties, working on the basis of
consensus."91 The ambiguity of the effectiveness of the consensus or "non-objection"
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provisions were such that, these provisions and the amendments were made the topics
of discussion at post-Tokyo round council meetings, where the states voiced there
concern of the conciliation, consensus and implementation provisions of the GATT
provisions and the Understanding of 1979. While the US and other nations including
developing nations promoted further surveillance and review provisions, the EC
warned against a legalistic approach, emphasising its preference for a more diplomatic
approach. According to the EC delegation, at that point in time, the concern was
"whether the understanding was not being used for purposes other than those
intended"92, which was a result of the ambiguous final drafting and the practice under
the Understanding of 1979. Unfortunately, the fact remained that ironically it was
these same concerns that the EC states had in utilising diplomatic approaches rather
than legal ones.93
Having had a insight into the dispute settlement procedures
which is governed by Art.22 & Art.23 of GATT and the Understanding of 1979, it is
important in my opinion to identify the deficiencies of the Pre-Uruguay round system,
considering the fact that there existed a combination of political and legal nature to
this system, which arose as a result of the above mentioned dichotomy, and the state's
concern for protecting one's economic and political interests. Hence in the proceeding
section I would try to deal with, what I see as deficiencies that existed in the GATT
dispute settlement mechanism, as a result of this existing protectionism.
4.4.4 Deficiencies of the GATT Dispute Settlement Mechanism: 
One of the changes made from the pre-1979 scenario in case of
dispute settlement procedures, was changing the composition of the panel to three
members. The last example of a five member panel goes back to 1981. The reasons
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for such a three member panel system is that it provides a easier balance, and more
importantly as Pescatore notes, "...three member groups quite naturally work for
mutual understanding, for consensus and for compromise." 94 However, one has to
quarry as to why the above mentioned statement by Pescatore should be the motive
given the fact that such panels are supposed to objectively examine the facts and
merits of the case? Is it the case that whatever objectivity there is, it is to be denied by
the consensus arrived at, as a result of political and protectionist pressures? As
mentioned by Pescatore, "...As a matter of record the reports of all three member
panels so far have been unanimous; there have been no dissenting opinion. There is
only one example of an individual opinion on record, and this relates to a five
member panel."95 Hence, as evidence has proved it to be, it is my opinion that there is
a truth in the fact that "..in assuming that role, the panel often is assisting the
negotiation in reference to the power positions of the disputing parties and not with
reference to the interpretation or application of an agreed upon existing rule" 96, and
further given credence to by the fact that in the GATT system the idea did not occur
that panel members should preferably be lawyers. This not only has given rise to a
more diplomatic oriented panel, but also as a result, as mentioned by Pescatore
provided for "...the poor legal quality of many of the older GATT panels."97
As seen with the problem of the composition of the panel,
another issue where problems arose was with regards to the consensus necessary in
order to establish a panel, as well as adopting a panel report. According to the 1979
Understanding, "....it is agreed that if a Contracting party invoking Article 23:2
requests the establishment of a panel to assist the Contracting Parties to deal with the
matter, the Contracting Parties would decide on its establishment in accordance with
standing practice. "98
184
The word 'requests' is of utmost importance, specially as it
gives a sense of a right to the party concerned in requesting a panel in order to resolve
the dispute. However, the problem is that such requests are usually taken by
consensus, hence negating the effectiveness of such a right. Though this issue is of
lesser importance, it exemplifies the debate that prevailed with regard to granting a
right to a panel, especially as countries who accepted a 'power oriented' approach
rejected such a right and furthermore as noted by Komuro, had the opportunity to
"...block the council decision to establish a panel. "99 Having said that, the most
controversial area where the consensus rule has applied is the adoption of panel
reports.
Panel reports were adopted by a consensus of the council
acting for the Contracting Parties. The fact that any of the contracting parties
including the parties to the dispute could block the adoption by the council of the
panel report has been the subject of frequent criticism. Consensus is not defined by
the GATT, and as mentioned by Komoro "...has been developed for political and
practical reasons; for example, to avoid voting. 	 The United States, followed by
Australia, New Zealand and Argentina supported and accepted a "consensus minus
two" approach, where the parties to the dispute are prevented from voting in council.
In contrast, Japan and the EC rejected such proposals to withdraw the disputant
parties from the process. The Japanese view was that the consensus rule binds the
parties to the decision and "as a result of their agreeing to or not obstructing the
adoption of the panel report, and thereafter it becomes no longer permissible by any
means for the parties to a dispute to deny or ignore the findings of the panel report in
seeking solution of the dispute." 101 On the other hand, the EC denied such a proposal
on the basis that the problem of obstruction arose as a result of competing concepts in
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who should be judge and jury of the process and who should participate in settlement
proceedings. Hence the EC suggested that adoption by consensus remain in practice,
but with added "political" disincentives to obstruct adoption, significantly justifying
Komuro's argument of political involvement and protectionism in dispute settlement.
Thus, it comes as no surprise to note that such obstructions to
implementation/adoption of GATT panel reports have figured around agricultural
subsidies and policies of other countries which would directly effect the national
production or trade practices of these larger economies. 102 Ironically, the fact that the
parties are volunteering to be parties to the panel process also emphasises on one
hand, the willingness of these nations to protect their policies, notwithstanding the
agreement to a WTO panel process. As the Secretariat reported, between 1979-1986,
there were 29 dispute settlement panels established. Of the 24 panel reports submitted
to the council, five reports were not adopted due to disagreements with interpretation
of GATT provisions or opposition by the losing party, emphasising the restrictive
nature of the pre 1994 settlement procedures when faced with protectionist states.103
Having said that, not only did the obstruction of adoption of
panel reports reduce the effect of the GATT dispute settlement system, in a legal point
of view, but it also reduced the effectiveness of provisions which protected less
developed countries in theory as well as in practice, which I would detail in the
following. Given the fact that the US and the EC are more inclined to appease
protectionist attitudes in two different ways, one has to question the effect of such
provisions that exist in the Understanding itself, which gives priority to the protection
of less developed countries. 104 Under Art.24 of the Understanding , and I quote,
"Particular attention would be paid to developments which effect rights and
obligations under the GATT, to matters effecting the interests of less developed
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contracting parties", and further under paragraph 6(3) of the Annex to the
Understanding recognised the practice of appointing panellist from a developing
country to a dispute. But given the fact that there did not exists a legally binding force
to the recommendations provided by the panel; coupled with the fact that such reports
needed the consensus of the parties involved to be adopted, as Jackson notes "...the
parties are left basically to rely upon their respective 'power positions', tempered by
the good will and good faith of the more powerful party.
that there existed a practice by the developed world in obstructing the panel process,
one has to say that it was a high probability that the developing countries were not
protected as a result of the full consensus rule playing its part in such trade dispute
settlement, specially given the fact that EC countries preferred a negotiated settlement
through political discussion, which personally I think is a barrier in itself. One could
argue on statistical evidence that developing countries had a greater opportunity in the
GATT to bring cases against developed countries. 106 But then again given the amount
of cases being blocked either by the US or the EC, as a result of the consensus rule,
which involved developing countries; one has to accept that politics or rather
'political clout' rather than legal control played a major part in protecting developing
countries in GATT panel proceedings, as a result of protectionist attitudes of
economically powerful states or trading blocks.
Interpretative difficulties remained another problem of the
GATT dispute settlement based on Art.22 & Art.23. For instance paragraph 1 of Art.
23 provides in some ways another consultation procedure, which could duplicate
Art.22 with its requirements of "written representation" to be given "sympathetic
consideration". Jackson argues that there is no necessary connection between Art.22
and Art.23, and that each article stands alone, and further that Art.22 is not a pre-
"105 Therefore, given the fact
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requisite of Art.23. 1 °7 However, as mentioned above, given the fact that the wording
of the two articles are similar, it is quite possible for disputing parties to presume that
consultations under paragraph 1 of Art.22 will be fulfilling the conditions of
paragraph 1 of Art.23.
According to Art.23(1)(b)&(c), provision is made for
consultations, if the issue really is 'non-violation impairment'. However, Art.23 does
not provide a definition of what "...the application by another contracting party of
any measure, whether or not it conflicts with the provisions of this agreement", and
nor does it provide a definition of what "...the existence of any other situation" is
supposed to mean. The logical assumption that could be made of such "any other
situation" is that, disputes can be brought before the GATT in which, although the
affects on trade can be considerable, the trade aspects take second place to political
considerations. 1 °8 Not only does this emphasise the leeway provided for political
negotiations between Contracting Parties, but also provided interpretation problems
for the panel system. For example, how is one to identify whether it is for political
reasons that the restrictive trade action was taken? and secondly it also provided the
panel with the interpretation problem of corroborating "any other situation" 1 °9 with
the fact that the "members recognise that it serves to preserve the rights and
obligations of members under the covered agreements" 1 °, which are rights in relation
to international trade. Consequently the panels in a number of cases have restrained
itself from deciding whether the restrictive measure confirmed with GATT. For
example in one such case, as a result of the interpretative difficulties, the panel did not
discuss the question of whether a Greek tax levied on certain imported goods might
impair the effects of GATT, but rather restrained itself to the question of whether the
tax violated GATT. 111 On the other extreme, as in the Uruguayan Recourse case,I12
188
the panel, in a apparent acceptance of Art.23(1)(b)&(c) measurers concluded that
measurers of the kind described in the second half of Art.23 of GATT can only be
serious enough if they constitute "..impairment and nullification", which must
probably relate to the "...benefits accruing to the Contracting Party under the General
agreement". As a result, it remained possible, under the 1979 Understanding and
Article 23, to invoke GATT against measurers not strictly violating GATT, as in the
Oil Seeds case(EC vs US), where the panel held, "...The Contracting Parties have
decided that a finding of impairment does not authorise them to request the impairing
contracting party to remove a measure not inconsistent with the covered
agreement."113
But as noted by Jackson, as a result of the different
approaches taken by the Contracting Parties as to whether a policy will be under
scrutiny, it not only reflects the fact that governments often cannot predict what the
impact of their actions would be, but also the fact that they would face claims against
such policies. Furthermore the difficulties arising out of the interpretation problem
was emphasised by the panel in the same case, as noted by Jackson, "...The panel
further noted that changes in trade volumes result not only from government policies,
but also other factors, and that in most circumstances; it is not possible to determine
whether a decline in imports following a change in policies is attributed to that
change or to other factors."114
As a result, under paragraph (b) & (c) of Art.23(1) it was
not only difficult for a panel to decide on what was a action which breached the
agreement and what the "...existence of any other situation" was; but it was also
difficult for a party complaining under nullification and impairment to prove that
there was a adverse change in competition and such changes had resulted in a
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lowering of imports. Art.23(1)(b) & (c) situations had not only become "a bit
awkward in the GATT system of dispute settlement" I15, but also clearly showed that
there existed in the GATT a philosophy among some countries, that some provisions
of the GATT agreements should be interpreted by political negotiations, rather than
by a appellate body of panel members, emphasising the protectionist attitudes of
states.
The successful implementation of the aims of the GATT needed, as
above mentioned, the consensus of the parties involved. However as a result of the
dichotomy in philosophy and the protectionist attitude of states, with regard to the
path that GATT dispute settlement should proceed, not only brought about this
negotiating history in GATT proceedings, but also brought about the difficulties in
appeasing all parties involved, especially as there was a growing diversity in trade and
economic policy practised by different parties, which was more inclined towards
protective subjective interests. This was compounded by the fact that smaller parties
had to face the political prowess of major trading blocks, thus negating the possibility
of any retaliatory action being taken by these countries, rather than by consensual
negotiations, which was not in keeping with the aims of liberal trading. Therefore the
Uruguay round of trade negotiations were started in order to resolve the political and
legal uncertainties of the pre 1994 era of GATT dispute settlement.
4.5 The present WTO Dispute Settlement System and a analysis of specific legal
issues in the light of protectionism
As a result of systematic efforts made since 1979 at codifying
the dispute settlement mechanism of the GATT/WTO, the GATT "understanding"
came into force in the beginning of 1995. As noted by Pescatore one of the most
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important declarations made was that the "dispute settlement is a central element in
providing security and predictability in the multilateral trading system" 116, which I
believe encompassed the improvements suggested by the Leutwiler report, as a result
of the deficiencies of the former regime influenced by protectionist policy making.
However, having said that, under Art.3.1 of the WTO Understanding, it was
acknowledged that, "...Members affirm their adherence to the principle for the
management of disputes heretofore applied under Article. 22 & 23 of GATT 1947,
and the rules and procedures as further elaborated and modified herein",117
and specially given the fact that the pre 1994 system
was strewn with ambiguities and deficiencies as mentioned above, one had to
question as to why the WTO accepted the prior procedure of dispute settlement as
noted and corroborated by Art. 16.1 of the WTO agreement which stated, "Except as
otherwise provided for under this agreement or the multilateral agreements, the W7'0
shall be guided by the decisions, procedures and the customary practices followed by
the Contracting parties to GATT 1947 and the bodies established in the framework of
GATT 1947. 118
However, given the fact that that I had presented a brief
outline of the relevant procedures of the dispute settlement mechanism and secondly
the fact that the WTO has only slightly modified such a procedure, I do not intend to
provide a repetition of such stages. But it is this kind of presentation, as noted in
Art.3.1 & Art.16.1, that I would take into account when dealing with the innovative
procedures with respect to the initiation, panel procedure, adoption and appeal of
reports of the new WTO dispute settlement, specially given the fact that such
"...decisions, procedures and customary practices", based on the above mentioned
legal or political philosophy, led to the demise of the GATT procedure. Furthermore I
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would also analyse as to whether the rights of due process, legal representation and
disclosure of information have been protected by the innovative dispute settlement
process provided for by the WTO, in order to clarify whether the WTO is a
improvement on the prior GATT system. The mentioned philosophical dichotomy and
protectionism prevalent in the member countries, with respect to the WTO dispute
settlement mechanism will be taken into account in achieving such a goal.
4.5.1 Request for a Panel & Composition of a Panel: 
The WTO understanding reaffirms the right of parties to
request a panel, which according to Art.6.1; "...a complaining party so requests, a
panel shall be established, at least at the next meeting of the DSB following the one at
which the request was made; by negative consensus of the members of the DSB." 119 I
would deal later on with the question of negative consensus more, with regard to the
adoption of reports, as I see it as a major innovation of the WTO system. At the
present it is appropriate to concentrate on the establishment and the composition of
the panel. Before 1989, the establishment of a panel was sometimes delayed because
of the resistance of a respondent party to the dispute. Indeed, as Jackson states, there
was no clearly recognised right in GATT to have a panel established, though reforms
were proposed in 1989 via the Understanding. 120 However after the implementation of
the DSU, where the right of a complainant is clearly set out in Art.6.1 as mentioned
above, this void which prevailed under the GATT system has been rectified. One
important consequence of this innovation as noted by Komuro 121 , and which
prevented any obstructions in practice, was the fact that it protected the independence
of the DSB from the political vetoing power of the major trading blocks of the US,
EC and Japan, which was based on protection, thus providing a opportunity for a
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lesser economically powerful country to initiate a case. This was given emphasis by
the negotiating positions taken by the states during the Uruguay Round on this
particular issue
The composition of such established panels is specified by
Art.8 of the DSU 122, where the panel consist of usually three members, and it is said
that there is a "clear preference for three member panels, since they are 'easier to
balance' and 'difficult to have a majority and minority in a three member panel'."123
Such a motive for clarification is emphasised by the three conditions imposed on the
composition of panellist. First panellists are required to be "well qualified
governmental and/or non governmental individuals." Secondly, panellist are "selected
with a view to ensuring the independence of the members, a sufficiently diverse
background and a wide spectrum of experience", and finally panellists should not be
members of disputing parties unless agreed by such parties. 124 Moreover, having
allowed the parties to the dispute to decide on the panellists in order to facilitate such
a selection, if the parties are undecided, the Understanding requires the Secretariat to
"maintain an indicative list of governmental and non governmental individuals
possessing the qualifications... "125 However, one has to question the preference for
such 3 member panels, given the fact that larger contracting party's ability to
manipulate the decision making of such panels as a result of the superior economic
and political power these nations wield.
Previous to the WTO agreement, allegations have been made in
respect of bias on the part of panel members and the use of government officials as
panel members. As Jackson notes, in such cases of government officials being panel
members; "...In assuming that role, the panel often is assisting the negotiation in
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reference to the power positions of the disputing parties and not with reference to the
interpretation or application of an agreed-upon existing rule"126
and further some reports have been criticised on the grounds
that they were poorly reasoned or were opposed by contracting parties. The main
reason for such misdeeds has either been the bias composition of the panel or the
restricted knowledge on the subject criteria on the part of the individual panel
members. The impartiality and independence was thus even greater in the case of the
WTO. Therefore in order to complement the DSU of 1994, the Contracting parties,
spearheaded, surprisingly enough by the United States, adopted the Rules of Conduct
for the Understanding on the Rules and Procedures for the Settlement of Disputes in
1996. 127 As noted in paragraph 20-26 "...the ethical code was designed to complement
the operation of the DSU" 128, and as such paragraph 3 of Section II entitled "General
Principles" provides that, "..Panellists, Appellate body members and secretariat
officials would be required to take care in the performance of their duties during
dispute settlement proceedings to adhere to the rules of ethical conduct in order to
maintain their independence and avoid creation of potential conflicts of interest. The
WTO members would provide for the disqualification of any panellists, Appellate
body member or secretariat official committing a material violation of these rules"129
and this provision has been further facilitated by the fact that
obligations of self-disclosure and confidentiality obligations have been imposed on
the "covered parties", namely the panellists, Appellate body members and secretarial
officials. Nevertheless, having provided such obligations on panel members, one other
important provision of the Rules is that it notes that, "...these rules shall in no way
modifi, the rights and obligations of members under the DSU nor the rules and
procedures therein" 130 , thus emphasising the fact that the Contracting parties are
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prepared to ensure that more procedures are brought about to facilitate rather than
override the WTO and thus protect the impartiality of panel members. Hence, one
could safely say that the above mentioned conditions are not only more elaborate than
paragraph C2 of the 1989 decision as noted by Kohona, but also that this innovation
on the part of the WTO has to a certain extent eradicated bias 131 as well as providing
flexibility, speed and accuracy in the adoption process of panel reports by the DSI3.132
4.5.2 Operational Process of Panels & the protection of Due process:
Having provided rules and regulations on the institution
procedure of the panel, the Understanding also provides for the operational process of
the panels. As with the 1979 & 1989 Understandings, the panels are given the
responsibility of "making an objective assessment of the matter before it", and "make
such other findings as well as assist the DSB in making the recommendations
provided for in the covered agreements."133 More importantly the time frame for the
whole procedure 'from the composition of the panel", until the "..insuance of the final
report" is set as not to exceed six months, or three months in cases of urgency134,
which in a procedural sense has eradicated the opportunity of states continuing with
protectionist practices. In order to make such recommendations the panel is
empowered to seek information from any source and consult with any experts to
obtain their opinions on such matters; which is a clear extension of the Art.23
provisions of GATT.
As mentioned above, the General agreement, in order to
achieve its respective aims, set out rules which were to protect the independence of
the concessions and to protect the interest of trade of members. These included
obligations which would ensure "market access" and rights to be treated in a non
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discriminatory fashion. I35 Therefore in order to enjoy such rights and obligations, it
was necessary that the process of dispute resolution provide rights such as rights of
due process and rights of developing nations, which in my view is the accessibility to
remedies granted by the DSM. Therefore I would deal with the question as to whether
due process is provided in such a panel process, as a merit of this system, which I
believe is the basis of this panel process. First, in relation to due process, until the
1994 WTO understanding came into effect; when a complaint is brought to the
attention of the GATT council; the panel that heard the case received written and oral
statements and developed a reasoned conclusion from such statements. The onus of
proving a GATT violation rested with the complainant 136, and as Thomas notes
"complaints tended to take a 'scatter gun' approach when alleging GATT
violations.''137 Though it may seem that this is a unfair advantage over the respondent,
specially as Hudec notes, where the panel is overboard with a" cluster of undisputed
facts." In cases such as EC-Refunds on Exports of Sugar(EC vs US) I39, this
advantage has been eradicated somewhat by the two factors. First, the disputing
parties are given every opportunity to participate in the settlement process as
mentioned in Art. 16.3 and I quote; "...shall have the right to participate fully in the
consideration of the panel report by the DSB and their views shall be fully
recorded"140, and this has been further confirmed by the fact the panels are obliged to
consult with the parties regularly in making their decision and further the parties are
allowed to comment at the interim review stage. There have been fears as noted by
Komuro that such participation could influence the decisions made by the DSB, and
hence obstruct the negative consensus necessary for implementation or adoption.I41
However, having mentioned the fears of losing parties, from evidence available, I
believe it is right to say that there has not been a instance where such a situation has
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risen, specially taking into consideration Art.8 which necessitates a more legal
background to the reports, much to the credit of the 1994 Understanding. This is
further enhanced by the fact that third party interest are protected when such parties
have "a substantial interest in a matter before the panel." 142 This form of protection
not only provides a third party with the opportunity to deliver information which
could protect its interest, but also could be decisive in the decision taken by the panel
in a dispute at hand, as noted in the Thai cigarettes case(US vs Thailand) 143 , which
involved import restrictions maintained by the government of Thailand, specially if
the complainant is a major world trading block.
Secondly fairness in the panel process is assured to an extent
when one considers the question of burden of proof No provision in the WTO
agreement explicitly provides which party has the burden of proof in a dispute
settlement proceeding. As Steger identifies "...Indeed, the burden of proof may vary
depending upon which covered agreements govern a particular dispute." 144 Thus one
could at the outset that complainants in some cases could have an upper hand in a
panel process. However, in the case of United States-Measure Affecting imports of
Woven Wool Shirts and Blouses from India(US vs India) 145 , the Appellate body
addressed the question of Burden of proof. While appreciating the fact that the
covered agreement concerning that particular case had its own terms, the Appellate
body had this to say, ".. Consequently, a party claiming a violation of a provision of
the WTO agreement by another member must assert and prove its claim.... We agree
with the panel that it, therefore, was up to India to put forward evidence and legal
argument sufficient to demonstrate that the transitional action ....was inconsistent
with the obligations assumed by the US... ,,146
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Hence, one could argue that the new WTO Understanding
has protected fairness, with the providence of legal rules and regulations in order to
negate the advantage obtained by complaining parties, if such complaints to a panel
involves a "scatter gun approach." As mentioned, the process of law should involve a
full opportunity for both parties to be heard. 147
 Further, it has been stated by the
Permanent Court of Justice that such a right will not diminish, notwithstanding the
fact that the decision of the panel is supervisory 148, and this has further been enhanced
by the fact that WTO members accept the jurisdiction of the DSB as a compulsory
measure under Art.6.1, rather than being consensual. Therefore in accordance with
this fact Art.12.3 and Art.12.4 requires panels to provide sufficient time for the parties
to present their submissions. But the problem arises in respect of representation by
counsel of parties to the dispute at the panel procedure stage. One important part of
due process is the right to effective representation. But as was seen in the Banana
Panel case; where private lawyers who were advising some of the Caribbean
countries, and rightly noted ambassador Edwin Laurent of St.Lucia this "entrenches
the disadvantage of small countries in the WTO, which unlike the larger and more
powerful countries cannot afford to employ full time specialised legal counsel on a
permanent basis." 149 If this case stands, and it seems like it for the present, this will
mean that such countries will only be represented by laymen, who will have to
confront legal specialist of countries with legal "fire-power" to coin a phrase.
This is, as Palmeter emphasises, "hardly the hall mark of
due process." I5° It is quite ironic to note that, while the DSU directs the Secretariat to
assist all members in respect of dispute settlement at their request, and that the
secretariat instructed that a qualified legal expert from the WTO co-operation service
be available to countries when requested; that the panel ousted lawyers, when the US
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objected that they were not permanent government officials. 151 The absurdity of this
decision is even made worse when one considers the qualification test for members of
the panel itself, as mentioned in Art.8.1, where members could be non-governmental
or individuals who have published on trade law. In my view one could say, while
taking into consideration the practical absurdities, that the consistency and the
regulatory nature of the so called due process provisions with respect to the panel
procedure of the DSU has gone "out of the window." This is a fact that is justified if
one takes into consideration the US: Standards for Reformulated and Conventional
Gasoline Case(Venezuela Vs US) 152 , where the appellate body invited the private
attorneys into the session. Hence it will be interesting, as Palmeter notes, to see if the
Appellate body follows its precedents.
4.5.3 The applicable law of GATT/WTO: 
As I had mentioned earlier in this chapter with regard to pre-
1994 GATT dispute settlement, the basis of such dispute resolution was Art.22 and
Art.23 of GATT, which gave primacy to negotiated settlement in contrast to legal
obligations. Art.22 and Art.23 had required that parties undertake negotiation and
other peaceful settlement methods, which was in keeping with the "power oriented"
basis of settlement than a "rule oriented" approach envisaged among the parties
concerned. As Art.22 states,
"..The contracting parties may at the request of a Contracting
party, consult with any contracting party or parties in respect of any matter for which
it has not been possible to find a satisfactory solution through consultation under
paragraph]."
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It was this basis or "non-legal" basis that was to be reformulated
with the changes made by negotiations held at the Uruguay Round at Punta del Este
and the following DSU of 1994, which was to be more rule oriented. The legal basis
on which the GATT was to be interpreted was identified as the Vienna Convention of
1969, which provided the customary rules of interpretation of public international
law. 1 " Under the Vienna Convention of 1969, it was provisioned on how a given
treaty was to be interpreted by the parties involved in a dispute or a panel constituted
for the resolution of such disputes. As Art.31 notes,
"A Treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the
ordinary meaning to be given to the term of the treaty in their context and in the light
of its object and purpose..."
which meant that the covered agreement in question, which
was the subject of dispute, was to be the governing law, according to the Vienna
Convention. However, such a seemingly easy interpretation has been argued against
by some scholarly authority, where the argument is that international law is also to be
a part of the legal basis of WTO dispute settlement, meaning that the obligations
accepted, has to be interpreted as part of the wider international obligations accepted
by the parties. I would deal with the applicability of International law, when making a
comparison between the three institutions , in the next chapter, where arguments have
raged as to whether international law should be a part of the WTO or whether the
WTO should be a separate island of law unto itself. Such arguments will be
considered with an eye on the effect that protectionism would have on either proposed
argument. For the moment, the assumption is made that the panels are to take these
applicable international laws in the interpretation of these trade obligations. One could
say that according to this theory, the panel procedures are to be legal as a result of the
200
application of international law. However, such a interpretation has been qualified by
Art.32 of the 1969 Vienna Convention, where it is stated that,
" Recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation,
including the preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion,
in order to confirm the meaning resulting from the application of article 31, or to
determine the meaning when the interpretation according to article 31: a) leaves the
meaning ambiguous or obscure; b) or leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or
unreasonable"154
meaning that any negotiations and committee stages of these
negotiations could be taken into account if any provision is not clear, in order to
understand the motives of the provisions at issue, particularly, if the parties at dispute
had taken different positions on that aspect at negotiation leve1. 155 Given the fact that
panel reports of the GATT/WTO has persuasive value on present and future panels, it
would seem that the applicable law of the GATT/VVTO could also encompass these
negotiations at bilateral and committee level, if the panels decide to take into
consideration these negotiations.I56
However, considering the fact that the DSU of 1994 was supposed
to make several changes in the format of dispute settlement and procedures adopted
for such, one has to identify any foreseeable problems that would emerge as a result
of the applicable law being a combination of legalised procedures and negotiation. As
I had noted, Art.22 of the GATT was negotiation based, where the "power oriented"
approach was the key to settlement. It was this approach to dispute settlement that the
DSU of 1994 was to control, with the effect that it would give an equal opportunity
for both parties concerned. As has been advocated by some scholars, the applicable
law of the WTO is the covered agreement as well as the international law principles
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that would be applicable. The basis of this theory has been the fact that the WTO has
been developed as a part of the UN system, and hence the applicability of
international law to any dispute settlement methods developed under the axis of the
United Nations. The justification for the applicability of international law principles in
the panel procedures have been even found in the DSU 1994, where the scholars have
argued that the panels are to apply not only the covered agreement, but are also to
interpret these obligations in the light of more elaborate international law principles,
to which the disputing members are party to under accepted treaty law. But it would
seem that the DSU has not totally replaced this system, where it has persuaded the
parties to the DSU to confirm that they would agree to resolve such disputes in
accordance with the principles enunciated under Art.22 & 23 of GATT. This, it would
seem is the interpretation of Art.3 of the DSU when it states that,
"Members affirm their adherence to the principles for the
management of disputes heretofore applied under Articles XXII and XXIII of GATT
1947, and the rules and procedures as further elaborated and modified herein. "157
Given the fact that power oriented approach to dispute
settlement has had a protectionist element to resolving disputes, when these disputes
concern a economic superpower and a relatively weak economy, during the pre 1994
period of dispute resolution; one has to question the logic of providing that the new
procedures of dispute settlement is to be managed under the axis of Art.22 & Art.23
of the former GATT? Does this not take us back to the time when negotiations and
protracted negotiations had obstructed the adoption and implementation of panel
reports, when resolution was based on bilateral negotiations, specially considering the
fact that this provision is in stark contrast to the improvements that were to be made in
dispute settlement via the DSU 1994?
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This combination of negotiations and legal procedure is further
complicated by the fact that the panel reports under the new WTO regime are to be
considered as being persuasive rather than having a precedent value, which means
that the individual panels are to decide on facts on a given case in hand and are not
obliged to follow the reasoning of the panel reports in the past. As one panel noted in
a case concerning the European Community, "while taking careful note of the earlier
panel reports, the panel did not consider them relieved of the responsibility, under its
terms of reference, to carry out its own thorough examination on this important
point. "158
In noting this fact, the panel disagreed with the result of the 1980
panel process which dealt with the issue earlier. The fact that the previous panel
reports are persuasive rather than being a precedent is not lost to most panels in the
WTO, where panels have taken these previous reasoning into account, but have not
applied them in a common law sense. In some cases, the Appellate Body has even
gone far to note that the agreement to adopt a panel report between the Contracting
Parties, does not constitute agreement by the Contracting Parties on the legal
reasoning in that panel report, rather that the conclusions and the recommendations
bound the parties together. Thus subsequent panels did not feel legally bound by the
detail and reasoning of a previous panel report. 159 According to this Appellate Body
report, the Contracting Parties would not have intended that the decision to adopt
would constitute a definitive interpretation of the provisions of GATT. Thus it was
concluded in this case that panel reports adopted by the GATT Contracting Parties
and the WTO Dispute Settlement Body would not constitute "subsequent practice"
under the Vienna Convention. As it said, "In short, their character and their legal
status have not been changed by the coming into force of the WTO Agreement. "160
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While, it is clear that the panels are not willing to accept common law type
precedential law of previous panel reports, questions however, have to be asked
whether this also means that the panels are still prepared to resolve disputes according
to Art.22 negotiations, notwithstanding the fact that the immediate panel is to deal
with the case at hand, with reference to previous panel reports? .
Given the fact that the parties concerned in these disputes are
prone to minimise any effect that these reports have on their individual standing on a
contentious issue, one would have to question the benefits, if any, that the new
procedures have on the improvements of the WTO. The fact that the panels over the
years have been reluctant to take as precedent previous panel reports, it is my belief
that this has reduced the effect of panel reports to mere fact interpretation on a alleged
violation of a GATT/WTO provision. Unfortunately, this does not, in my opinion,
constitute an improvement on the pre 1994 position, because the obligations on the
parties and the standard of obligations remain the same, given the fact that negotiation
is given prominence, in contrast to legal obligation. The basis of law it would seem, in
the case of panel reports, is conditioned by the negotiating positions of the parties
which do not have precedent value, but which could waiver in their reasoning on a
case to case basis.
4.5.4 Adoption of Panel Recommendations & Appeal Process: 
If a panel finds a violation of the WTO on the part of the
respondent party, according to Art. 19 it shall recommend that the offending party
bring the measure into conformity with that agreement. However, the more important
innovation made by the present WTO is the fact that it has provided rules and
regulations for the adoption of such reports and the appeal process thereafter. 161 Such
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objectively assessed reports, as mentioned above, will be adopted by the DSB by
negative consensus, after it has been provided to parties at the interim review stage.
Here, the parties are given an opportunity to make arguments for the inclusion or
deletion of certain matters from the draft report, which goes against the thinking of in
particular, the EC where diplomacy is clearly advocated. 162 The report shall not be
considered for adoption by the DSB until twenty days after their circulation to the
WTO members. Such a circulated report will be adopted within sixty days after the
circulation. However, such an adoption is subject to appeal by either party to the
Appellate body. 163 If such an appeal is made to the appellate body, such a body is
required to provide a report to the DSB within sixty days of its initiation, and is
accepted by the parties to the dispute unconditionally. 164 The period from the
establishment of the panel until the consideration of the panel report for adoption
shall, in general, not exceed nine months, provided that the panel report is not
appealed, which again exemplifies the innovations that the negotiating parties
desired.165
However, such final decisions have not been plain sailing. As
emphasised earlier, different states have taken different view points on a more
legalistic approach which was in contrast to a more diplomatic approach coupled with
a review mechanism. Where as the US wanted a separate arbitration mechanism, the
EC reiterated support a negotiation mechanism with a arbitration procedure as a
supplement to existing procedures, with imposed deadlines for implementation of
panel reports, at the Mid-term review of 1988. On the other hand, developing nations
were more concerned of third party rights and how arbitration would assist such
rights. This is emphasised by the proposal of Mexico, which supported the institution
of separate arbitration as long as both parties agree and it would not abridge the rights
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of third parties, at the mid-year negotiations of 1988. These negotiations were further
taken forward to the 1988-89 Mid-Term Review, where the US proposals were for
consensual adoption, if not automatic adoption of panel reports within a specific
period. This was in contrast to the EC led proposal, where adoption of panel reports
by consensus was preferred as long as procedural safeguards were in place, which was
once again emphasis on the separation of thinking on the part of the United States and
the European Community nations. Notwithstanding these difficulties in decision
making, one prime instance of innovation on the part of the GATT/WTO dispute
settlement procedures was seen in this area, to which I would turn my attention at
present.
4.5.4.1 Negative Consensus at Adoption of Reports:
One of the most important innovations on the part of the
WTO was the negative consensus rules of the DSB. In the past, a issue which gave
cause to apprehension on the part of the member states, has been the ability of parties
to block or delay progress in the dispute resolution process at different stages, namely
the establishment of a panel, the adoption of a panel and Appellate body reports,
implementation of DSB rulings and authorisation of retaliation etc., mainly by
exploiting the requirement to secure certain decisions by positive consensus. As panel
reports became effective as decisions, only when approved by the GATT council, on a
one vote per country situations and the ministerial conference are required to
"continue the practice of decision-making by consensus followed under GATT 1947",
it was possible as Kohona states "....its use in certain major disputes to attract
considerable attention. "166 The attention that Kohona mentions, I presume to be the
political attention given towards the opportunity to obstruct any report that could be
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an interference to achieving its objectives. This was exemplified and was the case in
the Canned Fruit Case(EC vs US) 167 , where the European community, a powerful
participant in world politics as well as a main trading block, refused to permit
adoption of the report, and the US eventually agreed to withdraw the report from the
agenda of the GATT counci1. 168
 This was one instance among many where the
country being a major trading block had taken advantage of its veto power in
obstructing the adoption of a panel report, which was condemning its actions against
the spirit of the GATT/WTO agreement, and was keeping with the protectionist
attitudes prevalent.
Therefore, improvements have been made by the Uruguay
Round Understanding, which Pescatore calls "inverted consensus" 169
 as mentioned
above, where the various steps leading up to the authorisation of a remedy is deemed
to be adopted unless a decision to the contrary is taken by consensus. This is very
much utilised in the case of adoption of reports, where they may be set aside only by
consensus, which as Pescatore identifies "...really means that there must be a
unanimous decision to reject them."" However, one could argue that given the
political and economic domination of some trading blocks, it would be a
disadvantageous situation for other states to promote the adoption of reports, which
are contrary to the motives of the trading blocks such as the EC and the US. This is,
given the fact that these economic blocks, in particular the European Community, had
greater preference for the adoption of reports by full consensus of the parties
concerned, with added political disincentives not to obstruct adoption, as mentioned
above, which unfortunately gave more credence to the fact that some nations viewed
the settlement process as a political negotiation process with no legal teeth. But on the
other hand, as noted by Steger, one of the major new and encouraging trends has been
207
a greater involvement of smaller and developing countries in WTO disputes in a
broad range of areas such as trade related intellectual property, trade related
investment measures, which in the majority of cases involve the Quad countries.171
This negated the argument that political and economic power could discourage less
developing countries from using its voting power to adopt reports provided for by
panels. Therefore, one could say with satisfaction that the Negative consensus rule has
not only helped to reduce the political opportunism prevalent in the former GATT, but
also has provided greater incentive for lesser economically powerful countries to
challenge the multilateral trading violations created by the actions of the major trading
blocks, and to act against any prevalent protectionism.
4.5.4.2 Appeal Process:
The creation of an appellate body and procedures for the
review of panel decisions is one of the most emphatic innovations of the WTO dispute
settlement. The Appellate body will be established by the DSB to hear cases from the
panels, and furthermore Art.17 provides for the establishment, composition and
qualifications of the standing appellate body. As with the case of the DSB, the
members of the Appellate body are required to be ".. Persons of recognised authority,
with demonstrated expertise in law, international trade and the subject of the covered
agreements generally. They shall be unaffiliated with any government. The appellate
body membership shall be broadly representative of membership in the WT" 72 and
furthermore with the panel process, the appeal process is covered by Working
Proceduresm of the Appellate body drawn up by the members in consultation with
Chairmen of the DSB and director General, which specifies the time frames and
provides for the right of due process as noted above.
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As with other international procedures for dispute
resolution, an appeal to the Appellate body is "...limited to issues of law covered in
the panel report and legal interpretations developed by the panel." 174 As noted by
Petersmann 175, unlike the ICJ and ECJ, the Appellate Body has no competence to give
advisory opinions, rather an interpretation of the issues put forward for its competence
by the parties. This is emphasised by the DSU, which notes that the, "provisions of
the understanding are without prejudice to the rights of members to seek authoritative
interpretation of provisions of a covered agreement through decision making under
the WTO agreement or a covered agreement which is a Plurilateral Trade
Agreement. "176
However, this has given rise to a question of jurisdiction of
the Appellate Body and further a question of interpretation which I would prefer to
deal with at the present moment. As mentioned above, the DSU specifies the scope of
the Appellate body appeal process. However, as identified by McRea, the argument is
as to whether the Appellate Body should provide a single interpretation of the panel
report in question or whether "...there must be a recognition of the need for states to
have some flexibility in the implementation of their obligations" m , thus providing a
political flexibility in the application of such terms, and as a consequence falling prey
to the protectionist attitudes of states. Therefore the question is; How the Appellate
Body has perceived its role so far, given the fact that WTO was supposed to be more
legal in nature rather than fall in to the clutches of politics? In the Reformulated
Gasoline case(Venezuela Vs US) 178 , the Appellate body rejected the complaining
parties attempt to make arguments on a matter that had not been appealed. According
to the appellate body, the subject matter of the appeal was defined by the appellants
submission, and thus panel findings could not be appealed. Hence the Body restricted
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itself to Art. 17.2 of the DSU which states that it "...address each of the issues
raised... .during a appellate proceedings", and complied with the view of the US, that
the proceedings of the WTO should be more legal than political, particularly, when it
has concerned political policy making by states in certain circurnstances. 179 As
happened in the above mentioned Reformulated Gasoline case(Venezuela Vs US), the
Appellate Body stated that "W7'0 members have a large measure of autonomy to
determine their own policies on the environment, their environmental objectives and
the environmental legislation they enact and implement" 180
 , thus in McRea's view
reassuring the states of its insistence on dealing with the interpretation of facts
presented to the initial panel, rather than introducing new issues for appeal. But
having said that, it seems that the Appellate body has in some instances given primacy
to negotiation and consultation when it redeems it to be fair and necessary in the
circumstances. One such case was the US-Restrictions on imports of Cotton and
Manmade Fibre Underwear(Costa Rica Vs US), where the Appellate body reversed
the panel findings by emphasising the importance of consultations on the basis of
protecting due process and transparency where it noted that, "The requirement of
consultations is ....grounded on, among other things, due process considerations; that
requirement should be protected from erosion or attenuation by a treaty
interpreter.., the restraint is to be applied in the future, after the consultations, should
these prove fruitless and the proposed measures not withdrawn. The principle of
effectiveness in treaty interpretation sustains this implication. "181
Not only does the emphasises on consultations provide a cue
for states to use political sovereignty and having their own freedom to legislate, but
also gives leeway for these states to practice protectionist policies, as emphasised in
the EC- Importation and distribution of Banana case(EC vs US). 182 Hence, in the
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backdrop of all these statements made, one has to question the inconsistency of the
message given to the interested parties, which is inconclusive on the role of the
Appellate body. Is it going to be a Body with a final word on the legal interpretation
of the panel reports, or is it going to provide the Contracting Parties with the
necessary flexibility, in order to implement such obligation via discussion and
negotiation, which is the hall mark of states which are keen on protecting one's own
economic and political interests. 183 Until now it seems that the Appellate body has
taken a consistent view, with exception as mentioned. But in my view, this has
reduced the legal effectiveness of the improvements made by the WTO,
notwithstanding the that scholars such as McRea's view of the Appellate body
obligation is to "...adopt a less intrusive, more deferential standard of review" 184, if
one takes into consideration of cases such as the Banana(EC vs US) and FSC(EC vs
US) cases 185, where Appellate Review has not necessarily resulted in immediate
reaction.
This fact is further confirmed when one considers the
question most argued; namely that a panel report favouring a winning party could lead
to a running alone of the complaining party. This is the debate as to whether the
losing party to a panel report would face the unilateral retaliation of the winning
party. 186 However, it seems that the appellate body has been the innovation developed
by the WTO to protect such a losing party. According to Wang, the significance of the
mechanism lies clearly in the possibility to prevent the blocking of panel rights, or for
that matter, unilateral actions on the part of the winning party. 187 According to Wang,
not only will the parties have an opportunity to check panel reports for errors and
have an opportunity to support their position with regard to legal issues, but also the
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opportunity of reversing an adverse ruling. This is further confirmed when one takes
into consideration Art.17.3, as mentioned above and Art.17.4, which states that,
"..Only parties to the dispute, not third parties, may appeal a panel
report. third parties which have notified the DSB of a substantial
interest in the matter pursuant to paragraph 2 of Article 10 may
make written submissions to, and be given an opportunity to be
heard by, the Appellate Body. ,, 188
Hence the losing party would have the luxury of being heard
by a triple layer of procedural guarantee. This is specially further enhanced by the fact
that differential treatment is provided for monitoring a developing country that has
brought a dispute settlement case. 189 If one takes for example a trade dispute between
the US and Sri Lanka in relation with exports with textiles; in such a situation Sri
Lanka, being a developing country would benefit from the three phase appeal process
which will be a obstruction to the "run away "benefactor of the "negative consensus"
report of the DSB. The dispute settlement mechanism seems to establish within the
GATT for the first time a genuine system of enforceable rules and remedies
applicable, which is confirmed by the fact that the Understanding provides that the
membership shall be "...broadly representative of membership in the WTO" 190, thus
granting a important benefit to countries who have based their economies on, for
example agriculture; where it accounts for around 30% of the Gross domestic
product. 191 But, more importantly, if the violation is on the part of the major trading
blocks such as the EC, US and Japan, this innovation on the part of the WTO creates a
opportunity for developing countries who, as noted by Chaytor 192, believed they were
better off avoiding the dispute settlement process because they could not effectively
retaliate if the larger "loser" refused to comply with the outcome, or for that matter
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compel the loser to enforce such panel findings, which in most cases were not
enforced voluntarily, as a result of the protective attitude towards withdrawing illegal
trading restrictions. But the problem has arisen in several cases, where the flip-side to
this argument is when the winning party of a appeal had to request a further appeal or
bring another case to the attention of the panel procedure, where the initial
implementation has not been satisfactory, as emphasised in the Banana and FSC cases
between the European Community and the United States.
Therefore, given the fact that special mention is made of
developing countries, coupled with the above mentioned articles, it is true to say that
this is a merit of the new WTO system, with respect to the belief long held by the "old
GATT hands", namely the EC led countries, that it is better to have a flexible,
imperfect system that protects the major principles, than a system so disciplined that it
provokes violation and defiance. Nonetheless, one could identify a possible demerit in
relation to the Appellate body. The creation of an appellate body and of procedures
for review of panel decisions is identified as the most dramatic innovation in
GATT/WTO dispute settlement. Though the Appellate body has enhanced the panel
procedure under Art. 17.3 of the DSU, the immediate deficiency of the article in
respect of the organisation of the body identified. under Art.8.3, which concerns the
composition of panel, members states that "...citizens of members whose governments
are parties to the dispute or third parties.. ..shall not serve on a panel concerned with
that dispute, unless the parties to the dispute agree otherwise". But in contrast, Art.
17.3 only mentions as mentioned above, that Appellate body members must be
...unaffiliated with any government." Obviously, the downward effect of this
connotation is that there may be space for partiality on the part of the members, who,
though not on the pay list of the government which is a party to the dispute, might be
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citizens of that member state. Given the fact that there existed a difference in thinking
on the part of the nations on this issue, one has to say that there is some doubt as to
the clarification of the status of panellists on panels. For example, the European
Community suggested that individuals be selected from a list of non-governmental
experts possessing experience in law, economics and trade, whereas the United States
supported selection from a designated list of experts (governmental and non-
governmental). This is further compounded by the fact that the US delegation had
earlier accepted the fact and notion that governmental panellists are not perceived as
neutral arbitrators, resulting in attempts to block unfavourable decisions. 193 Therefore,
as Vermulst observes from a systematical viewpoint, the phrase "unaffiliated with any
government" would have to be interpreted in a broad manner, if one is to rule out
partiality194, thus introducing a another issue of interpretation. This not only would
involve more disputes among parties, but also would involve a phase of negotiation
and discussion among the WTO member states, which has been the underlying thread
that holds the WTO process together, notwithstanding a denial of such process on the
part of the United States.
As we have seen in the context of this chapter, the WTO,
since its inception in 1995 has done its utmost to develop legal criteria and procedures
in order to streamline the operation of dispute settlement between member states, thus
eradicating the deficiencies that was inherent in the pre 1994 GATT. However, as was
seen, notwithstanding the legal obligations and institutions created, such as
establishing a panel, negative consensus, the Appellate Body, via the DSU 1994, vital
legal obligations, such as due process, counsel representation, protection of
developing countries from panel bias, a satisfactory appeal process has not
sufficiently been addressed. The primary reason, as I see it, in such deficiencies in the
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present system, is how member states look upon the WTO dispute settlement system.
From evidence available it seems that the WTO dispute settlement system, while
catering such legal obligations, has also more importantly catered for the parties who
prefer negotiation and discussion, which in my view is unfair on smaller states who
are void of the economic or political capacity to argue its case, against developed state
protectionism. While I have discussed the new procedures developed by the WTO
with regard to dispute settlement; in my opinion, the barometer of determining
whether the WTO DSM is a improvement is to identify whether satisfactory measures
have been adopted to implement such panel findings and whether such
implementation is carried out by the major trading blocks, specially considering the
fact that they endear protectionism in a broader sense and different philosophies on
how dispute settlement should be conducted, with respect to the WTO Dispute
settlement mechanism. This aspect of the Dispute settlement process will be discussed
in the following section.
4.5.5 Implementation of recommendations and the effect of panel reports: 
Given the legal innovations made by the WTO Dispute
Settlement Mechanism since January of 1995, one could argue that the WTO is an
improvement on the prior GATT system. However, having noted the negative aspects
of such innovations, as a result of the dichotomy in the philosophical view of the
WTO held by the major trading blocks and state protectionism. I believe that one
however, has to question the provisions provided for implementation of such panel
recommendations. In this section of this chapter I would first deal with the new
provisions on implementation, which provide for a three step legal retaliation process,
and alternate provisions of compensation in case such retaliation is not feasible, and
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secondly as to whether such provisions are effective when considering the fact that
the different trade blocks accept the WTO provisions on the condition that it does not
effect their protectionist interests, which I believe would clarify whether the WTO
Dispute Settlement Mechanism is really a improvement on the GATT.
4.5.5.1 Implementation of Recommendations:
As noted by the Director General of the GATT, the most of
problems of GATT dispute settlement in recent years have been related to the post
panel phase of surveillance and compliance with the decision made by the DSB,
confirming the panel report. The Understanding of 1979 provides that, "... The
contracting parties shall keep under surveillance any matter on which they have made
recommendations or given rulings. If the Contracting Parties recommendations are
not implemented within a reasonable period of time, the contracting party bringing
the case may ask the Contracting Parties to make suitable efforts with a view to
finding an appropriate solution."195
The problem, as noted by Mora 196 was the fact that this
provision did not shed any light on what a reasonable time is for such compliance and
nor did it provide as to what measures could be taken by the Contracting Parties to
ensure such compliance, leaving the states with discretion to comply with panel
decisions, leaving the states with discretion to comply with panel decisions. This is
another instance, which under the old GATT system emphasised the necessity of
consensus in order to decide what a "reasonable time" is and more significantly what
measures are taken in accordance with the panel report, thus resorting to diplomatic
negotiation. However, according to Mora, in order to solve this problem the 1994
Understanding has included a "...comprehensive regulation of the measures that
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might assure compliance with decisions of the Contracting Parties. " 197 After a report
is adopted, the DSB will oversee the implementation of the recommendations made
by the panel. 198 The mentioned article requires for prompt compliance of such
recommendations by the losing party, and further that the losing party notify the DSB
of its decisions in respect of implementation at a DSB meeting within thirty days of
the adoption of the panel report. 199 However, unless it is possible to comply
immediately, the text provides specific alternative approaches to be adopted for
implementation within a "reasonable period of time." Unlike the previous regime
which was governed by the above mentioned Art.22 of the 1979 Understanding,
where the reasonable time was a mutual decision taken by the parties, under no
supervision of the GATT and left a panel report in "legal limbo" 200, Art.21.3 provides
three options for implementing a recommendation within a "reasonable period of
time". In contrast to prior practice, the determination of "reasonable period" is subject
to approval by the DSB and as Kohona notes, "...the time taken between the
establishment of a panel to the determination of a reasonable period of time for the
implementation of its report under paragraph 21.3 shall not exceed fifteen
months"201 , which one could argue, is a conformation of the time limits under which
the WTO operates; and reduces the opportunity for obstruction202, and further reduces
the necessity for the force of "moral and sometimes political pressure" 203 , for such
compliance. This is confirmed by the fact that the issue of implementation is
automatically placed on the DSB agenda after the end of the six month period of time,
on the basis of negative consensus, until such a obligation is complied with. 204 It may
be argued that the understanding does not provide for a further period after the six
month period, and thus could be open to abuse by a party who has not complied with
such an obligation. But unlike the above mentioned situation, it seems that the WTO,
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to its merit has negated such obstructions to the adoption and implementation of panel
reports by requesting a negative consensus, which reinforces the obligation to comply.
But the first question which arises is; what the situation would be, if the local
legislation is against the recognition of WTO reports as part of the national law or the
implemented legislation is not in line with the obligations accepted under the WTO,
hence obstructing to quick implementation?
If one takes the US situation for example, one could identify
a move towards the restriction of the effect that WTO panel reports have on the
national economic activities. The question in the United States, with respect to
international agreements has been, whether such agreements are self-executing in the
US as a part of the law of the land or whether these agreements are subject to
legislation for implementation. The judiciary has concluded in most cases that
international agreements are a part of the law of the land, and thus self-executing,
unless there is an intention that should not be the case.205 The courts in the US have
tended to utilise criteria such as the language of the agreement, the class of the
agreement, its history, its purpose etc., in deciding whether such a agreement is to be
self executing or not. According to Leebron, the GATT/WTO agreements are not self-
executing; but an executive, non-binding agreement. Leebron argues that the present
legislation provides for non-self execution of GATT/WTO provisions, as with the
Trade Agreements Act of 1979, which made it clear that the executive agreements are
non-self executing. 206 Hence, the URAA was initiated in making the corresponding
changes that was necessary in local US law in compliance with the Uruguay Round
Agreements. These changes included confirming United States law to prior adverse
findings by GATT dispute settlement panels. But the implementation of these
agreements were not clear cut, as a result of the obstruction and reservations that the
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Congress has had on some of these provisions, when it believed that these provisions
were intrusive. The limitations and conditions under which these provisions were to
be implemented have been immense, where these have mostly concerned
protectionism in a broader sense, and not merely concerned with economic facts. It
would seem that the legislation that deals with the implementation of the Uruguay
Round agreements in the United States has confirmed this, when it provides that "no
provision of any of the UR agreements, nor the application of any such provision to
any person or circumstances that is inconsistent with any law of the US shall have
effect."207 Thus emphasising the supremacy of Congress and the sovereign rights of
the state. The restrictive nature of this implementing legislation is further emphasised
by the fact that the act provides higher authority for local legislation of the US in
comparison to WTO "law", which deals with the protection of certain areas of
concern and unilateral action initiated by the USTR. 208 Thus, the effect of this
position is that judicial action cannot be brought directly against the US to invalidate
these Federal laws, which the other party believes is against the norms of trade
liberalisation. Only Congress is allowed to act in these circumstances, in order to
change such alleged federal laws, which are deemed contradictory to GATT/WTO
provisions.
Similar situations have also arisen in other states over the effect
that panel reports or the WTO agreements would have in local jurisdictions, as a
result of disputes being brought to the DSB under the DSU of 1994. While in some
states, as in Brazil, there exists debate and a acceptance of the fact that judicial
interpretation is necessary in the implementation of WTO panel reports, in others, the
courts have invalidated the application of GATT panel reports as a result of the
dubious nature given to international treaty law under local Constitutions. In Japan for
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example, the constitution provides that treaties and established laws of nations "shall
be faithfully observed."209
 Notwithstanding the fact that it does not specify the rank
that international law holds in the Japanese legal order, it is clearly agreed that
international treaties have a higher ranking over statutes. However, at the same time,
the recognised theory in the Japanese legal order is that the Constitution has
supremacy over some treaties agreed upon by the government, particularly ones with
respect to "bilateral political or economic treaties"21° meaning, that the effect of such
treaties are in the hands of the local courts for judicial interpretation. While, the effect
of international treaties is not questioned under the constitution, as Iwasawa notes,
"The status of resolutions of international organizations and judgements of
international courts in Japan is not clear."211 While one could argue that such
resolutions and reports are part of accepting the international treaty, it would seem
that the Japanese courts have not complied with such a theory, when concerned with
GATT/VVTO panel reports being used by the parties concerned as standard authority
in the interpretation of GATT/WTO agreements, notwithstanding the acceptance by
the Japanese government of panel reports as being binding and the agreement to adopt
such reports.212 While the Japanese government has adopted panel reports and have
changed alleged violation laws of WTO agreements, after long drawn negotiations
with the United States for example; the question is whether Japan would have
willingly complied with such reports, if not for the pressure by the US.213
 The
emphasis given to state sovereignty and protectionism is emphasised in the Banana
and FSC cases, where the state or economic block in question was reluctant to
legislate for the corrective laws.214 In these cases, the only option left for the winning
party was to bring further cases against the implemented legislation, arguing that such
legislation has failed to adhere to the ruling of the panel and failed to comply with
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accepted rules of liberalisation. Thus it is within this context of issues that one has to
consider the compensation and suspension of concessions provisions elaborated by
the DSU of 1994, which goes in tandem with the implementation provisions thereof.
4.5.5.2 Compensation & Suspension of Concessions:
In recent years, questions have been asked as to whether the
measures adopted by the Contracting Parties have been adequate; especially as noted
by Bradley, "..Implementation in some cases has been partial or has taken a very
long time."215 This was confirmed by the Director General of the GATT, when he
noted that the GATT faced an, "increasing problem of conditional and incomplete
implementation of panel reports", and in my opinion this is a result of the original
GATT provisions as well as the Understandings prior to 1994 not including
compensation or suspension of concessions provisions in case of non-implementation
of recommendations, which realistically would amount to retaliation.
But, one of the salient features of the Understanding is the
express availability of compensation and suspension of concession provisions under
Art.22, which states that,
"Compensation and the suspension of concessions or other
obligations are temporary measures available in the event that the
recommendations and rulings are not implemented within a
reasonable period of time. However, neither compensation nor the
suspension of concessions or other obligations is preferred to full
implementation of a recommendation... ”216
which is ideal in cases as emphasised earlier, where states
have provided legislation, which would obstruct the fast implementation of panel
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reports or rulings. In contrast to implementation and compensation provisions, Art.
22.2 to 9 includes detailed rules for suspension of concessions, where the motive was
to reduces the opportunity for unilateral retaliation on the part of the major trading
blocks, which would, it seems protect the interest of other states in a lesser bargaining
position. Under Art.22.3, if a complaining party decides to request retaliation, three
principles are to be followed.
- First, retaliation should be in the same sector of the same agreement.
- Secondly, if this is not practicable, retaliation shall be in other sectors of the same
agreement.
- Finally if this process is impracticable, retaliation could be in another covered
Agreement,
This opportunity is thereby made a legal possibility, which has
hardly been invoked217 in GATT practice, which according to Mora "...creates a
regime of 'retaliation at request. 7"218 Nonetheless, I believe that this provision in
general has protected innocent parties, not parties to the original dispute; and further
provides a opportunity for other Contracting Parties to neutralise the scope of larger
trading parties to abuse this provision by providing that;
"....If the member concerned objects to the level of suspension
proposed or claims that the principles and procedures set forth in
paragraph 3 have not been followed where a complaining party has
requested authorisation to suspend concessions or other obligations
pursuant to paragraph 3(b) or (c), the matter shall be referred to
arbitration''219
which satisfies one of its main objectives, namely to restrict
the unfairness of 'self judgement', if the defendant party to the dispute abuses its
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council membership. Having said that, one has to question the appropriateness of this
provision from three different angles. First, with regard to the legalising of the
opportunity of retaliation; one would have to question the incentive this creates for
states such as the United States which has a history of unilateral retaliation as
emphasised by recent legislation and attitude towards dispute resolution in trade
relations. As we have witnessed, the US in particular has been very "trigger-happy" to
retaliate or suspend concessions in the past. Therefore, one has to question the
possibility of this trigger-happy nature being legislated for by the WTO in these
circumstances. Secondly, if one takes into account the motives in the initiation of
GATT/WTO, the emphasis was on the restriction of protectionist measures and
creating a fair ground for international trade relations. In contrast however, the WTO
has provided here an opportunity for states to take "tit for tat" action, even as a
temporary measure, as emphasised in the Banana and FSC cases. Thus, questions
have to be asked where the WTO is heading and whether the emphasise has changed
from being a peaceful settlement process to a purely legal procedure, particularly
when one considers the fact that retaliation in a broader sense provides a right for
protectionism, as a answer to protectionist action of the other party to the dispute.
Thirdly, Art.22(3)(d)(ii) provides that, in taking action for suspension of concessions,
the state needs to take into account the economic viability of such measures. If one
takes into account this provision from a developing country perspective, one could see
that this would have no positive effect on the ability of the developing country in
taking action, when faced with a opponent with a high economic supremacy,
particularly when most developing states are dependant on the exports sent to
developed nations. Therefore, one has to question whether this provision does actually
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redress the economic imbalance that was the ultimate goal of the new WTO dispute
settlement Understanding.
Conclusion:
As was seen within this chapter, the working of the GATT/World Trade
Organization is based on the "goodwill" of the participating Contracting Parties,
which is in keeping with the basis of the GATT/WTO, namely making a balance
between the consensus of states and state protectionism, that was the reason for the
creation of the whole United Nations system. However, as a result of the major
Contracting Parties taking different views on how the WTO and more importantly the
Dispute Settlement Mechanism should work, one could see the deterioration of such
consensus, hence the deficiencies of the pre 1994 GATT regime. While the reason for
such deterioration is consensus was partly as a result of states ideology on what the
WTO should be, a further reason for such deterioration resulted because states were
concerned in protecting their interests, hence their obstructions at GATT dispute
settlement.22° The states were keen on keeping the status quo, rather than being seen
as giving in to the demands of the other state at the dispute settlement forum, hence
the obstructions to the satisfactory completion of the GATT process.
But as emphasised, the WTO provided sufficient innovative
procedures in all areas to its merit, particularly with regard to issues such as the
adoption of panel reports, thus vindicating any argument to the effect that the World
Trade Organization Dispute Settlement Mechanism is a significant improvement on
the former regime, notwithstanding the protectionism that is still prevalent among
states. But as I have proved, such improvements have had its own deficiencies,
consequently negating any expected benefits of such a purported legal regime, mainly
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because there still exists interpretative difficulties with regard to issues such as
applicable law and existent reluctance of states in the enforcement of WTO awards.
Furthermore, notwithstanding the fact that the agreement has been ratified by the
Contracting Parties, the implementation of reports of the DSB has endured great
difficulties as a result of the prevailing dichotomy of views in the major trading
blocks towards the authority of panel reports over national trade policy, as
exemplified above, by the very recent cases involving the larger economically
dominant powers of the EC and the US. Hence it is my contention that, while the
WTO has provided a greater legal environment for the WTO Dispute Settlement
Mechanism; the "political cauldron" of negotiating and protectionist apathy toward
the WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism has reduced the effectiveness of such a
system with respect to key issues such as adoption of reports, applicable law, appeal
process and implementation of panel reports, which ultimately poses questions on it
effectiveness as a dispute settlement process. Thus, having discussed the present
WTO dispute settlement process, I would follow to make a comparative analysis of
the three institutions in the following chapter, with respect to the three key substantive
issues of jurisdiction, applicable law and enforcement, where state protectionism
seems to have a unwarranted effect.
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Chapter Five
Comparative analysis of ICJ, ICSID and WTO dispute settlement
from a protectionist viewpoint
Introduction
I would be making a comparative analysis of the above mentioned dispute settlement
mechanisms of the three institutions, with a consideration of the fact of how
protectionism or political protectionism has effected the workings of these
institutions. I would be dealing with the three different sectors namely, jurisdiction,
legal basis/applicable law and enforcement provisions on a comparative basis, taking
into account not only the protectionist attitudes of states towards dispute settlement,
but also taking account of the reasons why these arise and finally the fact that these
mechanisms are peaceful settlement mechanisms, which necessitates the consent of
states and restricts the opportunity of aggressive action. As I discussed in the previous
chapters, the relevant areas of substantive issues such as jurisdiction, applicable law
and enforcement provisions of the institutions of the ICJ, ICSID and WTO have been
agreed or consented to by the states and individuals concerned, with the motive to
protect their own individual interests, which has been mirrored by the consensual
nature of these provisions. Unfortunately, the consensual nature of these provisions
had to be balanced with the protective nature of states and the states attitudes towards
agreeing to dispute settlement, notwithstanding the fact that these states had agreed to
the dispute resolution process of the ICJ, icsrp and the WTO. Hence, the possibility
of protectionism affecting the initiation and the satisfactory completion of the process,
at different levels of intervention, which unfortunately is the initial reason for these
disputes to be brought to the attention of dispute settlement. Thus the balancing act
that these mechanisms have to carryout in providing a satisfactory solution acceptable
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to all parties concerned. As I had discussed in the previous chapters, this existent
protectionism, has affected the conclusion of these dispute settlement mechanisms at
different levels and at different situations, either in that the states have been unwilling
to accede to the jurisdiction of the mechanism or legislating for state sovereign laws,
which unfortunately contradict and obstruct to the enforcement of arbitration awards.
It is with this in mind that I would make a comparative analysis of these institutions
and the relevant sectors of dispute settlement.
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5.1 Jurisdiction:
One key issue which could be dealt with in making a comparison
between the dispute settlement mechanisms is the jurisdictional authority of these
institutions in dealing with a given dispute, and which parties could be considered as
being parties to a dispute. As with any international dispute, some are differentiated as
legal disputes, which relate to any rights and obligations legally recognised or
political decision making by the relevant state party. As was emphasised in chapter
one, disputes based on the arguments of the parties who believe that a right has been
breached or a obligation not complied with that has related to a consensual
convention, to which the states or individuals are parties to. Based on this
differentiation of legal and political disputes, different dispute settlement mechanisms
have chosen to deal with either legal or political disputes and give preference to
relevant parties as subjects of international law. As was discussed in chapter three, the
ICJ statute for example, notes that "in making recommendations under this article, the
Security Council should also take into consideration that legal disputes should as a
general rule be enforced by the parties to the ICJ in accordance with the provisions of
the courr i , where the assumption is that any dispute with legal and political fact
would be in the ambit of the Security Council. A further point made by the ICJ is the
fact that political facts relating to international trade and investment disputes should
be resolved by municipal law means, which in a sense makes the judicial objections
of the mechanisms questionable, considering the fact that these disputes could involve
political decision making or economic policy. 2
 Furthermore, the questionable nature
of this restriction of considering legal fact is given credence by the fact that the ICJ
recognises states as being the only subjects of public international law. When one
considers the fact that states do have the opportunity to adopt economic policy and
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legislate for such, on the protectionist basis, one would have to consider why
restrictions have been placed in only considering legal facts. This has been
particularly the case, when the ICJ has only dealt with the protection of aliens, which
also involves political and economic decision making, notwithstanding the fact that it
concerns a legal right of investors and traders of other states, within the axis of
peaceful dispute settlement, which has been influenced by protectionism. 3 The
questionable nature of limiting its jurisdiction to only legal fact and the ICJ's
reluctance to get involved in international trade issues, when the case is brought to its
attention by the parties, have been emphasised and justified by the recognition of the
fact that these disputes involve political factors and thus the competence of local
jurisdictions.4 As we have witnessed in chapter two, states have generally been
protective when it involves state policy. The ICJ, notwithstanding the fact it is a
judicial process, which could control any protective behaviour, has it seems been
influenced by protectionism within the axis of dispute settlement. Therefore, on the
evidence available, one has to question whether the ICJ as one of the leading judicial
settlement institution, has dealt with the jurisdictional issues relating to international
trade and investment disputes, having consideration to the protectionist nature of state
economic and social policy.
In contrast, one has to consider the situation regarding the
World Trade Organisation as the leading institution, which regulates international
trade between states. The disputes which arise between states and to be resolved under
the axis of the DSU of 1994, are as a result of alleged breach of obligations accepted
by the states as parties to the WTO. As I had discussed in chapter one, economic
disagreements that relate to accepted obligations are a reason for international
disputes, which could be interpreted, as providing legally binding rights under
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accepted conventions. In terms of the World Trade Organisation and the rights and
obligations therein, these result from the covered Agreements that states are parties to,
and to be resolved under the axis of the DSU of 1994. 5 As we have evidenced,
disputes that are related to covered agreements are to be resolved by a panel of
experts, but under the basis of Art.22 and 23 of the former GATT', which however
gave emphasis to diplomatic and negotiation based settlement. Questions could be
posed whether these disputes could be termed as political as a result of enforcement
being consensual and negotiation based. At the same time, the interpretation given to
the rights and obligations ensuing of these agreements are that, they are to be legal in
nature, notwithstanding the quasi-judicial nature of panel reports and panel
proceedings. While the panels have interpreted rights accruing under the Covered
Agreements being cause of legally binding disputes, the difference in the WTO
settlement process and the ICJ in particular concern the consideration given to the
economic policies of states by the respective institutions. While one could argue that,
by the consideration of economic policy activities by the respective panels in violation
and non-violation cases, it brings the protective nature of state policy into the
limelight and could encourage others to consider such action, the fact however
remains that the WTO has managed to encapsulate these policies in its consideration
of whether legal rights have been violated. As we have witnessed in chapter two, the
states are concerned with the various mechanics of peaceful settlement when it
concerns their rights and interests, and hence their individual positions on these
interests. This is particularly the case, even if the states have agreed to resolve these
disputes by peaceful settlement methods, as emphasised under Art.33 of the UN
Charter. In these circumstances, it is to the merit of the WTO that it has brought these
issues to the forefront when dealing with international trade issues. The fact remains
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that state economic and national policies are a part of any dispute, as emphasised in
chapter one, and hence should be the consideration of a given dispute settlement
institution. While one could question the opportunity provided for individual action
against states within the framework of the WTO system in contrast to the ICSID,
when one considers the fact that a certain trade policy of a individual state could
affect the rights and freedoms of a individual of another state, in the context of trade
liberalisation, on the evidence available of the WTO settlement process and the
consideration of the political nature of the dispute, one could say that this system was
more with reality in contrast to the situation that exists in the ICJ and the courts
attitude towards the protection of international trade, notwithstanding the public
international law nature of these institutions.
In contrast to the ICJ system of peaceful dispute settlement, the
WTO has been a more reality based institution, where the protectionist nature of states
have been taken into consideration. However, I also believe it is opportune to
compare this settlement process with the ICSID process which; while being a
exclusive process for a particular area of international economic relations; is however
comparable as a result of the opportunity that exists for state protectionism and the
protection of individual rights in the realm of international law, even in the case of
peaceful dispute settlement, when these systems operate in the realm of negotiation,
mediation or arbitration, as noted in chapter two. As was evidenced in chapter three,
the interests of states convey the same message; where the protection of sovereign
rights and the protection of economic benefits are a priority, notwithstanding the
consent provided for international economic activity. This motive remains the same
notwithstanding who the other party to any economic relations is, i.e. state or private
individual. It was within this protectionist basis that states have agreed to international
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investment agreements with private individuals; be it a private party or a multinational
corporation, where the state is looking to get the best possible investment and
accruing benefits, but at the same time trying to limit the opportunity of the other
party claiming any undue advantage of the agreed provisions. In this sense of
protectionism, the affect of protectionism and the necessity to restrict this inherent
protectionism, the objections of the ICJ, WTO and the ICSID was similar. However,
with regard to jurisdiction and the subjects of these institutions, the situation was quite
different. One could even go insofar as to say that the jurisdictional nature of the
ICSID was an innovation on the norms of international law. It would seem that it was
a combination of public international law or private international law regimes, in that
allows a private individual to be a party to a dispute governed by a convention agreed
under public international law. Apart from protecting the rights of private individuals,
which under the ICJ was under the jurisdiction of local courts, the main question that
needs attention in contrast to other settlement mechanisms is, whether a state could
use protectionism to "wriggle out" from the jurisdiction of the centre. The question is
whether protectionism could derail a dispute that is branded as opposed to political,
notwithstanding the fact that it involves economic policy making powers of the state
involved as a part of its sovereignty. As opposed to the situation that exists under the
ICJ regime, where the state has the option of not accepting the jurisdiction of the court
as a result of its unwillingness to deal with particular issues or the states unwillingness
to do so in dispute settlement in genera1 6, the ICSID has based its jurisdiction on
irrevocable consent, notwithstanding the fact that it is a consensual process; which
concern sovereign rights of states. It was even described as being the "cornerstone of
the jurisdiction of the centre." In this sense, one has to question whether the ICSID
has comparatively limited the opportunity of protectionism, with regard to the WTO.
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As we have witnessed; the membership of the WTO and the jurisdictional capacity of
the DSB and the panels depend on consent of the states concerned, keeping with the
norms of peaceful settlement. 7 Notwithstanding it's consensual nature, the position
with regard to the WTO remains however, that such consent is not revocable when the
state concerned is a party to a dispute, notwithstanding the fact that it concerns
economic policy making of states. When one considers the philosophy on which these
institutions have been based, one could say that the WTO and the ICSID have limited
the opportunity of protectionism, notwithstanding the consent factor. In terms of
dispute settlement effected by protectionism, as mentioned in chapter two, this is a
merit of the two systems in general.
However, there remain problems with regard to the ICSID
jurisdiction on what disputes are dealt with by the settlement process in context to the
WTO. As discussed earlier, the WTO system is quite clear on what disputes it deals
with, particularly ones based on the violation of obligations in covered agreements; as
evidenced by the interpretation of these obligations and rights by the settlement
panels. It was recognised that the ICSID was concerned with legal disputes, as
emphasised by the executive directors report. In contrast to the WTO however; it was
not clear what these legal interests were to be, notwithstanding the fact that they were
to be investment related. In keeping with the consensual nature of international
arbitration and international Convention, the ICSID allows the parties to decide on the
interpretation of what a investment related legal dispute was to be, as mentioned in
chapter three. This puts a question mark on what is to be considered as legal in a
given individual case. Given the protectionist nature of states and individual investors,
I believe that the ICSID has not satisfactorily dealt with this issue of jurisdiction, in
contrast to the situation that exists within the WTO system, particularly as the issue of
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jurisdiction and jurisdictional capabilities of relevant parties to a given dispute is a
first step where the parties could obstruct to the satisfactory completion of the
settlement process.
5.2 Applicable Law:
The second issue, which could be an obstruction to the
completion of the dispute settlement mechanism, is the basis of law/applicable law to
a given dispute brought to the attention of the settlement process. The importance of
this issue relates to the fact that, unless the given process deals satisfactorily with the
applicable law to the dispute; the state would have the opportunity to disrupt the
process by applying local laws, thereby favouring one party in contrast to the other.
The International Court of Justice, as emphasised earlier, is
a single institution initiated under the axis of the United Nations, hence the subject
matter and subjects being mainly legal disputes between states. Furthermore, as a
result of its initiation on an international plane, the acceptance by states of
international law being the applicable law to cases brought to the attention of the ICJ.
This norm of the application of international law has been accepted in many a case,
where the subjects have been diverse in nature. 8
 These have included cases ranging
from the maritime delimitation to the diplomatic protection of aliens; where the case
has been brought to the attention on the basis of a alleged breach in an international
agreement or international convention, where the basis of settlement has been
protectionist. 9
 The court deals with these cases in accordance with Art.38(1) of the
ICJ Statute, which provides a list of applicable laws in order to resolve the dispute at
hand. As Art.38(1) of the ICJ Statute notes, "the court, whose function is to decide in
accordance with international law such disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply: a)
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international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly
recognised by the contracting states, b) international custom, as evidence of a general
practice accepted as law, c) the general principles of law recognised by civilised
nations, d)subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings
of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for
the determination of rules of law" 1 °, which is a clear emphasis on the application of
international law to any case brought to the attention of the court. At the same time
however, the court has also acknowledged the fact that it is willing to adjudicate on
cases under the axis of Art.38, notwithstanding the fact that the case might not require
the application of international law." This position taken by the court, not only
emphasises the court's willingness to emancipate itself from a non-liquet situation,
but also as Roseanne notes "illustrates the broad scope and non-limitive character of
the provisions of Art.38(1)." I2 The broad scope and nature of the ICJ applying
international law to cases brought to its attention could be interpreted in two ways. It
could be the case that the ICJ would be willing to go out of its way to apply
international law to a relevant case; or it could be the case that the ICJ would state
that a given case should be within the jurisdiction of local law, while giving a decision
on the facts of the rest of a given case, which it believes to be within the gambit of
international law. This, it seems is the case with regard to cases that are engrossed
with economic facts, but would concern issues such as human rights, protection of
aliens etc., which are regulated by international law. As I had discussed in chapter
three, the ICJ has been willing to deal with issues which it believes to be within its
jurisdiction, excluding economic facts which it regards as being in the jurisdiction of
local laws. I3
 In most cases, these economic facts concern the economic policies of
states, which in most cases are protectionist and which the states are not willing to
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consent to judicial settlement, according to international law. In this sense, the ICJ has
been severely handicapped in the opportunity it has to resolve trade disputes, in
contrast o the WTO.
As Prof.Jaenicke notes, while the court has been willing to deal
with cases such as the protection of aliens, "...in such a case, it is normally not the
principle of national or most favoured nation treatment of aliens as such that is in
issue, but rather the scope and the interpretation of that principle.
has been willing to deal with these cases; it is exactly this issue of a applicable law
that has, in my opinion caused to give into protectionist policy making of states
inadvertently, in contrast to the application of laws within the WTO system, where the
responsibilities and the obligations of states are more clearly stated. While the DSU of
1994 of the WTO makes it quite clear on the applicable law, which obstructs to the
application of domestic laws; in contrast, it would seem that the ICJ has advocated a
application of domestic law to cases it is willing to deal with at present, as a result of
its unwillingness to deal with economic facts which were relevant, but were not at the
core of the dispute. I5
 In a sense, this situation is similar to the case of the ICSID,
where the applicable law is a question of interpretation and standards of application of
the law, which is not the ideal situation in the protection of international trade and
investments. Unfortunately, rather than remedying the present situation, the court in
one particular case has justified its decision on the basis that "...by opening the door
to competing diplomatic claims, ...could create an atmosphere of confusion and
insecurity in international economic relations." 16
 Hence, leaving the situation to be
resolved under domestic law. When one takes into consideration the fact that
adjudication is a peaceful settlement method, and the parties consent/willingness to
approach judicial settlement; one has to question the ICJ's decision to apply domestic
"14 While the court
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laws to economic disputes, notwithstanding the fact that the parties would have
consented to the application of international law through a bilateral or multilateral
treaty. Unfortunately, the policies of the ICJ, it seems, have given into protectionism
prevalent in international economic relations, with regard to the issue of applicable
law, particularly if domestic laws, which are the prerogative of states, are to apply to a
given dispute, which has been emphasised during peaceful settlement processes. As
we have witnessed in international arbitration, states have been concerned about
protecting one's sovereignty and sovereign rights. Thus the right to apply a suitable
law to a given dispute. In this sense, one could only question the ICJ's reluctance to
apply international law to trade and investment disputes brought to its attention.
As discussed in chapter four, when disputes are brought to the
attention of the WTO; a panel instituted, as a result of unsuccessful consultations
between parties, would have to determine the facts, according to the applicable law. In
this attempt to make a comparison between the three institutions, I would only deal
here with the substantive law applied to WTO dispute settlement, given the fact that
the interpretative law position with regard to panel reports holds a unique position
amongst the three institutions. In the case of the WTO panel procedures, there have
been agreements on which law should be the applicable law for international trade
disputes. The question has been whether the panel should apply the law of the covered
agreements or whether the general international law should be applicable for trade
disputes. As Trachtman notes, "..one persistent problem of the WTO legal system is
the recognition and application of legal rules from outside the system." 17 The DSU
does not explicitly provide for the international law provisions to apply in trade
disputes brought under its axis. Hence, the different interpretations as to what law
should be the substantive law. For an international institution, within the WTO, there
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is no mechanism to involve different legal rules in deciding which law takes
precedence when diverse laws conflict. I would deal here with the substantive
applicable law issue, in order to make a comparison with the ICJ and ICSID on this
particular issue of applicable law. Arguments have raged as to what law should be
applicable to WTO panel procedures, considering the international nature of the WTO
and the protectionism of state parties to the panel procedures. As noted in chapter
four, the WTO and its predecessor, the GATT, was initiated under the UN Charter,
hence the natural assumption of international law being applicable in the WTO
system. Furthermore, a clearly appreciated norm of international law is that, there
does not exists in international law of a situation of non-liquet. As Trachtman notes,"
the prevailing among writers is that, there is no room for non-liquet in international
adjudication, because there is no lacunae in international law." 18
 This clearly ties in
with the view that an international institution is an island and that an institution
developed in a broader international setting is open to the application of broader
international laws, notwithstanding the fact that the treaty creating the international
institution has not explicitly provided for the application of these broader legal
norms. 19
Thus, on this analysis, the assumption one could make is that
international law should be applicable to WTO panel reports. This is the argument
forwarded by Pauwelyn, when he argues that, while WTO rules could be considered
as lex specialis, as opposed to general international law, it does not necessarily mean
that WTO rules were created outside the system of international law. In his opinion
"like international environmental law and human rights law, WTO law is "just" a
branch of public international law."2° He takes much encouragement from previously
decided cases where this issue had been dealt with, and the confirmation of the
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continuation of international law, unless it has been contracted out, and has been
accepted as a rule of international law. 21
 It is in this context that the thesis is made that
the WTO panel process should apply international law, notwithstanding the non-
explicit nature of this obligation in the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding of
1994.22
 This acceptance of public international law has also been accepted in some
panel reports where the panel has noted that "the customary reports of international
law apply to the WTO treaties and to the process of treaty formation under the
WTO."23
 The panel in this case went even further and rejected the argument that
Art.3(2) of the DSU only refer to customary interpretation law on the basis that
customary international law applies to environmental relations in a more broader
sense. While, the view that international law in general should apply in panel
procedures have been accepted; at the same time, questions have been raised on the
acceptance of this view, on the basis that there is no explicit reference to substantive
international law in the DSU of 1994. To be fair to the proponents of this view, Art.
3(2) of the DSU does note that the "recommendation and rulings of the DSB cannot
add or diminish the rights and obligations provided in the covered agreements" 24, and
this has further being confirmed by Art. 11, which has provided that the panels should
carry out its functions with regard to covered agreement obligations. When one
considers that fact that the WTO dispute settlement works under the axis of general
peaceful settlement mechanisms, namely arbitration, and the fact that an important
condition of this process is the consent of parties on a applicable process; it is
understandable that the proponents of the applicability of WTO law rejects the
applicability of non-WTO law to the process.
The argument even gained strength from the fact that in some
cases the Appellate body has rejected the applicability of non-WTO agreements as
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applicable law to the panel process.25
 However, the fact remains that WTO disputes
result as a reason of protectionist policies of states. These have ranged from the
protection of human rights, labour rights, the sovereign rights of states, which the
states would argue are within the axis of local jurisdiction, as emphasised in chapter
one, when one considers the reasons for international disputes. In terms of a
protectionist effect that these policies and sovereign rights have on the resolution of
the dispute, one could see that the application of international law is appropriate in
contrast to local laws of a given state. This necessity of interaction between
international law has been confirmed by the fact that there exists international laws
which have regulated these reasons for international disputes, which would/could
restrict the application of protectionist policies. In these circumstances, the proponents
against the application of non-WTO law could argue, why the WTO should apply
non-WTO international law which could control protectionist policies, where the ICJ
as one of the main adjudicatory mechanism provides that international trade should be
domestically regulated. However, the fact remains that the states have accepted the
jurisdiction of the WTO to resolve international trade disputes in a international
context; thus the application of international law, in general terms, notwithstanding
the fact that there is no explicit commitment to apply general international law. In this
sense, one could say that the WTO has dealt with the protectionist nature of state
commitment to the issue of applicable law in a given international dispute brought to
the attention of the panel process.
As was discussed with regard to the International court of Justice
and the WTO, the norm has been that international law should be applicable to
relations between states. The implication of this norm was that, if a private individual
was involved and such rights were at issue, they were in the realm of domestic legal
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systems. This was the interpretation given by the ICJ, on the fundamental question of
under what conditions a state may exercise diplomatic protection of corporations and
their shareholders of its nationality, who have suffered injury by an alleged
internationally illegal act of another state. 26
 In this case, the court based its arguments
on the established rule relating to the right of diplomatic protection, where the
company incorporated under a certain law will be under the legal protection of that
state. According to the court, if competing claims of shareholders were allowed, it
would have created "...an atmosphere of confusion and insecurity in international
economic relations."27
 While, this case concerned diplomatic protection of aliens, the
general implication of this decision was that local/ municipal laws were to regulate
relations of an economic nature, when concerning a private individual. This was
further confirmed in the Serbian Loans case (France Vs Serb Croat States), where the
court held, in keeping with its philosophy that "relations between states and the
natives of other states are necessarily governed by a municipal legal system and that
system is presumed to be the national system of the contracting state." 28
 This is where
the ICSID, it would seem has differed from the norms of international law, where a
combination of international and domestic laws are provided as being the applicable
law for these relations. The philosophy of the ICS1D has been twofold. Firstly, the
protection of local interests of the state, be it social or economical, particularly as
these interests mainly concern developing states, which are dependent on the
multinationals for greater investments. Secondly, the key interests of the ICSID also
concern the individual investor, who is made a subject of international law by the
ICSID convention, thus making the investment relationship, one that is regulated by
international law, emphasising the protective nature of international disputes and the
settlement of these disputes. However, such an interpretation has not been clear cut,
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because what is provided is a combination of national and international law as being
applicable, where various interpretations are being given by the case law that has dealt
with the issue of applicable law in ICSID disputes. Keeping with the conditions
necessary for international arbitration, the ICSID convention provides that the consent
of the parties are necessary in deciding on the applicable law. However, the
significant problem with the ICSID is that it has not necessarily taken into
consideration the inequality of the economic capabilities of the parties, where in most
cases the state is dependant on the resources of the investor; hence creating a barrier
for the parties to agree on with regard to the applicable law to such a investment
agreement.
As discussed with the ICJ and the WTO, the issue of agreeing
on a specific law by the states, has not been an issue, particularly as solutions are in-
built to resolve such a disagreement. In this sense, the icsrp applicable law
provisions has not considered the issue of protectionism that could have an effect on
the procedures. This issue has led to the second discrepancy with regard to what law
should be applicable in the case of disagreement. As mentioned in chapter three,
Art.42 of the icsm convention provides that in case of disagreement between parties
on the applicable law; the domestic law of the state would apply, including its rules on
the conflict of laws. Furthermore, it also provides the international law would be a law
to be considered in these circumstances. One could say that the ICSID convention has
resolved the above mentioned inequality between parties, by providing that domestic
law would apply in the case of disagreement. However, this has brought to the
forefront the issue of state sovereignty and protectionism, which unfortunately is not
what the drafters of the convention expected. 29 To the credit of the ICSID, it has tried
to make a balance between protecting the interests of both parties concerned and
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improving the conditions of liberalisation. Unfortunately, as we have witnessed
earlier, in chapter three, the problem with the provision with regard to applicable law
is that it has been the subject of different interpretations, because of its debatable
nature as to what law is applicable. The reason for this is the protectionist nature of
states, anxious to control the investment and the investor's keenness to get the best
'value for its money.' 3° In general, this is the key reason for most economic disputes,
as noted in cases dealt in chapter one, and the situation in the ICSID seems to be no
exception. However, the ICSID system, notwithstanding its novel nature and being a
innovation on the ICJ norms, has not necessarily dealt with the applicable law issue,
notwithstanding the fact that it has tried to create a settlement process for international
investments. Comparatively, the ICSID has not conclusively dealt with the applicable
law factor which has unfortunately given way to the protectionist attitude of state to
question the applicability of international law to an investment agreement, which is
emphasised by the objections raised at different cases and dealt by the adjudicators in
these cases. Notwithstanding the fact that the ICJ has not satisfactorily dealt with
international trade issue and has allowed domestic law to be applied in contrast to the
ICSID, hence making the issue of applicable law debatable in both these systems, one
could only conclude that the WTO system has, however, dealt with the issue of
applicable law in terms of substantive law, even though questions have been raised
regarding the interpretative nature and standing of panel reports as law.
5.3 Enforcement:
As discussed in chapter two and three, one important factor in
the satisfactory completion of a dispute settlement mechanism, is the consensual
aspect of such settlement. In terms of enforcement, this relates to the consent given by
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the parties to accept not only the jurisdiction of the institution, but also an acceptance
to comply with any decision given by the relevant authority. While, the consent
provisions are of utmost importance in peaceful settlement methods such as
negotiation & mediation with regard to enforcement of a accepted remedy, the
difference from arbitration and adjudication is the fact that there will exists a binding
obligation to enforce a decision given by the adjudicator, if not face the consequences
provided for by the institutional settlement process. It is within this axis of consent
and the approach taken by the settlement method to enforce a decision, that I would
be making a comparable analysis of the ICJ, WTO and the ICSID enforcement
provisions at present.
As discussed in chapter three, the jurisdiction of the ICJ could
be seised by the states unilaterally, but at the same time with the opportunity to make
reservations on this acceptance of jurisdiction. It is within this situation that the states
are accepting the obligation to enforce a decision of the court, if the court has dealt
with international economic activities according to international law. The accepted
obligation according to the UN charter and the statute of the ICJ is that "each member
of the UN undertakes to comply with the decision of the ICJ in any case it is a
party."31 This is further compounded by the fact that there is no appeal on the decision
of the court; thus the enforcement of the decision being dependant on the protective
nature of states. The effect of protectionism is further emphasised by the fact that the
UN charter provides for Security Council resolutions if the states do not comply with
ICJ obligations; notwithstanding the fact that such jurisdiction depends on there being
a "threat to world peace." 32 As I had pointed out in chapter three, one could not
foresee a trade war developing between economically unequal states, which strangely
makes the enforcement of obligations via the security council debatable, to say the
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least. As Schlochauer notes, "the possibilities of enforcing the judgement against the
party in default are however, limited, because the only measure which may be
employed are those concerned with the settlement of disputes under Chapter 4 of the
Charter."33
 One could understand the logic behind the enforcement provisions of
Chapter 5 of the UN charter and the statute, when one considers the type of cases that
have been dealt by the court and the Security Council, which could effect the relations
between states. 34
 Furthermore, it also justifies the enforcement provisions of these
institutions, particularly as the cases could involve political and economic
repercussions, which has the potential to threaten world peace and international
relations. Unfortunately, the question one had to ask was whether these provisions
were appropriate or useful in the protection of international trade disputes, particularly
with jurisdictional and consensual limitation to such enforcement. The fact remains
that the states concerned are protectionist in nature and thus their attitude towards
protecting their individual rights, as they perceive them to be. Unfortunately, it does
not seem that the ICJ enforcement mechanisms have taken these positions into
account in providing for dispute settlement, particularly when these individual
positions could have an influence on the enforcement of ICJ judgements, especially if
the only relevant provisions are those contained in Chapter 4 of the charter. As with
any adjudicatory procedure, the ICJ enforcement is based on the fact that the states
have accepted the jurisdiction of the ICJ, and thus the following enforcement
consequences. As Merrills notes "when both sides have clearly accepted the court's
jurisdiction by treaty or in some other way, the institution of litigation indicates that
the applicant takes such arrangements seriously, as well as demonstrating its support
for the principle that disputes about legal rights ought to be settled by adjudication."35
But as seen in the past, there have been cases where this acceptance of an enforcement
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obligation has been ignored, not only with regard to ICJ, but the Security Council as
well, by the state party to a given dispute, which unfortunately emphasises the
debatable nature of ICJ enforcement provisions, if applied to international trade
disputes, in contrast to the situation that exists in the WTO system, where
enforcement is more likely to happen within a reasonable time frame.36
While the ICJ enforcement is concerned with disputes between
states where the willingness of states to enforce ICJ reports, and protectionism is at
loggerheads; the situation with regard to the ICSID settlement differentiates from this
as a result of the interests of investors/individuals who are within the jurisdiction of
individual states. The economic strength of states are not necessarily at issue, but a
given states attitude toward controlling the actions of these individual investors, and
the state's willingness to accept the obligations provided by the ICSID is at the heart
of enforcement of ICSID, emphasising the protective nature of economic disputes.
Arguments could be forwarded for undisputed enforcement of ICSID obligations on
the basis that the state and the individuals have willingly recognised the jurisdiction of
the Centre for the settlement of disputes, keeping with the norms of arbitration. As
discussed in relation to jurisdiction, the ICSID has provided for unrevocable consent,
which includes, in my opinion, not only the recognition of ICSID awards, but also a
willingness to enforce such awards, but also a willingness to enforce such awards in
respective states.37 Unfortunately, this consent of recognising and enforcing ICSID
obligations have been debatable as a result of the varying interpretations that have
been given to the applicable law to such disputes, in contrast to the ICJ and the WTO.
Not only does this question of which law applies effect which rules apply to the
merits of the case, but how the case is to be enforced. Keeping with the debatable
nature of applicable law and interpretation of a given case, the ICSID Convention has
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dealt with enforcement of ICSID reports in similar fashion, where the interests of
states and the sovereign rights of these states have been taken into account.
As I had discussed in Chapter 4, this parity has been achieved
under Art.54 & Art.55, where enforcement is made subject to local immunity laws
relating to execution of arbitral awards. Unfortunately, the fact has remained that the
individual immunity laws of states and the stance taken by the courts have made these
provisions of enforcement restrictive in nature, and given into the relevant
protectionism of states. While there is a question mark over the consensual
enforcement provisions of the ICJ in comparison, the problem with the ICSID is not
necessarily the consensual nature, but the enforcement provisions itself, which has
made enforcement subject to local laws and jurisdictions. Given the fact that
international investors are to work within the axis of local jurisdiction, and subject to
the sovereign rights of the given state; in contrast to the situation in the ICJ and the
WTO, it is unfortunately not ideal that the ICSlD has made recognition and
enforcement subject to sovereign laws of that particular state. In similarity with the
ICJ and the WTO, the ICSID provisions have provided that, in the case of unjustified
immunity claims by the state, it would be vulnerable to sanctions imposed upon it by
the convention. 38
 These concern mainly, the investor's country espousing the case at
the ICJ or claiming diplomatic assistance from its state. However, as noted by Moore,
the situation seems to be a catch 22 position with regard to the diplomatic protection
option provided by the ICSID convention. 39
 The effect of Art.27 of the Washington
Convention, is that the investor's state could espouse diplomatic protection of its
subject, if the invested state does not comply with an ICSID obligation/award. The
only way that the investor state could argue its subject's case before the ICJ is by
showing that there has been a "denial of justice" under international law. One main
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condition of denial of justice emphasised, is that all local remedies offered should be
exhausted, meaning that judicial resources at local level should be utilised, before a
claim could be brought by the investor state. Considering the protectionist nature of
states based on its sovereign rights to legislate for immunity from arbitral awards°, it
would seem that claiming diplomatic protection via a claim of denial of justice would
be a virtual non-starter. In contrast to the ICJ and the WTO enforcement measures,
which are based on a international plane, one could only note that the ICSID has been
effected by the protectionist influences that states could wield, as a result of local laws
and jurisdictions being given a opportunity to determine the enforcement of these
awards.
In similarity to the ICJ and the ICSID as peaceful settlement
mechanisms, which deal with a different range of disputes; the WTO has accepted the
fact that consent is the necessity in resolving disputes emerging as a result of violation
of accepted norms. The consequence of this stance, as emphasised when dealing with
the ICJ and the ICSID, is the fact that the success depends on the state's recognition
of a decision and the willingness to act upon these decisions. Thus, the dependency on
the states to shed their individual protectionist stance to resolve the disputes at hand.
As with the situations that existed with the ICJ and the ICSID, the WTO dispute
settlement works in these circumstances, where the enforcement of panel reports by
the respondent state is dependant on the consensus of the states. The consensual part
of enforcement in the WTO was the same as the ICSID and ICJ, prior to the initiation
of the DSU of 1994, whereby the enforcement of the panel report is to be done with
the consent of parties, thus opening up the resolution of the dispute to the political and
economic powers of the states. But, as mentioned in chapter 4, the DSU of 1994 has
brought rules and regulations such as "negative consensus" in order to negate the
255
influence the states have on the process, which has been coupled with the fact that the
process has to completed within a "reasonable period of time", thus ensuring that the
settlement of the dispute does not exceed fifteen months from the initiation of the
process. In this sense, the WTO settlement process as a whole is better equipped to
restrict the opportunity of state protectionism with respect to the possible faster
resolution of trade disputes.
However, as emphasised when dealing with the ICJ and the
ICSID, the first problem of enforcement is the fact that these awards are subject to
local immunity laws and recognition laws as a result of states being concerned in
protecting their interests, be it economical or political, and the fact that the
opportunity to enforce a given decision is dependent on the local laws of the states
concemed.41 It is in contrast to this, that the WTO has provided that the awards of the
panels should be implemented within a "reasonable time period." However, in
keeping with the protectionist nature of states, as evidenced in chapter four, different
states have dealt with the implementation of Uruguay round agreements and the panel
reports in a restrictive manner, which has left a question mark over whether panel
reports would be readily implemented or whether political and economic supremacy
would prevail, notwithstanding the motives to refute protectionism. As a result, any
sort of implementation of WTO panel reports have taken longer via bilateral
negotiations, notwithstanding the fact that in general the WTO dispute settlement
mechanism has satisfactorily dealt with the issue of implementation of reports.42
The effective and useful nature of the WTO, in contrast to the ICJ
and ICSID in the area of trade and investments has been emphasised by the novel
addition of compensation and suspension of concession provisions via the DSU of
1994. The ICJ and ICSID, as mentioned earlier, makes the enforcement provisions
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dependent on the consent of states, which as a consequence makes these actions
dependent on protectionism. In terms of "self judgement", these provisions on
"suspension of concessions" are not only obstructing the prevalent protectionism, but
also seems realistic on the position of the different parties to trade relations, in terms
of controlling the amount and quantities of retaliation. Questions could be raised on
three different angles, as mentioned in chapter four, with regard to "retaliation"
provisions, and whether these provisions are any different from those with regard to
the ICJ and ICSID, in terms of encouraging protectionism. This is specially the case,
when retaliation is accepted in contrast to compensation, which ultimately goes
against the philosophy of the WTO, and further brings about a certain uncertainty to
the completion of retaliatory actions when the dispute concerns one state dependant
on the other. While there are jurisdictional problems relating to enforcement with
regard to the ICJ settlement process for example; the fact however remains that it is a
judicial process which the states have agreed upon and in general being complied with
by the states concerned, which ultimately reduces the imbalance, be it economic or
political. It is in contrast to this that one has to consider the WTO "retaliation"
provisions, which is based on consent between states and is to make a balance
between the interests of the states concerned. If one takes for example a dispute that
arises between a larger economically powerful state such as the United states and a
dependant state such as Sri Lanka, on some issue with regard to textile exports, one
has to question the realistic feasibility of the fact of a dependant state such as Sri
Lanka taking any retaliatory action against the economic supremacy of the US, no
matter what the motives of the new "suspension of concessions" provisions were at its
initiation. One has to question, whether an economic power such as the United States
or the European community for example, would act in a similar way to an action
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brought by another economically powerful block, in similar given situations. The
evidence available, unfortunately points to the contrary.43
Conclusion:
It is quite clear from the evidence available that, the ICJ and the ICSID primarily
suffer from the interpretative difficulties and ultimately the debate that this opens
these mechanisms to, as dispute settlement mechanisms in international trade and
investments. The fact has remained that, the interpretative difficulties have made
these systems wide open to state protectionism, which is prevalent at present, and
consequently effects the satisfactory completion of the dispute settlement process. It
would seem that the ICJ and the ICSID have found it difficult to make a balance
between the competing norms of state consensus and state protectionism, which
ultimately is what the dispute settlement process is attempting to achieve.
Unfortunately, it would seem that the WTO has itself fallen into the same trap of its
dependence on inter state willingness to comply with its decisions, where some states
recognise as being a part of their sovereign rights, as has been the case with regard to
the ICSID and to a certain extent the ICJ, which unfortunately has given into the
protectionist nature of states. This is the case, in my opinion, notwithstanding the
important innovations made by the WTO since 1994, for improved dispute resolution.
Furthermore, it seems to be the case that, protectionism has effected all three
important substantive issues, which ultimately has an effect on the satisfactory
completion of dispute settlement. However, having said that, it is my view that one
also has to appreciate nonetheless, the fact that the WTO has comparatively provided
a satisfactory resolution process with respect to the ICJ and ICSID, notwithstanding
the mentioned protectionism, which clearly is a obstruction to dispute settlement. But
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equally; the question whether more could be done to improve the WTO system seems
to be for the future, especially in terms of faster enforcement, to which one could only
provide limited recommendations.
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22" situation with regard to enforcement.
42 The prime example of this reluctant implementation of Uruguay round agreements and panel reports
were dealt with regard to the United states and Japan in chapter four. See notes 198-205 of chapter
four, pp62-64
43 See the presently ongoing dispute between the United States and the European community with
regards to alleged illegal taxation activities by the US, in violation of WTO agreements, where it seems
the parties are pointing towards negotiations, notwithstanding the fact that an arbitrator had given a
decision against the US.
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Chapter Six
General Conclusions and Recommendations
The aim of this thesis, as put forward in the preface, was to
emphasise the fact that protectionism, as a broader concept was responsible for the
rise of international disputes, and further the fact that such protectionism, ultimately,
still has an effect on the workings of dispute settlement mechanisms, aimed at
resolving such disputes. In order to achieve such an analysis of how and when this
norm of "protectionism" had affected dispute resolution, discussion was undertaken to
deal with the broader norm of protectionism, which not only included economic, but
also political overtones, in the practices of states. It was my firm belief that
protectionism included not only the state actions in protecting economic interests, but
also other desired effects, which culminate from a states attitude towards protecting
one's sovereign rights. Hence, the enforcement of rules and regulations by the state, in
the belief, that it is the right of a sovereign state to protect what it is theirs. It was my
argument that, it was this broader conception of protectionism that gave rise to
different categorised reasons for international disputes, notwithstanding the fact that
there existed an inter-twining of these reasons in the ultimate basis of protectionism. It
was with this in mind, that I took the opportunity to discuss the different reasons
forwarded, in the rise of international disputes. Reasons for international disputes
were separated into two different groups, as mentioned in chapter One. First, they
were identified as disagreements arising from interests and policies, where parties
may change their preferences, or states changing their political policies to suit their
needs, notwithstanding the outcome of a breached contract of the effect it has on the
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other party concerned. Thus, these reasons were duly categorised as being political
and moral, in the rise of international disputes between states.
As was noted, these ranged from the protection of a combined
economic interests and honour, as was the case in the Nicaragua case and the Panama
Canal case of 1964, where the Panamanians were mainly motivated by the protection
of justice and honour; to the protection of a reputation of power and security reasons,
as was emphasised in the Cuban conflict with the United States, or the Suez Canal
case between the Egyptians and the British government, where the protection of
sovereign rights were a primary issue. As happened in many a case, in spite of the
issues being veiled in terms of economic interests, it was also a fact that the issue of
self-preservation of power and honour was a sublime factor in many of these
disputes.' On the whole, one could say that it was a state's concern of protecting its
subjective interests, for wider moral reasons, notwithstanding the fact that there
existed an economic factor at the outset of the dispute.
Secondly, disagreements arose as a result of conflicting assertions of
rights and obligations, as a result of the economic activities of the states concerned,
which are separated from the above mentioned moral and philosophical reasons for
international disputes. Consequently, these were categorised as being protectionist,
because they were against the norms of accepted economic rules promoted by the
WTO and other economic institutions. However, as was evidenced in most cases,
these reasons were either inter twined with the above mentioned political and moral
reasons, or was mainly a reason for investment and trade contracts being breached at
international level, by states, parties to such agreements. The reason for this situation
was as a result of the fact that international trade was seen as a avenue for gaining
economic prosperity, by these states, who were willing to breach accepted rules for a
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combination of philosophical and economic reasons. Hence, the emergence of many
an example of cases, where economic regulation was a protectionist reason for
international disputes.2
As emphasised in the noted situations in the United States, India or
China for example, disputes arose as a result of protectionist measures generally
including tariffs and non-tariff barriers, where the justifications for such control has
been varied from the stimulation of industrial development, self sustained growth to
the protection of individual commercial sectors. 3
 While, direct trade restrictions have
been a source of industrial disputes, the regulation of economic policies has also
extended to international investments, as emphasised in the disputes that have
resulted. Not only were the direct regulatory actions protectionist, but the ultimate
motives of such regulation was also protectionist, in that, such regulation was inter-
twined with the political control that states, as sovereign entities desired. 4
 Thus
culminating in international disputes, involving the state as host and the individual
investor. This was clearly the case in the oil cases, where the states in question were
keen to emphasise the rights, not only for the perceived economic benefits and
financial payments, but also to the sovereign rights of legislating for such protection.
Therefore, the resulting verdict from such international disputes was the fact that
protectionism, in a broader sense was a basis for the rise in international disputes,
notwithstanding the fact that such reasons have been categorised as being political and
economic reasons.
It was in this protectionist atmosphere that the United Nations
Charter provided for the peaceful settlement of disputes, in the axis of Art.33(1),
where adjudication, negotiation, mediation, arbitration was to operate. While,
adjudication and the substantive issues with respect to adjudication was straight
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forward in terms of accepting the jurisdiction and the verdict of such a settlement
process for enforcement; questions however, did arise on these issues, with respect to
the other peaceful settlement methods. This was particularly the case, where the
influences that states wielded, had a constructive or restrictive impact, as a result of
the consensual nature of these settlement methods, and the protectionist attitude of
states, parties to such dispute settlement. It was bearing this state influence, that I
followed to discuss various issues with respect to negotiation, mediation and
arbitration, as peaceful settlement methods of international disputes. The issues, as I
had discussed, were varied, particularly, depending on the level of control that the
states have on the methods of settlement, and how such protectionist attitudes could
affect the final outcome of settlement process. Hence, while the consent of parties to
the dispute and the secrecy involved in a process was key to a successful negotiating
method, as was emphasised in chapter two, the same was not the case in arbitration as
a method of peaceful settlement, where the more important issues of applicable law,
enforcement of arbitral awards, choosing the proper arbitrators were key to such a
process. While, these issues may have looked technical, it was paramount to discuss
these, for three simple reasons. First, the discussion of these issues emphasised the
impact that state consent has on the successful completion of the process, and the
level of consent needed for such a completion. Secondly, these varied issues, also
emphasised the impact that state protectionism has on these methods of settlement,
where there was a balance to be made between the level of consent of the states and
the state's protectionist attitudes, which ultimately decided the success of the
individual settlement process. The third reason for discussing these issues was also
important in emphasising the fact that protectionism does go beyond the mere
protection of economic fact, and that such broader protectionism does have an impact
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on the completion of dispute settlement. This was clear, when one notes the different
cases at the divergent settlement mechanisms, where the movement or non-movement
by the respective states at different levels has resulted in the completion or objections
to the completion of the negotiation or arbitration. 5
 Having discussed broadly, the
peaceful settlement mechanisms for international disputes, and the effect that state
protectionism has on the procedural issues of these methods, it was important in my
view to narrow the focus to international trade and investment dispute settlement
mechanisms, within the boundaries of peaceful settlement, to which my attention was
turned, particularly considering that fact that state protectionism does have a effect on
these trade and investment relations.
While I did not focus on adjudication as a peaceful settlement
process, and the issues relating to adjudication, it was however, my belief that one had
to deal with a judicial process, and how that particular judicial process dealt with
international trade and investments disputes, considering that most resolution methods
for such disputes are arbitration based rather than pure judicial settlement. It was this
in mind, that I dealt with the International Court of Justice (ICJ), as being one of the
key judicial methods of settlement, the International Centre for the Settlement of
Investment Disputes (ICSID) and the World Trade Organization (WTO) dispute
settlement mechanisms. It was my opinion that protectionism does influence the
workings of these institutional mechanisms, as a result of its influence on the peaceful
settlement methods of settlement, under the foundation of which, these institutions
ultimately operate. Therefore, in order to conclude as to whether the WTO dispute
settlement mechanism is satisfactory in its objective to provide a watertight settlement
process for trade and investments, I proceeded to make a comparative analysis with
the ICJ and the ICSID for two important reasons. First, the comparison with the ICJ
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was made, in order to analyse how, and to what extent it has succeeded in dealing
with international trade and investment disputes as a judicial settlement process.
Secondly, a comparison was made with the ICSID, particularly as this raised issues
with respect to the extension of jurisdiction to include private individuals as subjects
of international law, as a mixed arbitral institution, which is in contrast to the position
of the WTO. It was my belief that it was important to make a comparison of these
institutions, especially as the differences in jurisdiction, coupled with the protectionist
attitudes of the states, does provide for different outcomes with respect to the
settlement of disputes.
Therefore, a comparison was made of key substantive issues of
jurisdiction, applicable law and the enforcement of awards, of the three different
institutions. Several conclusions could be made of this existing situation. First, one
could note from the discussion of the individual issues and institutions, the fact that
these institutions and the settlement process, does operate in the environment of
having to balance state consensus on one hand and protectionism on the other. It was
clearly evident from the discussion of the substantive issues that, while the states
agreed in principle and provided consent for the process; at the same time these same
states were keen to protect their subjective interests. Evidence of this situation was
apparent, when dealing with issues such the applicable law and enforcement of
arbitral awards, where the states were willing to obstruct to the process by forwarding
its sovereign rights and immunity laws, when either the applicable law or the award of
the tribunal was against the protectionist interests of the losing state. Secondly, by
discussing the substantive issues of the ICJ and the ICSID, one could conclude that in
specific situations, the debatable and questionable nature of the phrasing of the
applicable treaties and conventions on these substantive issues, has contributed to the
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possible abuse and different interpretations by states, which are keen to protect their
individual interests. This seemed to be the case, with respect to what is or not a legal
dispute under the Statute of the ICJ for example and the jurisdictional issues which
have ultimately depended on judicial decision making; or the second part of deciding
the ICSID jurisdiction, i.e. "..the legal dispute arising out of an investment", for
example, which unfortunately has been left open to interpretations of the arbitrators
and possible abuse of the states. 6 Unfortunately, it would seem that the contradiction
between the consent of the state on one hand and protectionism on the other has also
contributed to questions been asked with regard to the substantive issues of
jurisdiction, applicable law and enforcement, as a result of the interpretative
difficulties of the treaties and conventions which regulate dispute settlement of the
ICJ and ICSID.
While it is clear that protectionism had a effect on the satisfactory
resolution of disputes in the respective methods, the question that next arose was how
the WTO settlement mechanism had dealt with such an effect, considering the fact
that it had to deal with the protectionism of states, particularly, when the consent of
the same states were made, if the system was to work in general. As was discussed in
chapter four, the basis under which the GATT was initiated, mainly concerned state
consent towards accepting the GATT/WTO to regulate international economic
relations. Unfortunately, with this came the situation, where the states could make the
decision to provide or deny the consent to the settlement process, when it effected the
subjective protectionist interests. Thus making the system prior to 1994,
comparatively ineffective as a settlement process and secondly being in the hands of
economically powerful states and economic blocks. As was well evidenced, the WTO
has progressed immensely since the changes of 1994, where new regulations were
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provided in order to control dispute settlement, non particularly so being the "negative
consensus" rule which has taken away the obstructive element that plagued the
previous GATT system. 7
 Therefore, what conclusions could one make in terms of the
WTO as a settlement process? While new procedures have been provided for dispute
settlement, the fact however has remained where there still remains discrepancies in
relation to issues such as applicable law and enforcement of panel reports, as a result
of the influence that the states still have on such settlement. 8
 The reason for much of
this debate results from the fact that state consent is still an important factor in trade
dispute settlement under the WTO proceedings, as is evident from mainly the
enforcement of panel reports in states, which is decisive in the satisfactory completion
of the process. Unfortunately, as I had discussed in chapter four, it would seem that
the protectionist attitudes of states who are party to WTO dispute settlement, has
undermined this consensual factor and also the satisfactory nature of the mechanism
as a whole.
The second question, one could ask is what conclusion could be
made, in terms of a comparative analysis of the WTO with the ICJ & ICSID, as a
satisfactory dispute settlement process, from a protectionist point of view? As I had
discussed in chapter five and endeavoured to analyse, there are differences between
all three institutions, in terms of the substantive issues, which effect the completion of
dispute settlement, notwithstanding the fact that all three institutions are based on the
above mentioned contradiction of state consent and state protectionism. The
conclusion one could make of the WTO in comparison to the ICJ and the ICSID, is
the fact that it is more in stride with the commercial nature of international trade and
investment relations, although there are limitations with respect to the jurisdiction of
the ICJ and interpretative questions raised with regard to the applicable of the process,
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in comparison to the position of the ICSID. But to the merit of the WTO, this negative
impact has been defused by taking into account of the economic policies of the states,
which ultimately is the reason for international trade and investment disputes. In this
sense, one could say that the WTO has, comparatively negated the protectionist
attitudes of states, which is the reason for dispute settlement. While the WTO has
dealt with the jurisdictional issue, which effects the settlement process; the important
issue with which to judge the satisfactory nature of settlement was the enforcement of
institutional awards. As I had mentioned in my previous conclusion, the WTO is still
plagued by the limitations in enforcement, as a result of the consensual nature of this
part of WTO settlement, which delays the immediate or reasonable resolution of the
dispute. 9
 In comparison, the ICJ as a judicial process requires immediate resolution.
However, as I had noted, the possibility of such resolution is dependant on consensus,
and secondly, on the viability of enforcement measures in Chapter IV of the Charter,
in case of immediate non-enforcement. The ICS1D on the other hand, has been
influenced by states forwarding state immunity laws, which restricts or delays
enforcement, as emphasised in the case law. 1 ° This is regardless of the fact that
consent is irrevocable in ICSID settlement. Unfortunately, this not only showed the
protectionist effect on the settlement of ICSID dispute settlement, but also the fact
that irrevocable consent was of restricted value in terms enforcement. Having taken
into account of these individual position, the conclusion one could make is that the
WTO procedures, while raising questions of delay, are still acceptable in terms of
proportionality of enforcement measures, and secondly in terms of the opportunity of
states arguing a case of state sovereignty, which objects to dispute resolution. It is my
firm belief that this is still the case, notwithstanding the argument that tit-for-tat
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measures breed protectionism, even if it does emphasise the fact that protectionism
has effected immediate resolution of the dispute at hand.
If one accepts the thesis that the contradiction between the ideals of
state protectionism and state consent to dispute settlement does effect the satisfactory
completion of trade dispute settlement and particularly WTO dispute settlement; the
following question would be, as to what remedies are available for such a problem.
The key issue that effects the dispute settlement process, is the fact that, there are
situations where enforcement of panel reports are delayed well over the "reasonable
time" limit as applied by the DSU of 1994. 11
 Hence, question is whether there is a
possibility of adopting another method of enforcement, if one is to argue that the
WTO settlement process is "water-proof' in terms of the effect that protectionism
could have on the system as a whole. It is clear that the system is still
diplomatic/consent based, notwithstanding the new procedures introduced by the DSU
of 1994. This is specially the case, not only in the WTO, but also in other multilateral
systems such as the NAFTA, where they are based on the WTO system, or allows
jurisdiction to the WTO, in a given dispute 12 . If one takes for example the NAFTA,
this is quite clearly the case, where the dispute settlement process is modelled on the
WTO panel process, and dependant on consent of the parties, notwithstanding the fact
that issues such as 'negative consensus', third party rights and time limitations are
applicable to the settlement process. 13
 Thus, being dependant on the diplomatic, rather
than the judicially enforced system. While, I do accept that comparatively, the WTO
dispute settlement process is successful, my recommendation, taking into account the
recent cases between the "big two", is to making the ICJ jurisdiction viable for
international trade disputes, if the diplomatic option does not work in practice.
However, this option of judicial enforcement is again subject to certain conditions,
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such as the ICJ's willingness to deal with international trade and investment disputes,
as emphasised in chapter three and secondly, the willingness of WTO members to
provide their consent in order for the change to be made in Art.21 and Art.22 of the
DSU of 1994, for judicial means, which unfortunately for the present, does not seem
imminent. Therefore, it is my fervent hope that states, which are parties to the WTO,
would take these issues to note, in recognising that more change is needed in order to
uphold the ideals of the United Nations, of trade liberalisation, and the limitation of
state protectionism, via the dispute settlement process.
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Notes
'See Donelan, M.D., International Disputes: Case histories 1945-1970, Europa Publications, (1973)
2 See for example the case at the WTO settlement process, Thailand-Restrictions on importation of and
internal taxes on cigarettes, reproduced in W.T.M. (1991) 1
3 The local laws in Nigeria, such as the Customs and Excise Tariff act of 1988 or Ss 301 of the Tariff
Act of 1989, in the US, were prime examples of these justifications for state economic protectionism.
4 The 'oil cases' were a clear situation where the state sovereignty issue was at a prime. Among them,
the Liamco Vs Libya case was example for such a case.
5 The disarmament negotiations between the US and Russia was a case in point, where a significant
move from their original positions by both parties, which brought about the disarmament plan was a
example of the necessity of state consent and willingness.
6 There have been many cases in the ICSID, where the substantive issues have been argued, as a result
of the various interpretations that could be given to these issues. Klockner industries Vs Republique of
Cameroon, B & B Vs Government of Congo, are cases in point.
7 Ironically, such obstructions were mainly focused on the agricultural subsidies and policies of larger
economies, as was the case in the EEC-subsidies on exports of wheat flour; The US-countervailing
duties on non-rubber footwear from Brazil situations, which were brought to the Settlement forum.
8 The FSC and Banana disputes between the US and the EC, which have gone against the merits of the
new system, emphasises the problems still existent in WTO dispute settlement.
9 The FSC and Banana cases between the US and the EC emphasises this problem, where
notwithstanding the time limitations provided in the DSU of 1994, the cases have run for several years
or the states have enforced the panel decisions with unsatisfactory legislation, which provokes the other
party to bring a further case to the WTO forum.
10 The FSAI of 1976 in the United States and the state immunity Act of 1978 in the United Kingdom,
are legislation in point, where the acceptance of arbitral reports for enforcement is restrictive.
11 According to Article 21.3 of the DSU of 1994, the reasonable time period is not to exceed 15 months
from the date of the establishment of the panel.
12 Holbein, J. & Musch, D., NAFTA-Treaties, Oceana Publications, Inc., NY,(2003)
13 See Articles 2009-2017 of NAFTA, which deals with issues such the roster of panel members, third
party rights, negative consensus, time limits for the report to be agreed.
273
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Primary sources
Case Law of the ICJ
See Table of Cases
Case Law of the ICSID
See Table of Cases
Case Law of the WTO
See Table of Cases
Charter of the United Nations
Statute of the ICJ
See Appendix I
The ICSID Treaty
See Appendix II
The Dispute Settlement Understanding of the WTO
See Appendix III
International Treaties, Conventions and Rules
See Table of Treaties
Secondary Sources
Aldcroft, D.H.,	 The European Economy, 1914-1980, (1980), published by
Croom Helm Ltd, London
Amerasinghe, C.F., "Investment Disputes, conventions and ICSID", in EPIL, No 5
(1981) 189-192, published by North Holland Publishing Co.
"Liability to third parties of member states of Int. organisations:
Practice, principles & judicial precedent", in 85 AJIL(1991) 259-
281.
274
Awuku, E., "How do the results of the Uruguay Round effect the North South Trade,
in 28 JWT(1994), pp75-93
Beal Van, I., "The GATT dispute settlement procedures", in 22 JWT(1988), pp67-77
Bercovitch, I., Resolving International conflicts: The theory & Practice of mediation
(1996), published by London
Mediation in International Relations, (1992), published by London
Bentwitch, N., A Commentary on the Charter of the UN, (1951), published by
London
Bherens,	 "Alternative methods of dispute settlement in international economic
relations", in Adjudication of international trade disputes in
international and national economic law, by E.U.Petersmann, (1992),
pp5-32
Bhagwati, J., Protectionism, (1988), published by MIT Press, Cambridge, London
Writings on International Economics, (1997), published by Oxford
University Press, Delhi
"US Trade policy at crossroads", in Political Economy & International
Economics, (1991), published by the MIT Press, London, pp35-83
Bossche Van Den, P., "The European Community and the Uruguay round", in
Implementing the Uruguay round, by J.Jackson (1997),
published by Clarendon Press, pp23-103
Brand, R., "Private parties and GATT dispute resolution: Implications of the panel
report on section 337 of the US tariff act of 1930", in 24 JWT(1990)
Bourne, C., "Procedure in the development of international drainage basins: The duty
to consult and to negotiate", in Can. Yearbook of Int.L.(1972), pp212-
234
Brownlie, I., "Remedies in the ICJ", in Fifty Years of the ICJ, by V.Lowe &
M.Fitzmaurize (1996), published by Cambridge University Press
Principles of Public international Law, (1990), Fourth Edition,
Published by Clarendon Press, Oxford
275
Brochure, A., "The London Court of Arbitration„ March 1961 (unpaginated)
Burton, F., "Expropriation of foreign owned firms in developing countries", in
18 JVVT(1984) 396-414.
Bernini, G. & Berg, A., "The enforcement of arbitral awards against a state: The
problem of immunity from execution", in Contemporary
problems in Int. Arbitration, by J.Lew (1987), pp359-373,
published by dordrecht, Nijhoff
Bockstiegel, K.H., "Arbitration of disputes between states and private enterprises in
the ICC", by in 59 AJIL (1965)579-586.
Burmester, H., "The Torres strait treaty: Ocean boundary delimitation by
agreement", in 76 AJIL (1982), pp321-349
Cameron, J. & Campbell, K., Dispute resolution in the WTO, (1998), published by
Cameron May, London
Carver, P., "The strengths and weaknesses on International arbitration involving a
state as a party", in Contemporary problems in International arbitration,
by Lew, J., (1987), pp264-272, published by the Martinus Nijhoff.
Circular of the Secretary General, Permanent court of Arbitration, March 1960; in
54 AJIL (1960), pp933-942
Chaytor, B., "Dispute settlement under the GATT/WTO: The experience of
developing nations", in Dispute resolution in the WTO, by Cameron
& Campbell (1998), pp250-270
Cheng, Bin. General Principles of Law as applied by International Courts and
Tribunals, (1987), Published by Stevens & Sons, London
Cline, W.R., "GATT machinery and the Tokyo round agreements", by Jackson, J. in
Trade policies in the 1980s, (1983), published by the Institute for
International Economics, Washington
276
Collier, J. & Lowe, V., The settlement of disputes of international Law: Institutions &
Procedures, (1999), Ch.7, published by Oxford University
Press
Cohn, E., Domke, M. & Eisemann, F., The International Center for Settlement Of
Investment Disputes, by Dr.A. Broches, in Handbook Of International
Arbitration in International Trade, (1977), pp3-15, published by
North Holland Publishing co.
Craig, W.L. & Paulsson, J., International Chamber of Commerce Arbitration, (1984),
published by Oceana, New York
Charney, J., "Third party dispute settlement & Int.Law", in 36 CJTL(1997-98)65-89
Crook, J., "Applicable law in Int. Arbitration: The Iran-US claims tribunal
experience", in 83 AJIL(1989), pp278-311
Colosi, T., "The Iceberg Principle: Secrecy in Negotiation", in Perspectives on
Negotiation; Four case studies and interpretations, by D.B.Bendahmane
& J.Mcdonald, (1986), published by Foreign Service Institute, US
Dept. of State
Curtis, C.T., "International Investment disputes: res-judicata effect of partially
annulled ICSID award", in 83 AJIL(1989) 106-112.
Cardenas, E.J., "Argentina- A judicial court intervenes in an arbitration started under
the ICC", in 26 The Int.Lawyer(1992), 789-793.
Croff, C., "The applicable law in an international commercial arbitration: Is It still a
conflict of laws problem?", in 15 The Int.Lawyer(1981) 613-644.
Davey, W., "Dispute settlement in GATT", in 11 Fordham Int.L.J.(1987), pp67-78
Delaume, G.R., "Economic development & sovereign Immunity", in 79 AJIL(1985)
319-346.
"ICSID arbitration & the courts", in 77 AJIL(1983) 784-803.
Demaret, P.	 "The Metamorphoses of the GATT: From the Havana Charter to the
277
World Trade Organization", in 34 CJTL(1995), pp123-171
DoneIan, D.M., International disputes: Case Histories 1945-1970, (1973), published
by Europa publications, London
Fawcett, J., International Economic conflicts: prevention & resolution, (1977),
published by Europa Publishers, London
Freedman, L., Signals of War: The Falklands Conflicts, (1990), published by London
Fox, H., "Arbitration", in International Disputes: The Legal aspects, by Waldock, C.,
(1972), pp 101-127, published by Europa publishers, London
"States and the undertaking to arbitrate", in 37 ICLQ (1988), pp1-29
Gray, C., "Developments in dispute settlement: Inter state arbitration since 1945", in
BYBIL(1992), pp97-134, published by the Clarendon Press, London
Giardina, A., "The ICSID", in Essays on Int. Commercial arbitration, by P.Sarcevic,
(1989), pp214-222, published by Graham & Trotman, London
Goldman, B., "The applicable law- general principles of law, The Lex Mercatoria",
in Contemporary problems in International Arbitration, by Lew, J.,
(1987), pp113-125
Goodrich, L.M., Charter of the United Nations: Commentary & Documents, (1949),
published by Stevens & Sons Ltd, London
The International Court of Justice, published by the ICJ, The Hague (1976)
Hirsch, M., Arbitration Mechanism of the International Center for the Settlement of
Investment Disputes„ (1993), published by Dordecht, M.Nijhoff.
Hudec, R.E., The GATT Legal system & World trade diplomacy, (1990), published
by Butterworths Legal Publishers
Enforcing International trade law: The evolution of the modern GATT
legal system, (1991), published by Butterworths, London
278
"The GATT legal system: A diplomats jurisprudence", in 4 JWT(1970)
pp615-665
Horn, N., "Normative problems of a new International economic order, in 16 JWT
(1982), pp 338-351
Ikle, F.C., How Nations Negotiate, (1964), published by N.Y.Harper. Harved
University Press.
Iwasawa, I. "Constitutional Problems involved in implementing the UR in Japan",
in Implementing the Uruguay Round, by J.Jackson (1997), pp 137-174,
published by Clarendon Press, Oxford
Jackson, J.H., Documents supplement to legal problems of International Economic
Relations, (1989), published by West Publishing Co. Minn.
World Trade & Law of GATT (1969), published by N.Y.Bobbs Merril
Co.
World Trade Organization, Constitution and Jurisprudence, (1998),
published by Pinter publishers, London
Legal Problems of International Economic Relations: Cases, Materials
& Text, (1995), published by West Publishing
The World Trading System: Law & Policy of International Economic
Relations, (1992), published by MIT Press, London
Restructuring the GAT'T system, (1990), published by Pinter
Publishers, London
Implementing the Uruguay Round, (1997), published by Clarendon
Press, Oxford
"Government disputes in International Trade Relations: A proposals on
the context of GATT", in 13 JWT(1979), pp1-21
"The birth of the GATT-MTN system: A constitutional appraisal", in
Law & Policy in International Business (1980), Vol.2, No.21
"US constitutional law principles and foreign trade law and policy", in
National constitutions and International economic law, by
Petersmann, E.U., (1993), pp65-91
"The WTO dispute settlement understanding misunderstandings on the
nature of legal obligation", in Dispute Resolution in the WTO, by
279
Cameron & Campbell (1998), pp69-75
The World Trading system, Law & Policy of international Relations,
(1994), published by the MIT Press, Cambridge, London
Jaenicke, A., "International Trade conflicts before PCIJ & ICJ", in Adjudication of
Int. Trade Disputes in Int. & National Economic Law, by
E.U.Petersmann (1992), published by the University Press Freiburg,
pp43-58
Kass, S., "Obligatory negotiations in international negotiations", in Can.Yearbook of
Int.L.(1965), pp36-72
Klabbers, J., "Jurisprudence in International Trade , Article XX of GATT", in
36 JWT (1992), pp63-94
Komuro, N., "The WTO dispute settlement mechanism", 29 JWT (1995), pp5-95
Kohona, P. "Dispute Resolution under the WTO: An overview", in 28 JWT(1994),
pp 23-44
Kufuor, K., "From GATT to the WTO: The developing countries & the reform of the
procedures for the settlement of International trade policies", in 31 JWT
31(1997), pp17-145
Kuijper, P., "The new WTO dispute settlement system: The impact on the European
community", in 29 JWT(1995), pp49-71
Kuyper, P.J. "The Law of GATT as a special field of International law: Ignorance,
further refinement on self contained regime of International law, in
Neth Y.B.Int.L. (1994), Vol.24, pp227
Lalive, P., "The first World Bank arbitration (Holiday Inns Vs Morocco)- some legal
Problems", in BYBIL(1980) 123-161.
"Arbitration with foreign states or state controlled entities: some practical
questions", in Contemporary Problems in International Arbitration", by
J.D.Lew (1987), published by Dordrecht, Nijhoff, pp289-296
Lavelle, R. "Dispute Settlement under the Vienna Convention on succession of states
280
in respect of treaties", in 73 AJIL(1979), pp407-425
Lew, J., Contemporary Problems in International Arbitration, (1987), published by
Dordrecht, Nijhoff.
Lall, A., Modern International Negotiations; Principles & Practice, (1966), published
by Columbia University Press, London
Lando, 0., "The law applicable to the merits of the dispute", in Contemporary
problems in international Arbitration, by Lew, J., (1987)
"The Lex Mercatoria in International Commercial Arbitration", in 34
ICLQ(1985), pp747-768
Leebron, D., "Implementing the Uruguay round in the US", in Implementing the
Uruguay Round, by Jackson, J., (1998), pp175-243
Lieb, L., "Iran & Iraq at Algiers, 1975", in International mediation in theory and
practice, by Zartman, I., (1985), published by boulder, Colorado
Long, 0., Law & It's limitations in the GATT multilateral trading system, (1985),
published by Martinus Nijhoff Publishers.
Lubman, S., "Mao and Mediation: Politics and Dispute Resolution in Communist
China", in California Law Review, (1967), pp1284
Lowenfield, A. "Remedies along with Rights: Institutional Reform in the New
GATT", in 88 AJIL(1994), pp477-488
Mandell, B., "The limits of mediation: Lessons from the Syria-Isreal experience;
1974-1994", in The Theory and practice of mediation, by Bercovitch,I.
(1996)
Marceau, G., "Rules on ethics for the WTO dispute settlement mechanism-The rules
of conduct for the understanding on rules & procedures governing the
settlement of disputes", in 32 JWT(1998), pp57-97
Martha, J., "Representation of parties in world trade disputes", in 31 JWT(1997),
pp83-96
281
Merrils, J.G., International dispute Settlement (1998), third edition, published by
Cambridge University Press, Ch. 6& 7
McRea, D., "The emerging appellate jurisdiction in International trade law", in
Dispute Resolution in the WTO, by Cameron & Campbell (1998), pp98-
110, published by Cameron & May Publishers, London
Mcwhinney, E., Judicial Settlement of international Disputes, (1991), Ch.2, published
by Nijhoff publications.
"The Law/Politics dichotomy and the Political questions exceptions
to jurisdiction: Nicaragua Vs US", Ch. 11 in Judicial Settlement of
Int.Disputes, (1991),pp37-55
Mcnair, Lord, "The general Principles of Law recognised by civilised nations",
33 BYBIL(1957) 10
Ma'cll, F., "Competence of Arbitral tribunals in Int. Commercial Arbitration", in
Essays on Int. Commercial Arbitration, by P.Sarcevic (1989), published
by Graham & Trotman, London.
Mora, M., "A GATT with Teeth: Law wins over politics in the resolution on
international trade disputes", in 31 CJTL(1993) pp101-180
Moore, M.M., "Mt. Arbitration between states & Foreign investors- The world Bank
convention", in 18 Stanford Law Review(1965-66) 1359-1380.
Murphy, A., The European Community and the international trading system,
(1990)
Nicholas, H.G., The United Nations as a political institution, (1975), published by
the Oxford University Press
Northedge, F.S., International Disputes, The Politics aspects, (1971), Published by
London
O'Keefe, P.J., "The ICSID", in The Yearbook of World Affairs (1980), 286-304.
282
Ostrihensky, R., "New developments in the GATT dispute settlement procedures", in
24 JWT(1990), pp67-89
Palmeter, D., "The WTO Appellate body needs remand authority", in 32 JWT(1998),
pp41-44
"The need for due process in WTO proceedings", in 31 JWT(1997),
51-57
Paulsson, J., "Arbitration Unbound: Award detached from the law of its country of
origin", in 30 ICLQ(1981)358-387.
Pauwelyn, J. "The role of Public International Law in the WTO: How far can we
go", in 94 AJIL(2000), Vol. 95, pp535-594
Pescatore, P., Handbook on GATT dispute Settlement, (1992), published by Kluwer
Publishers
"The GATT dispute settlement mechanism: Its present situation and its
prospects", in 27 JWT(1993), pp5-20
Petersmann, E.U., Adjudication of International trade disputes in International &
National Economic Law, (1992), published by University press,
Freiberg
New GATT round of Multilateral trade negotiations: Legal &
Economic problems, (1988), published by Kluwer Law Co.
National constitutions and international Economic Law, Edited by
M.Hilf, (1993), published by Kluwer Publishers, Boston
"How to promote the International rule of law? Contributions by
the WTO appellate review system", in dispute Resolution in the
WTO, by Cameron & Campbell, (1998), 75-98
Rosenne, S., The Law & Practice of the International court„ 2' revised Edition
(1985), published by Deventer Publishers
Reisenfeld, S.A., "Foreign Investment", by, in Encyclopedia of public international
Law, vol8 (1984) 246
Rubin, I, "Culture, negotiation & the eye of the beholder", in Negotiation Journal
283
(1991), pp249-254
Salvatore, D., National Trade Policies, Studies in Comparative Economic Policies,
(1992), published by Greenwood Trees, Westport and distributed by
Elsevier Science Publishers, Holland
Sarcevic, P., Essays on International Commercial Arbitration, (1989), published by
Graham & Trotman, London.
Schmittohoff, C., The Law & Practice of International Trade, (1990), published by
Stevens & Sons, London
Schwebel, S., International Arbitration: Three salient problems, (1987), published by
Grotius Publications, Cambridge
"The treatment of Human rights & of aliens in the ICJ", in Fifty Years
of the ICJ, by Lowe & Fitzmaurize (1996), pp327-350
Schlochauer, H., "The International Court of Justice", in Encyclopedia of Public
International Law; nol; Settlement of disputes (1981), 72-92,
published by north Holland Publishing Co.
Slim, R., "Small state mediation in International relations", in Mediation in
International Relations, by Bercovitch, I., (1992), pp206
Sornarajah, M., "State responsibility & Bilateral Investment Treaties", in 20 JWT
(1986), pp79-98
"The Myth of Int contract law", in 15 JWT(1981), pp187-219.
Snyder, E., "Foreign investment protection: The Dispute solving aspect", in 5 CJTL
(1964-66), Vol. 3-4, no2, pp127-151.
Stark, J.G., The Protection and encouragement of private foreign investment, (1966),
Published by Butterworths Publishers, London
Steger, D., "New directions in international trade law: WTO dispute settlement", in
Dispute Resolution in the WTO, by Cameron & Campbell (1998), pp28-
57
284
Suratgor, D., "The Sapphire arbitration award, the procedural aspects: A report and
critique", in 5 CJTL(1964), pp152
Sutherland, P.F., "The world Bank convention on the Settlement of Investment
disputes", in 28 ICLQ(1979) 367-400.
Sandrock, 0.," 'Handcuffs' clauses in international commercial Contracts: Basic
reflections on the autonomy of the parties to choose the proper law
for their contracts", in 31 The Int.Lawyer(1997),no4, 1105-1119.
"Observations by the Department of state on the ICJ's Nov.26, 1984 Judgement", in
79 AJIL(1985) 438
Thomas, J., "The need for due process in WTO proceedings", in 31 JWT(1997),
pp45-49
"Litigation process under the GATT dispute settlement system-Lessons
for the WTO", in 30 JWT(1996), pp53-81
Toomy, S.T., "International conflict systems: A face negotiating theory", in Theories
in International Communication, by Y.Kim, (1988), published by
Beverley Hills, California
Torre, F., "The status of GATT in EC law; Revisited-the consequences of the
judgement on the Banana import regime for the enforcement of the UR
agreements", in 29 JWT(1995), pp53-68
Touval, S., International Mediation in theory & practice, (1985), published by
Boulder Co., Westview Press
"International mediation; Conflict resolution and power politics", in
41 Journal of Social Issues(1985), pp 27-45
Trachtman, J.P. "The domain of WTO dispute resolution", in Harved Int.L.Journal,
(1999), Vol.40, pp333-377
United Nations, Handbook on the Peaceful settlement of disputes between States
(1992), published by the Office of legal Affairs, UN, NY
285
United Nations, Guide to the Charter of the United Nations, (1955), published by the
UN Department of Information
UNCTAD, Handbook of international trade data & development statistics, (1990),
New York
Vayrynen, R., "Focus on: Is there a role for the UN in conflict Resolution?", in
Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 22, No3 (1985) 187-196
Vermulst, E., "An overview of the WTO dispute settlement system and its
relationship with the Uruguay round agreements: Nice on paper but
too much stress for the system", in 29 JWT(1995), pp131-161
Vibhute, K.I., "Waiver of State Immunity by an agreement to Arbitrate and
International Commercial Arbitration", in Journal of Business Law
(1998), pp550-563
World Trade Organization, The Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral
negotiations: Legal Text (1995), Geneva
Waldock, C.M., International Disputes: The Legal aspects, (1972), published by
Oxford, London
Wang, L., "Some observations on the dispute settlement system in the World Trade
Organization", in 29 JWT(1995), pp173-179
"Are trade disputes fairly settled", in 31 JWT(1997), pp59-72
Wells,W., The Havana Charter, GATT and the ITO, (1967), published by Empire
Industries Association
Wilson, L., "The Settlement of Boundary disputes: Maxie°, the US and the
International boundary commission", in 29 ICLQ(1980), pp38-53
Young, M., "Dispute resolution in the Uruguay round: Lawyers triumph over
diplomats", in 29 The Int.Lawyer(1995), pp389-409
Yun, C.S., "The convention on the settlement of investment disputes-commentary and
forecast", in Malaya law Review (1969), Voll 1, No2, pp287-315.
286/
STATUTE
OF THE
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
TABLE OF CONTENTS:
Article 1 
Chapter I: Organization of the Court (Articles 2 - 33) 
Chapter II: Competence of the Court (Articles 34 - 38)
Chapter III: Procedure (Articles 39 - 64)
Chapter IV: Advisory Opinions (Articles 65 - 68) 
Chapter V: Amendment (Articles 69 & 70) 
Article 1
The International Court of Justice established by the Charter of the United Nations as
the principal judicial organ of the United Nations shall be constituted and shall
function in accordance with the provisions of the present Statute.
CHAPTER I - ORGANIZATION OF THE COURT
Article 2
The Court shall be composed of a body of independent judges, elected regardless of
their nationality from among persons of high moral character, who possess the
qualifications required in their respective countries for appointment to the highest
judicial offices, or are jurisconsults of recognized competence in international law.
Article 3
1. The Court shall consist of fifteen members, no two of whom may be nationals of
the same state.
2. A person who for the purposes.of membership in the Court could be regarded as a
national of more than one state shall be deemed to be a national of the one in which he
ordinarily exercises civil and political rights.
Article 4
1. The members of the Court shall be elected by the General Assembly and by the
Security Council from a list of persons nominated by the national groups in the
Permanent Court of Arbitration, in accordance with the following provisions.
2. In the case of Members of the United Nations not represented in the Permanent
Court of Arbitration, candidates shall be nominated by national groups appointed for
this purpose by their governments under the same conditions as those prescribed for
members of the Permanent Court of Arbitration by Article 44 of the Convention of
The Hague of 1907 for the pacific settlement of international disputes.
3. The conditions under which a state which is a party to the present Statute but is not
a Member of the United Nations may participate in electing the members of the Court
shall, in the absence of a special agreement, be laid down by the General Assembly
upon recommendation of the Security Council.
Article 5
1. At least three months before the date of the election, the Secretary-General of the
United Nations shall address a written request to the members of the Permanent Court
of Arbitration belonging to the states which are parties to the present Statute, and to
the members of the national groups appointed under Article 4, paragraph 2, inviting
them to undertake, within a given time, by national groups, the nomination of persons
in a position to accept the duties of a member of the Court.
2. No group may nominate more than four persons, not more than two of whom shall
be of their own nationality. In no case may the number of candidates nominated by a
group be more than double the number of seats to be filled.
Article 6
Before making these nominations, each national group is recommended to consult its
highest court of justice, its legal faculties and schools of law, and its national
academies and national sections of international academies devoted to the study of
law.
Article 7
1. The Secretary-General shall prepare a list in alphabetical order of all the persons
thus nominated. Save as provided in Article 12, paragraph 2, these shall be the only
persons eligible.
2. The Secretary-General shall submit this list to the General Assembly and to the
Security Council.
Article 8
The General Assembly and the Security Council shall proceed independently of one
another to elect the members of the Court.
Article 9
At every election, the electors shall bear in mind not only that the persons to be
elected should individually possess the qualifications required, but also that in the
body as a whole the representation of the main forms of civilization and of the
principal legal systems of the world should be assured.
Article 10
1. Those candidates who obtain an absolute majority of votes in the General
Assembly and in the Security Council shall be considered as elected.
2. Any vote of the Security Council, whether for the election of judges or for the
appointment of members of the conference envisaged in Article 12, shall be taken
without any distinction between permanent and non-permanent members of the
Security Council.
3. In the event of more than one national of the same state obtaining an absolute
majority of the votes both of the General Assembly and of the Security Council, the
eldest of these only shall be considered as elected.
Article 11
If, after the first meeting held for the purpose of the election, one or more seats remain
to be filled, a second and, if necessary, a third meeting shall take place.
Article 12
1. If, after the third meeting, one or more seats still remain unfilled, a joint conference
consisting of six members, three appointed by the General Assembly and three by the
Security Council, may be formed at any time at the request of either the General
Assembly or the Security Council, for the purpose of choosing by the vote of an
absolute majority one name for each seat still vacant, to submit to the General
Assembly and the Security Council for their respective acceptance.
2. If the joint conference is unanimously agreed upon any person who fulfills the
required conditions, he may be included in its list, even though he was not included in
the list of nominations referred to in Article 7.
3. If the joint conference is satisfied that it will not be successful in procuring an
election, those members of the Court who have already been elected shall, within a
period to be fixed by the Security Council, proceed to fill the vacant seats by selection
from among those candidates who have obtained votes either in the General Assembly
or in the Security Council.
4. In the event of an equality of votes among the judges, the eldest judge shall have a
casting vote.
Article 13
1. The members of the Court shall be elected for nine years and may be re-elected;
provided, however, that of the judges elected at the first election, the terms of five
judges shall expire at the end of three years and the terms of five more judges shall
expire at the end of six years.
2. The judges whose terms are to expire at the end of the above-mentioned initial
periods of three and six years shall be chosen by lot to be drawn by the Secretary-
General immediately after the first election has been completed.
3. The members of the Court shall continue to discharge their duties until their places
have been filled. Though replaced, they shall finish any cases which they may have
begun.
4. In the case of the resignation of a member of the Court, the resignation shall be
addressed to the President of the Court for transmission to the Secretary-General. This
last notification makes the place vacant.
Article 14
Vacancies shall be filled by the same method as that laid down for the first election
subject to the following provision: the Secretary-General shall, within one month of
the occurrence of the vacancy, proceed to issue the invitations provided for in Article
5, and the date of the election shall be fixed by the Security Council.
Article 15
A member of the Court elected to replace a member whose term of office has not
expired shall hold office for the remainder of his predecessor's term.
Article 16
1. No member of the Court may exercise any political or administrative function, or
engage in any other occupation of a professional nature.
2. Any doubt on this point shall be settled by the decision of the Court.
Article 17
1. No member of the Court may act as agent, counsel, or advocate in any case.
2. No member may participate in the decision of any case in which he has previously
taken part as agent, counsel, or advocate for one of the parties, or as a member of a
national or international court, or of a commission of enquiry, or in any other capacity.
3. Any doubt on this point shall be settled by the decision of the Court.
Article 18
1. No member of the Court can be dismissed unless, in the unanimous opinion of the
other members, he has ceased to fulfill the required conditions.
2. Formal notification thereof shall be made to the Secretary-General by the Registrar.
3. This notification makes the place vacant.
Article 19
The members of the Court, when engaged on the business of the Court, shall enjoy
diplomatic privileges and immunities.
Article 20
Every member of the Court shall, before taking up his duties, make a solemn
declaration in open court that he will exercise his powers impartially and
conscientiously.
Article 21
1. The Court shall elect its President and Vice-President for three years; they may be
re-elected.
2. The Court shall appoint its Registrar and may provide for the appointment of such
other officers as may be necessary.
Article 22
1. The seat of the Court shall be established at The Hague. This, however, shall not
prevent the Court from sitting and exercising its functions elsewhere whenever the
Court considers it desirable.
2. The President and the Registrar shall reside at the seat of the Court.
Article 23
1. The Court shall remain permanently in session, except during the judicial vacations,
the dates and duration of which shall be fixed by the Court.
2. Members of the Court are entitled to periodic leave, the dates and duration of which
shall be fixed by the Court, having in mind the distance between The Hague and the
home of each judge.
3. Members of the Court shall be bound, unless they are on leave or prevented from
attending by illness or other serious reasons duly explained to the President, to hold
themselves permanently at the disposal of the Court.
Article 24
1. If, for some special reason, a member of the Court considers that he should not take
part in the decision of a particular case, he shall so inform the President.
2. If the President considers that for some special reason one of the members of the
Court should not sit in a particular case, he shall give him notice accordingly.
3. If in any such case the member Court and the President disagree, the matter shall be
settled by the decision of the Court.
Article 25
1. The full Court shall sit except when it is expressly provided otherwise in the
present Statute.
2. Subject to the condition that the number of judges available to constitute the Court
is not thereby reduced below eleven, the Rules of the Court may provide for allowing
one or more judges, according to circumstances and in rotation, to be dispensed from
sitting.
3. A quorum of nine judges shall suffice to constitute the Court.
Article 26
1. The Court may from time to time form one or more chambers, composed of three
or more judges as the Court may determine, for dealing with particular categories of
cases; for example, labour cases and cases relating to transit and communications.
2. The Court may at any time form a chamber for dealing with a particular case. The
number of judges to constitute such a chamber shall be determined by the Court with
the approval of the parties.
3. Cases shall be heard and determined by the chambers provided for in this article if
the parties so request.
Article 27
A judgment given by any of the chambers provided for in Articles 26 and 29 shall be
considered as rendered by the Court.
Article 28
The chambers provided for in Articles 26 and 29 may, with the consent of the parties,
sit and exercise their functions elsewhere than at The Hague.
Article 29
With a view to the speedy dispatch of business, the Court shall form annually a
chamber composed of five judges which, at the request of the parties, may hear and
determine cases by summary procedure. In addition, two judges shall be selected for
the purpose of replacing judges who find it impossible to sit.
Article 30
1. The Court shall frame rules for carrying out its functions. In particular, it shall lay
down rules of procedure.
2. The Rules of the Court may provide for assessors to sit with the Court or with any
of its chambers, without the right to vote.
Article 31
1. Judges of the nationality of each of the parties shall retain their right to sit in the
case before the Court.
2. If the Court includes upon the Bench a judge of the nationality of one of the parties,
any other party may choose a person to sit as judge. Such person shall be chosen
preferably from among those persons who have been nominated as candidates as
provided in Articles 4 and 5.
3. If the Court includes upon the Bench no judge of the nationality of the parties, each
of these parties may proceed to choose a judge as provided in paragraph 2 of this
Article.
4. The provisions of this Article shall apply to the case of Articles 26 and 29. In such
cases, the President shall request one or, if necessary, two of the members of the
Court forming the chamber to give place to the members of the Court of the
nationality of the parties concerned, and, failing such, or if they are unable to be
present, to the judges specially chosen by the parties.
5. Should there be several parties in the same interest, they shall, for the purpose of
the preceding provisions, be reckoned as one party only. Any doubt upon this point
shall be settled by the decision of the Court.
6. Judges chosen as laid down in paragraphs 2, 3, and 4 of this Article shall fulfill the
conditions required by Articles 2, 17 (paragraph 2), 20, and 24 of the present Statute.
They shall take part in the decision on terms of complete equality with their
colleagues.
Article 32
1. Each member of the Court shall receive an annual salary.
2. The President shall receive a special annual allowance.
3. The Vice-President shall receive a special allowance for every day on which he acts
as President.
4. The judges chosen under Article 31, other than members of the Court, shall receive
compensation for each day on which they exercise their functions.
5. These salaries, allowances, and compensation shall be fixed by the General
Assembly. They may not be decreased during the term of office.
6. The salary of the Registrar shall be fixed by the General Assembly on the proposal
of the Court.
7. Regulations made by the General Assembly shall fix the conditions under which
retirement pensions may be given to members of the Court and to the Registrar, and
the conditions under which members of the Court and the Registrar shall have their
travelling expenses refunded.
8. The above salaries, allowances, and compensation shall be free of all taxation.
Article 33
The expenses of the Court shall be borne by the United Nations in such a manner as
shall be decided by the General Assembly.
CHAPTER II- COMPETENCE OF THE COURT
Article 34
1. Only states may be parties in cases before the Court.
2. The Court, subject to and in conformity with its Rules, may request of public
international organizations information relevant to cases before it, and shall receive
such information presented by such organizations on their own initiative.
3. Whenever the construction of the constituent instrument of a public international
organization or of an international convention adopted thereunder is in question in a
case before the Court, the Registrar shall so notify the public international
organization concerned and shall communicate to it copies of all the written
proceedings.
Article 35
1. The Court shall be open to the states parties to the present Statute.
2. The conditions under which the Court shall be open to other states shall, subject to
the special provisions contained in treaties in force, be laid down by the Security
Council, but in no case shall such conditions place the parties in a position of
inequality before the Court.
3. When a state which is not a Member of the United Nations is a party to a case, the
Court shall fix the amount which that party is to contribute towards the expenses of
the Court. This provision shall not apply if such state is bearing a share of the
expenses of the Court
Article 36
1. The jurisdiction of the Court comprises all cases which the parties refer to it and all
matters specially provided for in the Charter of the United Nations or in treaties and
conventions in force.
2. The states parties to the present Statute may at any time declare that they recognize
as compulsory ipso facto and without special agreement, in relation to any other state
accepting the same obligation, the jurisdiction of the Court in all legal disputes
concerning:
a. the interpretation of a treaty;
b. any question of international law;
c. the existence of any fact which, if established, would constitute a
breach of an international obligation;
d. the nature or extent of the reparation to be made for the breach of an
international obligation.
3. The declarations referred to above may be made unconditionally or on condition of
reciprocity on the part of several or certain states, or for a certain time.
4. Such declarations shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United
Nations, who shall transmit copies thereof to the parties to the Statute and to the
Registrar of the Court.
5. Declarations made under Article 36 of the Statute of the Permanent Court of
International Justice and which are still in force shall be deemed, as between the
parties to the present Statute, to be acceptances of the compulsory jurisdiction of the
International Court of Justice for the period which they still have to run and in
accordance with their terms..
6. In the event of a dispute as to whether the Court has jurisdiction, the matter shall be
settled by the decision of the Court.
Article 37
Whenever a treaty or convention in force provides for reference of a matter to a
tribunal to have been instituted by the League of Nations, or to the Permanent Court
of International Justice, the matter shall, as between the parties to the present Statute,
be referred to the International Court of Justice.
Article 38
1. The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law such
disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply:
a. international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing
rules expressly recognized by the contesting states;
b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as
law;
c. the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;
d. subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the
teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations,
as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law.
2. This provision shall not prejudice the power of the Court to decide a case ex aequo
et bono, if the parties agree thereto.
CHAPTER III - PROCEDURE
Article 39
1. The official languages of the Court shall be French and English. If the parties agree
that the case shall be conducted in French, the judgment shall be delivered in French.
If the parties agree that the case shall be conducted in English, the judgment shall be
delivered in English.
2. In the absence of an agreement as to which language shall be employed, each party
may, in the pleadings, use the language which it prefers; the decision of the Court
shall be given in French and English. In this case the Court shall at the same time
determine which of the two texts shall be considered as authoritative.
3. The Court shall, at the request of any party, authorize a language other than French
or English to be used by that party.
Article 40
1. Cases are brought before the Court, as the case may be, either by the notification of
the special agreement or by a written application addressed to the Registrar. In either
case the subject of the dispute and the parties shall be indicated.
2. The Registrar shall forthwith communicate the application to all concerned.
3. He shall also notify the Membqrs of the United Nations through the Secretary-
General, and also any other states entitled to appear before the Court.
Article 41
1. The Court shall have the power to indicate, if it considers that circumstances so
require, any provisional measures which ought to be taken to preserve the respective
rights of either party.
2. Pending the final decision, notice of the measures suggested shall forthwith be
given to the parties and to the Security Council
Article 42
1. The parties shall be represented by agents.
2. They may have the assistance of counsel or advocates before the Court.
3. The agents, counsel, and advocates of parties before the Court shall enjoy the
privileges and immunities necessary to the independent exercise of their duties.
Article 43
1. The procedure shall consist of two parts: written and oral.
2. The written proceedings shall consist of the communication to the Court and to the
parties of memorials, counter-memorials and, if necessary, replies; also all papers and
documents in support.
3. These communications shall be made through the Registrar, in the order and within
the time fixed by the Court.
4. A certified copy of every document produced by one party shall be communicated
to the other party.
5. The oral proceedings shall consist of the hearing by the Court of witnesses, experts,
agents, counsel, and advocates.
Article 44
1. For the service of all notices upon persons other than the agents, counsel, and
advocates, the Court shall apply direct to the government of the state upon whose
territory the notice has to be served.
2. The same provision shall apply whenever steps are to be taken to procure evidence
on the spot.
Article 45
The hearing shall be under the control of the President or, if he is unable to preside, of
the Vice-President; if neither is able to preside, the senior judge present shall preside.
Article 46
The hearing in Court shall be public, unless the Court shall decide othenvise, or
unless the parties demand that the public be not admitted.
Article 47
1. Minutes shall be made at each hearing and signed by the Registrar and the
President.
2. These minutes alone shall be authentic.
Article 48
The Court shall make orders for the conduct of the case, shall decide the form and
time in which each party must conclude its arguments, and make all arrangements
connected with the taking of evidence.
Article 49
The Court may, even before the hearing begins, call upon the agents to produce any
document or to supply any explanations. Formal note shall be taken of any refusal.
Article 50
The Court may, at any time, entrust any individual, body, bureau, commission, or
other organization that it may select, with the task of carrying out an enquiry or giving
an expert opinion.
Article 51
During the hearing any relevant questions are to be put to the witnesses and experts
under the conditions laid down by the Court in the rules of procedure referred to in
Article 30.
Article 52
After the Court has received the proofs and evidence within the time specified for the
purpose, it may refuse to accept any further oral or written evidence that one party
may desire to present unless the other side consents.
Article 53
1. Whenever one of the parties does not appear before the Court, or fails to defend its
case, the other party may call upon the Court to decide in favour of its claim.
2. The Court must, before doing so, satisfy itself, not only that it has jurisdiction in
accordance with Articles 36 and 37, but also that the claim is well founded in fact and
law.
Article 54
1. When, subject to the control of the Court, the agents, counsel, and advocates have
completed their presentation of the case, the President shall declare the hearing closed.
2. The Court shall withdraw to consider the judgment.
3. The deliberations of the Court shall take place in private and remain secret.
Article 55
1. All questions shall be decided by a majority of the judges present.
2. In the event of an equality of votes, the President or the judge who acts in his place
shall have a casting vote.
Article 56
1. The judgment shall state the reasons on which it is based.
2. It shall contain the names of the judges who have taken part in the decision.
Article 57
If the judgment does not represent in whole or in part the unanimous opinion of the
judges, any judge shall be entitled to deliver a separate opinion.
Article 58
The judgment shall be signed by the President and by the Registrar. It shall be read in
open court, due notice having been given to the agents.
Article 59
The decision of the Court has no binding force except between the parties and in
respect of that particular case.
Article 60
The judgment is final and without appeal. In the event of dispute as to the meaning or
scope of the judgment, the Court shall construe it upon the request of any party.
Article 61
1. An application for revision of a judgment may be made only when it is based upon
the discovery of some fact of such a nature as to be a decisive factor, which fact was,
when the judgment was given, unknown to the Court and also to the party claiming
revision, always provided that such ignorance was not due to negligence.
2. The proceedings for revision shall be opened by a judgment of the Court expressly
recording the existence of the new fact, recognizing that it has such a character as to
lay the case open to revision, and declaring the application admissible on this ground.
3. The Court may require previous compliance with the terms of the judgment before
it admits proceedings in revision.
4. The application for revision must be made at latest within six months of the
discovery of the new fact.
5. No application for revision may be made after the lapse of ten years from the date
of the judgment.
Article 62
1. Should a state consider that it has an interest of a legal nature which may be affected
by the decision in the case, it may submit a request to the Court to be permitted to
intervene.
2 It shall be for the Court to decide upon this request.
Article 63
1. Whenever the construction of a convention to which states other than those
concerned in the case are parties is in question, the Registrar shall notify all such
states forthwith.
2. Every state so notified has the right to intervene in the proceedings; but if it uses
this right, the construction given by the judgment will be equally binding upon it.
Article 64
Unless otherwise decided by the Court, each party shall bear its own costs.
CHAPTER IV - ADVISORY OPINIONS
Article 65
1. The Court may give an advisory opinion on any legal question at the request of
whatever body may be authorized by or in accordance with the Charter of the United
Nations to make such a request.
2. Questions upon which the advisory opinion of the Court is asked shall be laid
before the Court by means of a written request containing an exact statement of the
question upon which an opinion is required, and accompanied by all documents likely
to throw light upon the question.
Article 66
1. The Registrar shall forthwith give notice of the request for an advisory opinion to
all states entitled to appear before the Court.
2. The Registrar shall also, by means of a special and direct communication, notify
any state entitled to appear before the Court or international organization considered
by the Court, or, should it not be sitting, by the President, as likely to be able to
furnish information on the question, that the Court will be prepared to receive, within
a time limit to be fixed by the President, written statements, or to hear, at a public
sitting to be held for the purpose, oral statements relating to the question.
3. Should any such state entitled to appear before the Court have failed to receive the
special communication referred to in paragraph 2 of this Article, such state may
express a desire to submit a written statement or to be heard; and the Court will decide.
4. States and organizations having presented written or oral statements or both shall
be permitted to comment on the statements made by other states or organizations in
the form, to the extent, and within the time limits which the Court, or, should it not be
sitting, the President, shall decide in each particular case. Accordingly, the Registrar
shall in due time communicate any such written statements to states and organizations
having submitted similar statements.
Article 67
The Court shall deliver its advisory opinions in open court, notice having been given
to the Secretary-General and to the representatives of Members of the United Nations,
of other states and of international organizations immediately concerned.
Article 68
In the exercise of its advisory functions the Court shall further be guided by the
provisions of the present Statute which apply in contentious cases to the extent to
which it recognizes them to be applicable.
CHAPTER V - AMENDMENT
Article 69
Amendments to the present Statute shall be effected by the same procedure as is
provided by the Charter of the United Nations for amendments to that Charter, subject
however to any provisions which the General Assembly upon recommendation of the
Security Council may adopt concerning the participation of states which are parties to
the present Statute but are not Members of the United Nations.
Article 70
The Court shall have power to propose such amendments to the present Statute as it
may deem necessary, through written communications to the Secretary-General, for
consideration in conformity with the provisions of Article 69.
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CONVENTION ON THE SETTLEMENT
OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES BETWEEN STATES
AND NATIONALS OF OTHER STATES
PREAMBLE
he Contracting States
onsidering the need for international cooperation for economic development, and the
ole of private international investment therein;
Iearing in min the possibility that from time to time disputes may arise in connection
ecognizing that while such disputes would usually be subject to national legal
rocesses, international methods of settlement may be appropriate in certain cases;
ttaching particular importance to the availability of facilities for international
onciliation or arbitration to which Contracting States and nationals of other Contracting
tates may submit such disputes if they so desire;
esiring to establish such facilities under the auspices of the International Bank for
econstruction and Development;
ecognizing that mutual consent by the parties to submit such, disputes to conciliation
r to arbitration through such facilities constitutes a binding agreement which requires in
articular that due consideration be given to any recommendation of conciliators, and
hat any arbitral award be complied with; and
eclaring that no Contracting State shall by the mere fact of its ratification, acceptance
r approval of this Convention and without its consent be deemed to be under any
bligation to submit any particular dispute to conciliation or arbitration,
ave agreed as follows:
ith such investment between Contracting States and nationals of other Contracting
tates;
CHAPTER I
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes
Section 1
Establishment and Organization
Article 1
(1) There is hereby established the International Centre for Settlement of
Investment Disputes (hereinafter called the Centre).
(2) The purpose of the Centre shall be to provide facilities for conciliation and
arbitration of investment disputes between Contracting States and nationals of
other Contracting States in accordance with the provisions of this Convention.
Article 2
The seat of the Centre shall be/at the principal office of the International Bank for
Reconstruction and Developmeint (hereinafter called the Bank). The seat may be
moved to another place by deOsion of the Administrative Council adopted by a
majority of two-thirds of its members.
EArticle 3
The Centre shall have an Administrative Council and a Secretariat and shall
maintain a Panel of Conciliators and a Panel of Arbitrators.
Section 2
The Administrative Council
Article 4
(1) The Administrative Council shall be composed of one representative of each
Contracting State. An alternate may act as representative in case of his
principal's absence from a meeting or inability to act.
(2) In the absence of a contrary designation, each governor and alternate
governor of the Bank appointed by a Contracting State shall be ex officio its
representative and its alternate respectively.
Article 5
The President of the Bank shall be ex officio Chairman of the Administrative
Council (hereinafter called the Chairman) but shall have no vote. During his
absence or inability to act and during any vacancy in the office of President of the
Bank, the person for the time being acting as President shall act as Chairman of
the Administrative Council.
Article 6
(1) Without prejudice to the powers and functions vested in it by other provisions of
this Convention, the Administrative Council shall:
(a) adopt the administrative and financial regulations of the Centre;
(b) adopt the rules of procedure for the institution of conciliation and
arbitration proceedings;
(c) adopt the rules of procedure for conciliation and arbitration
proceedings (hereinafter called the Conciliation Rules and the Arbitration
Rules);
(d) approve arrangements with the Bank for the use of the Bank's
administrative facilities and sOrvices;
6(e) determine the conditions f service of the Secretary-General and of
any Deputy Secretary-Gener4 I;
(f) adopt the annual budget of revenues and expenditures of the Centre;
(g) approve the annual report on the operation of the Centre.
The decisions referred to in sub-paragraphs (a), (b), (c) and (f) above shall be
adopted by a majority of two-thirds of the members of the Administrative Council.
(2) The Administrative Council may appoint such committees as it considers
necessary.
(3) The Administrative Council shall also exercise such other powers and perform
such other functions as it shall determine to be necessary for the implementation of
the provisions of this Convention.
Article 7
(1) The Administrative Council shall hold an annual meeting and such other meetings
as may be determined by the Council, or convened by the Chairman, or convened by
the Secretary-General at the request of not less than five members of the Council.
(2) Each member of the Administrative Council shall have one vote and, except as
otherwise herein provided, all matters before the Council shall be decided by a
majority of the votes cast.
(3) A quorum for any meeting of the Administrative Council shall be a majority of its
members.
(4) The Administrative Council may establish, by a majority of two-thirds of its
members, a procedure whereby the Chairman may seek a vote of the Council without
convening a meeting of the Council. The vote shall be considered valid only if the
majority of the members of the Council cast their votes within the time limit fixed by
Article 8 Members of the Administrative Council and the Chairman shall serve
without remuneration from the Centre.
Section 3
The Secretariat
Article 9 The Secretariat shall consist of a Secretary-General, one or more
Deputy Secretaries-General and staff.
Article 10
(1) The Secretary-General and any Deputy Secretary-General shall be elected
by the Administrative Council by a majority of two-thirds of its members upon
the nomination of the Chairman for a term of service not exceeding six years
and shall be eligible for re-election. After consulting the members of the
Administrative Council, the Chairman shall propose one or more candidates for
each such office.
(2) The offices of Secretary- eneral and Deputy Secretary-General shall be
incompatible with the exercise  of any political function. Neither the Secretary-
General nor any Deputy Secretary-General may hold any other employment or
engage in any other occupation except with the approval of the Administrative
Council.
(3) During the Secretary-General's absence or inability to act, and during any
vacancy of the office of Secretary-General, the Deputy Secretary-General shall
act as Secretary-General. If there shall be more than one Deputy Secretary-
General, the Administrative Council shall determine in advance the order in
which they shall act as Secretary-General.
Article 11
The Secretary-General shall be the legal representative and the principal
officer of the Centre and shall be responsible for its administration, including
the appointment of staff, in accordance with the provisions of this Convention
and the rules adopted by the Administrative Council. He shall perform the
function of registrar and shall have the power to authenticate arb .itral awards
rendered pursuant to this Convention, and to certify copies thereof.
Section 4
The Panels
Article 12
The Panel of Conciliators and the Panel of Arbitrators shall each consist of
qualified persons, designated as hereinafter provided, who are willing to serve
thereon.
Article 13 (1) Each Contracting State may designate to each Panel four persons
who may but need not be its nationals.
(2) The Chairman may designate ten persons to each Panel. The persons so
designated to a Panel shall each have a different nationality.
Article 14 (1) Persons designated to serve on the Panels shall be persons of high
moral character and recognized competence in the fields of law, commerce,
industry or finance, who may be relied upon to exercise independent judgment.
Competence in the field of law shall be of particular importance in the case of
persons on the Panel of Arbitrators.
(2) The Chairman, in designating persons to serve on the Panels, shall in addition
pay due regard to the importance of assuring representation on the Panels of the
principal legal systems of the world and of the main forms of economic activity.
Article 15 (1) Panel members shall serve for renewable periods of six years.
(2) In case of death or resignation of a member of a Panel, the authority which
designated the member shakhave the right to designate another person to serve
for the remainder of that mem‘her's term.
(3) Panel members shall continue in office until their successors have been
designated.
Article 16
(1) A person may serve on both Panels.
(2) If a person shall have been designated to serve on the same Panel by more
than one Contracting State, or by one or more Contracting States and the
Chairman, he shall be deemed to have been designated by the authority which
first designated him or, if one such authority is the State of which he is a
national, by that State.
(3) All designations shall be notified to the Secretary-General and shall take
effect from the date on which the notification is received.
Section 5
Financing the Centre
Article 17 If the expenditure of the Centre cannot be met out of charges for the use
of its facilities, or out of other receipts, the excess shall be borne by Contracting
States which are members of the Bank in proportion to their respective subscriptions
to the capital stock of the Bank, and by Contracting States which are not members of
the Bank in accordance with rules adopted by the Administrative Council.
Section 6
Status, Immunities and Privileges
Article 18
The Centre shall have full international legal personality. The legal capacity of the
Centre shall include the capacity:
(a) to contract;
(b) to acquire and dispose of movable and immovable property;
(c) to institute legal proceedings.
Article 19
To enable the Centre to fulfil its functions, it shall enjoy in the territories of each
Contracting State the immunities and privileges set forth in this Section.
Article 20
The Centre, its property and assets shall enjoy immunity from all legal process,
except when the Centre waives this immunity.
Article 21
The Chairman, the members of the Administrative Council, persons acting as
conciliators or arbitrators or members of a Committee appointed pursuant to
paragraph (3) of Article 52, and the officers and employees of the Secretariat
-
(a) shall enjoy immunity from legal process with respect to acts
performed by them in the exercise of their functions, except when the
Centre waives this immunity;
(b) not being local nationals, shall enjoy the same immunities from
immigration restrictions, alien registration requirements and national
service obligations, the same facilities as regards exchange restrictions
and the same treatment in respect of travelling facilities as are accorded
by Contracting States to the representatives, officials and employees of
comparable rank of other Contracting States.
Article 22
The provisions of Article 21 shall apply to persons appearing in proceedings under
this Convention as parties, agents, counsel, advocates, witnesses or experts;
provided, however, that sub-paragraph (b) thereof shall apply only in connection with
their travel to and from, and their stay at, the place where the proceedings are held.
Article 23
(1) The archives of the Centre shall be inviolable, wherever they may be.
(2) With regard to its official communications, the Centre shall be accorded by each
Contracting State treatment not less favourable than that accorded to other
international organizations.
Article 24
-,,....„
(1) The Centre, its assets, property and income, and its operations and transactions
authorized by this Convention shall be exempt from all taxation and customs duties.
The Centre shall also be exempt from liability for the collection or payment of any
taxes or customs duties.
(2) Except in the case of local nationals, no tax shall be levied on or in respect of
expense allowances paid by the Centre to the Chairman or members of the
Administrative Council, or on or in respect of salaries, expense allowances or other
emoluments paid by the Centre to officials or employees of the Secretariat.
(3) No tax shall be levied on or in respect of fees or expense allowances received by
persons acting as conciliators, or arbitrators, or members of a Committee appointed
pursuant to paragraph (3) of Article 52, in proceedings under this Convention, if the
sole jurisdictional basis for such tax is the location of the Centre or the place where
such proceedings are conducted or the place where such fees or allowances are paid.
,	 CHAPTER II
Jurisdiction of the Centre
Article 25
(1) The jurisdiction -of the Centre shall extend to any legal dispute arising directly out
of an investment, between a Contracting State (or any constituent subdivision or
agency of a Contracting State designated to the Centre by that State) and a national
of another Contracting State, which the parties to the dispute consent in writing to
submit to the Centre. When the parties have given their consent, no party may
withdraw its consent unilaterally.
(2) "National of another Contracting State" means:
(a) any natural person who had the nationality of a Contracting State
other than the State party to the dispute on the date on which the parties
consented to submit such dispute to conciliation or arbitration as well as
on the date on which the request was registered pursuant to paragraph
(3) of Article 28 or paragraph (3) of Article 36, but does not include any
person who on either date also had the nationality of the Contracting
State party to the dispute; and
(b) any juridical person which had the nationality of a Contracting State
other than the State party to the dispute on the date on which the parties
consented to submit such dispute to conciliation or arbitration and any
juridical person which had the nationality of the Contracting State party
to the dispute on that date and which, because of foreign control, the
parties have agreed should be treated as a natioria-kof another
Contracting State for the purposes of this Convention.
(3) Consent by a constituent subdivision or agency of a Contracting State shall
require the approval of that State unless that State notifies the Centre that no such
approval is required.
(4) Any Contracting State may, at the time of ratification, acceptance or approval of
this Convention or at any time thereafter, notify the Centre of the class or classes of
disputes which it would or would not consider submitting to the jurisdiction of the
Centre. The Secretary-General shall forthwith transmit such notification to all
Contracting States. Such notification shall not constitute the consent required by
paragraph (1).
Article 26
Consent of the parties to arbitration under this Convention shall, unless otherwise
stated, be deemed consent to such arbitration to the exclusion of any other remedy.
A Contracting State may require the exhaustion of local administrative or judicial
remedies as a condition of its consent to arbitration under this Convention.
Article 27	 -
(1) No Contracting State shall give diplomatic protection, or bring an international
claim, in respect of a dispute which one of its nationals and another Contracting State
shall have consented to submit or shall have submitted to arbitration under this
Convention, unless such other Contracting State shall have failed to abide by and
comply with the award rendered in such dispute.
(2) Diplomatic protection, for the purposes of paragraph (1), shall not include
informal diplomatic exchanges for the sole purpose of facilitating a settlement of the
dispute.
CHAPTER III
Conciliation
Section 1
Request for Conciliation
Article 28
(1) Any Contracting State or any national of a Contracting State
wishing to institute conciliation proceedings shall address a request to that effect in
writing to the Secretary-General who shall send a copy of the request to the other
party.
(2) The request shall contain information concerning the ilies in dispute, the
identity of the parties and their consent to conciliation in accordance with the rules of
procedure for the institution of conciliation and arbitration proceedings.
(3) The Secretary-General shall register the request unless he finds, on the basis of
the information contained in the request, that the dispute is manifestly outside the
jurisdiction of the Centre. He shall forthwith notify the parties of registration or
refusal to register.
Section 2
Constitution of the Conciliation Commission
Article 29
(1) The Conciliation Commission (hereinafter called the Commission) shall be
constituted as soon as possible after registration of a request pursuant to Article 28.
(2) (a) The Commission shall consist of a sole conciliator or any uneven number of
conciliators appointed as the parties shall agree.
(b) Where the parties do not agree upon the number of conciliators and the
method of their appointment, the Commission shall consist of three conciliators,
one conciliator appointed by each party and the third, who shall be the president
of the Commis gion, appointed by agreement of the parties.
Article 30
If the Commission shall not have been constituted within 90 days after notice of
registration of the request has been dispatched by the Secretary-General in
accordance with paragraph (3) of Article 28, or such other period as the parties may
agree, the Chairman shall, at the request of either party and after consulting both
parties as far as possible, appoint the conciliator or conciliators not yet appointed.
Article 31
(1) Conciliators may be appointed from outside the Panel of Conciliators, except in
the case of appointments by the Chairman pursuant to Article 30.
(2) Conciliators appointed from outside the Panel of Conciliators shall possess the
qualities stated in paragraph (1) of Article 14.
Article 32
(1) The Commission shall be the judge of its own competen e.
(2) Any objection by a party to the dispute that that dispute is not within the
jurisdiction of the Centre, or for other reasons is not within the competence of the
Commission, shall be considered by the Commission which shall determine whether
to deal with it as a preliminary question or to join it to the merits of the dispute.
Article 33
Any conciliation proceeding shall be conducted in accordance with the provisions of
this Section and, except as the parties otherwise agree, in accordance with the
Conciliation Rules in effect on the date on which the parties consented to conciliation.
If any question of procedure arises which is not covered by this Section or the
Conciliation Rules or any rules agreed by the parties, the Commission shall decide the
question.
Article 34
(1) It shall be the duty of the Commission to clarify the issues in dispute between the
parties and to endeavour to bring about agreement between them upon mutually
acceptable terms. To that end, the Commission may at any stage of the proceedings
and from time to time recommend terms of settlement to the parties. The parties
shall cooperate in good faith with the Commission in order to enable the Commission
to carry out its functions, and shall give their most serious consideration to its
recommendations.
(2) If the parties reach agreement, the Commission shall draw up a report noting the
issues in dispute and recording that the parties have reached agreement. If, at any
stage of the proceedings, it appears to the Commission that there is no likelihood of
agreement between the parties, it shall close the proceedings and shall draw up a
report noting the submission of the dispute and recording the failure of the parties to
reach agreement. If one party fails to appear or participate in the proceedings, the
Commission shall close the proceedings and shall draw up a report noting that party's
failure to appear or participate.
Article 35
Except as the parties to the dispute shall otherwise agree, neither party to a
conciliation proceeding shall be entitled in any other proceeding, whether before
arbitrators or in a court of law or otherwise, to invoke or rely on any views expressed
or statements or admissions or offers of settlement made by the other party in the
conciliation proceedings, or the report or any recommendations made by the
Commission.
CHAPTER IV
Arbitration	 z
Section I
Request for Arbitration
Article 36
(1) Any Contracting State or any national of a Contracting State wishing to institute
arbitration proceedings shall address a request to that effect in writing to the
Secretary-General who shall send a copy of the request to the other party.
(2) The request shall contain information concerning the issues in dispute, the
identity of the parties and their consent to arbitration in accordance with the rules of
procedure for the institution of conciliation and arbitration proceedings.
(3) The Secretary-General shall register the request unless he finds, on the basis of
the information contained in the request, that the dispute is manifestly outside the
jurisdiction of the Centre. He shall forthwith notify the parties of registration or
refusal to register.
Section 2
Constitution of the Tribunal
Article 37
(1) The Arbitral Tribunal (hereinafter called the Tribunal) shall be constituted as soon
as possible after registration of a request pursuant to Article 36.
(2) (a) The Tribunal shall consist of a sole arbitrator or any uneven number of
arbitrators appointed as the parties shall agree.
(b) Where the parties do not agree upon the number of arbitrators and the
method of their appointment, the Tribunal shall consist of three arbitrators, one
arbitrator appointed by each party and the third, who shall be the president of
the Tribunal, appointed by agreement of the parties.
Article 38
If the Tribunal shall not have been constituted within 90 days after notice of
registration of the request has been dispatched by the Secretary-General in
accordance with paragraph (3) of Article 36, or such other period as the parties may
agree, the Chairman shall, at the request of either party and after consulting both
parties as far as possible, appoint the arbitrator or arbitrators not yet appointed.
Arbitrators appointed by the Chairman pursuant to this Article shall not be
)nationals of the Contracting State party to the dispute or of the C- racting State
whose national is a party to the dispute.
Article 39
The majority of the arbitrators shall be nationals of States other than the Contracting
State party to the dispute and the Contracting State whose national is a party to the
dispute; provided, however, that the foregoing provisions of this Article shall not
apply if the sole arbitrator or each individual member of the Tribunal has been
appointed by agreement of the parties.
Article 40
(1) Arbitrators may be appointed from outside the Panel of Arbitrators, except in the
case of appointments by the Chairman pursuant to Article 38.
(2) Arbitrators appointed from outside the Panel of Arbitrators shall possess the
qualities stated in paragraph (1) of Article 14.
Section 3
Powers and Functions of the Tribunal
Article 41
(1) The Tribunal shall be the judge of its own competence.
(2) Any objection by a party to the dispute that that dispute is not within the
jurisdiction of the Centre, or for other reasons is not within the competence of the
Tribunal, shall be considered by the Tribunal which shall determine whether to deal
with it as a preliminary question or to join it to the merits of the dispute.
Article 42
(1) The Tribunal shall decide a dispute in accordance with such rules of law as may be
agreed by the parties. In the absence of such agreement, the Tribunal shall apply the
law of the Contracting State party to the dispute (including its rules on the conflict of
laws) and such rules of international law as may be applicable.
(2) The Tribunal may not bring in a finding of non liquet on the ground of silence or
obscurity of the law.
(3) The provisions of paragraphs (1) and (2) shall not prejudice the power of the
Tribunal to decide a dispute ex aequo et bono if the parties so agree.
Article 43
Except as the parties otherwise agree, the Tribunal may, if it deems it necessary at
any stage of the proceedings,
(a) call upon the parties to produce documents or other evidence, and
(b) visit the scene connected with the dispute, and conduct such inquiries
there as it may deem appropriate.
Article 44
Any arbitration proceeding shall be conducted in acco danceance with the provisions of
this Section and, except as the parties otherwise agree, in accordance with the
Arbitration Rules in effect on the date on which the parties consented to arbitration. If
any question of procedure arises which is not covered by this Section or the
Arbitration Rules or any rules agreed by the parties, the Tribunal shall decide the
question.
Article 45
(1) Failure of a party to appear or to present his case shall not be deemed an
admission of the other party's assertions.
(2) If a party fails to appear or to present his case at any stage of the proceedings
the other party may request the Tribunal to deal with the questions submitted to it
and to render an award. Before rendering an award, the Tribunal shall notify, and
grant a period of grace to, the party failing to appear or to present its case, unless it
is satisfied that that party does not intend to do so.
Article 46
Except as the parties otherwise agree, the Tribunal shall, if requested by a party,
determine any incidental or additional claims or counterclaims arising directly out of
the subject-matter of the dispute provided that they are within the scope of the
consent of the parties and are otherwise within the jurisdiction of the Centre.
Article 47
Except as the parties otherwise agree, the Tribunal may, if it considers that the
circumstances so require, recommend any provisional measures which should be
taken to preserve the respective rights of either party.
Section 4
The Award
Article 48
(1) The Tribunal shall decide questions by a majority of the votes of all its members.
(2) The award of the Tribunal shall be in writing and shall be signed by the members
of the Tribunal who voted for it.
(3) The award shall deal with every question submitted to the Tribunal, and shall
state the reasons upon which it is based.
(4) Any member of the Tribunal may attach his individual opinion to the award,
whether he dissents from the majority or not, or a statement of his dissent.
(5) The Centre shall not publish the award without the consent of the parties.
Article 49
(1) The Secretary-General shall promptly dispatch certified copies of the award to the
parties. The award shall be deemed to have been rendered on the date on whith the
certified copies were dispatched.
-(2) The Tribunal upon the request of a party made within 45 days after the date on
which the award was rendered may after notice to the other party decide any
question which it had omitted to decide in the award, and shall rectify any clerical,
arithmetical or similar error in the award. Its decision shall become part of the award
and shall be notified to the parties in the same manner as the award. The periods of
time provided for under paragraph (2) of Article 51 and paragraph (2) of Article 52
shall run from the date on which the decision was rendered.
Section 5
Interpretation, Revision and Annulment of the Award
Article 50
(1) If any dispute shall arise between the parties as to the meaning or scope of an
award, either party may request interpretation of the award by an application in
writing addressed to the Secretary-General.
(2) The request shall, if possible, be submitted to the Tribunal which rendered the
award. If this shall not be possible, a new Tribunal shall be constituted in accordance
with Section 2 of this Chapter. The Tribunal may, if it considers that the
circumstances so require, stay enforcement of the award pending its decision.
Article 51
(1) Either party may request revision of the award by an application in writing
addressed to the Secretary-General on the ground of discovery of some fact of such a
nature as decisively to affect the award, provided that when the award was rendered
that fact was unknown to the Tribunal and to the applicant and that the applicant's
ignorance of that fact was not due to negligence.
(2) The application shall be made within 90 days after the discovery of such fact and
in any event within three years after the date on which the award was rendered.
(3) The request shall, if possible, be submitted to the Tribunal which rendered the
award. If this shall not be possible, a new Tribunal shall be constituted in accordance
with Section 2 of this Chapter.
(4) The Tribunal may, if it considers that the circumstances so require, stay
enforcement of the award pending its decision. If the applicant requests a stay of
enforcement of the award in his application, enforcement shall be stayed provisionally
until the Tribunal rules on such request.
Article 52
(1) Either party may request annulment of the award by an application in writing
addressed to the Secretary-General on one or more of the following grounds;
(a) that the Tribunal was not properly constituted;
(b) that the Tribunal has manifestly exceeded its powers;
(c) that there was corruption on the part of a member of the Tribunal;
(d) that there has been a serious departure from a fundamental rule of
procedure; or
(e) that the award has failed to state the reasons on which it is based.
(2) The application shall be made within 120 days after the date on which the award
was rendered except that when annulment is requested on the ground of corruption
such application shall be made within 120 days after discovery of the corruption and
in any event within three years after the date on which the award was rendered.
(3) On receipt of the request the Chairman shall forthwith appoint from the Panel of
Arbitrators an ad hoe Committee of three persons. None of the members of the
Committee shall have been a member of the Tribunal which rendered the award, shall
be of the same nationality as any such member, shall be a national of the State party
to the dispute or of the State whose national is a party to the dispute, shall have
been designated to the Panel of Arbitrators by either of those States, or shall have
acted as a conciliator in the same dispute. The Committee shall have the authority to
annul the award or any part thereof on any of the grounds set forth in paragraph (1).
(4) The provisions of Articles 41-45, 48, 49, 53 and 54, and of Chapters VI and VII
shall apply mutatis mutandis to proceedings before the Committee.
(5) The Committee may, if it considers that the circumstances so require, stay
enforcement of the award pending its decision. If the applicant requests a stay of
enforcement of the award in his application, enforcement shall be stayed provisionally
until the Committee rules on such request.
(6) If the award is annulled the dispute shall, at the request of either party, be
submitted to a new Tribunal constituted in accordance with Section 2 of this Chapter.
Section 6
Recognition and Enforcement of the Award
Article 53
(1) The award shall be binding on the parties and shall not be subject to any appeal
or to any other remedy except those provided for in this Convention. Each party shall
abide by and comply with the terms of the award except to the extent that
enforcement shall have been stayed pursuant to the relevant provisions of this
Convention.
(2) For the purposes of this Section, "award" shall include any decision interpreting,
revising or annulling such award pursuant to Articles 50, 51 or 52.
Article 54
(1) Each Contracting State shall recognize an award rendered pursuant to this
Convention as binding and enforce the pecuniary obligations imposed by that award
within its territories as if it were a final judgment of a court in that State. A
Contracting State with a federal constitution may enforce such an award in or
through its federal courts and may provide that such courts shall treat the award as if
it were a final judgment of the courts of a constituent state.
(2) A party seeking recognition or enforcement in the territories of a Contracting
State shall furnish to a competent court or other authority which such State shall
have designated for this purpose a copy of the award certified by the Secretary-
General. Each Contracting State shall notify the Secretary-General of the designation
of the competent court or other authority for this purpose and of any subsequent
change in such designation.
(3) Execution of the award shall be governed by the laws concerning the execution of
judgments in force in the State in whose territories such execution is sought.
Article 55
Nothing in Article 54 shall be construed as derogating from the law in force in any
Contracting State relating to immunity of that State or of any foreign State from
execution.
CHAPTER V
Replacement and Disqualification of Conciliators and Arbitrators
Article 56
(1) After a Commission or a Tribunal has been constituted and proceedings have
begun, its composition shall remain unchanged; provided, however, that if a
conciliator or an arbitrator should die, become incapacitated, or resign, the resulting
vacancy shall be filled in accordance with the provisions of Section 2 of Chapter III or
Section 2 of Chapter IV.
(2) A member of a Commission or Tribunal shall continue to serve in that capacity
notwithstanding that he shall have ceased to be a member of the Panel.
(3) If a conciliator or arbitrator appointed by a party shall have resigned without the
consent of the Commission or Tribunal of which he was a member, the Chairman
shall appoint a person from the appropriate Panel to fill the resulting vacancy.
Article 57
A party may propose to a Commission or Tribunal the disqualification of any of its
members on account of any fact indicating a manifest lack of the qualities required by
paragraph (1) of Article 14. A party to arbitration proceedings may, in addition,
propose the disqualification of an arbitrator on the ground that he was ineligible for
appointment to the Tribunal under Section 2 of Chapter IV.
Article 58
The decision on any proposal to disqualify a conciliator or arbitrator shall be taken by
the other members of the Commission or Tribunal as the case may be, provided that
where those members are equally divided, or in the case of a proposal to disqualify a
sole conciliator or arbitrator, or a majority of the conciliators or arbitrators, the
Chairman shall take that decision. If it is decided that the proposal is well-founded
the conciliator or arbitrator to whom the decision relates shall be replaced in
accordance with the provisions of Section 2 of Chapter III or Section 2 of Chapter IV.
CHAPTER VI
Cost of Proceedings
Article 59
The charges payable by the parties for the use of the facilities of the
Centre shall be determined by the Secretary-General in accordance with the
regulations adopted by the Administrative Council.
Article 60
(1) Each Commission and each Tribunal shall determine the fees and expenses of its
members within limits established from time to time by the Administrative Council
and after consultation with the Secretary-General.
(2) Nothing in paragraph (1) of this Article shall preclude the parties from agreeing in
advance with the Commission or Tribunal concerned upon the fees and expenses of
its members.
Article 61
(1) In the case of conciliation proceedings the fees and expenses of members of the
Commission as well as the charges for the use of the facilities of the Centre, shall be
borne equally by the parties. Each party shall bear any other expenses it incurs in
connection with the proceedings.
(2) In the case of arbitration proceedings the Tribunal shall, except as the parties
otherwise agree, assess the expenses incurred by the parties in connection with the
proceedings, and shall decide how and by whom those expenses, the fees and
expenses of the members of the Tribunal and the charges for the use of the facilities
of the Centre shall be paid. Such decision shall form part of the award.
-
	 CHAPTER VII
Place of Proceedings
Article 62
Conciliation and arbitration proceedings shall be held at the seat of the Centre except
as hereinafter provided.
Article 63
Conciliation and arbitration proceedings may be held, if the parties so agree,
(a) at the seat of the Permanent Court of Arbitration or of any other appropriate
institution, whether private or public, with which the Centre may make arrangements
for that purpose; or
(b) at any other place approved by the Commission or Tribunal after consultation with
the Secretary-General.
CHAPTER VIII
Disputes Between Contracting States
Article 64
Any dispute arising between Contracting States concerning the interpretation or
application of this Convention which is not settled by negotiation shall be referred to
the International Court of Justice by the application of any party to such dispute,
unless the States concerned agree to another method of settlement.
CHAPTER IX
Amendment
Article 65
Any Contracting State may propose amendment of this Convention. The text of a
proposed amendment shall be communicated to the Secretary-General not less than
90 days prior to the meeting of the Administrative Council at which such amendment
is to be considered and shall forthwith be transmitted by him to all the members of
the Administrative Council.
Article 66
(1) If the Administrative Council shall so decide by a majority of two-thirds of its
members, the proposed amendment shall be circulated to all Contracting States for
ratification, acceptance or approval. Each amendment shall enter into force 30 days
after dispatch by the depositary of this Convention of a notification to Contracting
States that all Contracting States have ratified, accepted or approved the
amendment.
(2) No amendment shall affect the rights and obligations under this Convention of
any Contracting State or of any of its constituent subdivisions or agencies, or of any
national of such State arising out of consent to the jurisdiction of the Centre given
before the date of entry into force of the amendment.
CHAPTER X
Final Provisions
Article 67
This Convention shall be open for signature on behalf of States members of the Bank.
It shall also be open for signature on behalf of any other State which is a party to the
Statute of the International Court of Justice and which the Administrative Council, by
a vote of two-thirds of its members, shall have invited to sign the Convention.
Article 68
(1) This Convention shall be subject to ratification, acceptance or approval by the
signatory States in accordance with their respective constitutional procedures.
(2) This Convention shall enter into force 30 days after the date of deposit of the
twentieth instrument of ratification, acceptance or approval. It shall enter into force
for each State which subsequently deposits its instrument of ratification, acceptance
or approval 30 days after the date of such deposit.
Article 69
Each Contracting State shall take such legislative or other measures as may be
necessary for making the provisions of this Convention effective in its territories.
Article 70
This Convention shall apply to all territories for whose international relations a
Contracting State is responsible, except those which are excluded by such State by
written notice to the depositary of this Convention either at the time of ratification,
acceptance or approval or subsequently.
Article 71
Any Contracting State may denounce this Convention by written notice to the
depositary of this Convention. The denunciation shall take effect six months after
receipt of such notice.
Article 72
Notice by a Contracting State pursuant to Articles 70 or 71 shall not affect the rights
or obligations under this Convention of that State or of any of its constituent
subdivisions or agencies or of any national of that State arising out of consent to the
jurisdiction of the Centre given by one of them before such notice was received by
the depositary.
Article 73
Instruments of ratification, acceptance or approval of this Convention and of
amendments thereto shall be deposited with the Bank which shall act as the
depositary of this Convention. The depositary shall transmit certified copies of this
Convention to States members of the Bank and to any other State invited to sign the
Convention.
Article 74
The depositary shall register this Convention with the Secretariat of the United
Nations in accordance with Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations and the
Regulations thereunder adopted by the General Assembly.
Article 75
The depositary shall notify all signatory States of the following:
(a) signatures in accordance with Article 67;
(b) deposits of instruments of ratification, acceptance and approval in
accordance with Article 73;
(c) the date on which this Convention enters into force in accordance with
Article 68;
(d) exclusions from territorial application pursuant to Article 70;
(e) the date on which any amendment of this Convention enters into
force in accordance with Article 66; and
(f) denunciations in accordance with Article 71.
DONE at Washington, in the English, French and Spanish languages, all three texts
being equally authentic, in a single copy which shall remain deposited in the archives
of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, which has indicated
by its signature Wow its agreement to fulfil the functions with which it is charged
under this Convention.
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UNDERSTANDING ON RULES AND PROCEDURES
GOVERNING THE SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES
Members hereby agree as follows:
Article 1
Coverage and Application
1. The rules and procedures of this Understanding shall apply to disputes brought pursuant to the
consultation and dispute settlement provisions of the agreements listed in Appendix 1 to this
Understanding (referred to in this Understanding as the "covered agreements"). The rules and procedures
of this Understanding shall also apply to consultations and the settlement of disputes between Members
concerning their rights and obligations under the provisions of the Agreement Establishing the World
Trade Organization (referred to in this Understanding as the "WTO Agreement") and of this Understanding
taken in isolation or in combination with any other covered agreement.
2. The rules and procedures of this Understanding shall apply subject to such special or additional
rules and procedures on dispute settlement contained in the covered agreements as are identified in
Appendix 2 to this Understanding. To the extent that there is a difference between the rules and
procedures of this Understanding and the special or additional rules and procedures set forth in
Appendix 2, the special or additional rules and procedures in Appendix 2 shall prevail. In disputes
involving rules and procedures under more than one covered agreement, if there is a conflict between
special or additional rules and procedures of such agreements under review, and where the parties to
the dispute cannot agree on rules and procedures within 20 days of the establishment of the panel, the
Chairman of the Dispute Settlement Body provided for in paragraph 1 of Article 2 (referred to in this
Understanding as the "DSB"), in consultation with the parties to the dispute, shall determine the rules
and procedures to be followed within 10 days after a request by either Member. The Chairman shall
be guided by the principle that special or additional rules and procedures should be used where possible,
and the rules and procedures set out in this Understanding should be used to the extent necessary to
avoid conflict.
Article 2
Administration
1. The Dispute Settlement Body is hereby established to administer these rules and procedures
and, except as otherwise provided in a covered agreement, the consultation and dispute settlement
provisions of the covered agreements. Accordingly, the DSB shall have the authority to establish panels,
adopt panel and Appellate Body reports, maintain surveillance of implementation of rulings and
recommendations, and authorize suspension of concessions and other obligations under the covered
agreements. With respect to disputes arising under a covered agreement which is a Plurilateral Trade
Agreement, the term "Member" as used herein shall refer only to those Members that are parties to
the relevant Plurilateral Trade Agreement. Where the DSB administers the dispute settlement provisions
of a Plurilateral Trade Agreement, only those Members that are parties to that Agreement may participate
in decisions or actions taken by the DSB with respect to that dispute.
2. The DSB shall inform the relevant WTO Councils and Committees of any developments in
disputes related to provisions of the respective covered agreements.
3. The DSB shall meet as often as necessary to carry out its functions within the time-frames
provided in this Understanding.
4. Where the rules and procedures of this Understanding provide for the DSB to take a decision,
it shall do so by consensus.'
Article 3
General Provisions
1. Members affirm their adherence to the principles for the management of disputes heretofore
applied under Articles XXII and XXIII of GATT 1947, and the rules and procedures as further elaborated
and modified herein.
2. The dispute settlement system of the WTO is a central element in providing security and
predictability to the multilateral trading system. The Members recognize that it serves to preserve the
rights and obligations of Members under the covered agreements, and to clarify the existing provisions
of those agreements in accordance with customary rules of interpretation of public international law.
Recommendations and rulings of the DSB cannot add to or diminish the rights and obligations provided
in the covered agreements.
3. The prompt settlement of situations in which a Member considers that any benefits accruing
to it directly or indirectly under the covered agreements are being impaired by measures taken by another
Member is essential to the effective functioning of the WTO and the maintenance of a proper balance
between the rights and obligations of Members.
4. Recommendations or rulings made by the DSB shall be aimed at achieving a satisfactory
settlement of the matter in accordance with the rights and obligations under this Understanding and
under the covered agreements.
5. All solutions to matters formally raised under the consultation and dispute settlement provisions
of the covered agreements, including arbitration awards, shall be consistent with those agreements and
shall not nullify or impair benefits accruing to any Member under those agreements, nor impede the
attainment of any objective of those agreements.
6. Mutually agreed solutions to matters formally raised under the consultation and dispute settlement
provisions of the covered agreements shall be notified to the DSB and the relevant Councils and
Committees, where any Member may raise any point relating thereto.
7. Before bringing a case, a Member shall exercise its judgement as to whether action under these
procedures would be fruitful. The aim of the dispute settlement mechanism is to secure a positive
solution to a dispute. A solution mutually acceptable to the parties to a dispute and consistent with
the covered agreements is clearly to be preferred. In the absence of a mutually agreed solution, the
first objective of the dispute settlement mechanism is usually to secure the withdrawal of the measures
concerned if these are found to be inconsistent with the provisions of any of the covered agreements.
The provision of compensation should be resorted to only if the immediate withdrawal of the measure
'The DS B shall be deemed to have decided by consensus on a matter submitted for its consideration, if no Member, present
at the meeting of the DSB when the decision is taken, formally objects to the proposed decision.
is impracticable and as a temporary measure pending the withdrawal of the measure which is inconsistent
with a covered agreement. The last resort which this Understanding provides to the Member invoking
the dispute settlement procedures is the possibility of suspending the application of concessions or other
obligations under the covered agreements on a discriminatory basis vis-à-vis the other Member, subject
to authorization by the DSB of such measures.
8. In cases where there is an infringement of the obligations assumed under a covered agreement,
the action is considered prima facie to constitute a case of nullification or impairment. This means
that there is normally a presumption that a breach of the rules has an adverse impact on other Members
parties to that covered agreement, and in such cases, it shall be up to the Member against whom the
complaint has been brought to rebut the charge. •
9. The provisions of this Understanding are without prejudice to the rights of Members to seek
authoritative interpretation of provisions of a covered agreement through decision-making under the
WTO Agreement or a covered agreement which is a Plurilateral Trade Agreement.
10. It is understood that requests for conciliation and the use of the dispute settlement procedures
should not be intended or considered as contentious acts and that, if a dispute arises, all Members will
engage in these procedures in good faith in an effort to resolve the dispute. It is also understood that
complaints and counter-complaints in regard to distinct matters should not be linked.
11. This Understanding shall be applied only with respect to new requests for consultations under
the consultation provisions of the covered agreements made on or after the date of entry into force
of the WTO Agreement. With respect to disputes for which the request for consultations was made
under GATT 1947 or under any other predecessor agreement to the covered agreements before the
date of entry into force of the WTO Agreement, the relevant dispute settlement rules and procedures
in effect immediately prior to the date of entry into force of the WTO Agreement shall continue to
apply.2
12. Notwithstanding paragraph 11, if a complaint based on any of the covered agreements is brought
by a developing country Member against a developed country Member, the complaining party shall
have the right to invoke, as an alternative to the provisions contained in Articles 4, 5, 6 and 12 of this
Understanding, the corresponding provisions of the Decision of 5 April 1966 (BISD 14S/18), except
that where the Panel considers that the time-frame provided for in paragraph 7 of that Decision is
insufficient to provide its report and with the agreement of the complaining party, that time-frame may
be extended. To the extent that there is a difference between the rules and procedures of Articles 4,
5, 6 and 12 and the corresponding rules and procedures of the Decision, the latter shall prevail.
Article 4
Consultations
1.	 Members affirm their resolve to strengthen and improve the effectiveness of the consultation
procedures employed by Members.
2This paragraph shall also be applied to disputes on which panel reports have not been adopted or fully implemented.
2. Each Member undertakes to accord sympathetic consideration to and afford adequate opportunity
for consultation regarding any representations made by another Member concerning measures affecting
the operation of any covered agreement taken within the territory of the former.3
3. If a request for consultations is made pursuant to a covered agreement, the Member to which
the request is made shall, unless otherwise mutually agreed, reply to the request within 10 days after
the date of its receipt and shall enter into consultations in good faith within a period of no more than
30 days after the date of receipt of the request, with a view to reaching a mutually satisfactory solution.
If the Member does not respond within 10 days after the date of receipt of the request, or does not
enter into consultations within a period of no more than 30 days, or a period otherwise mutually agreed,
after the date of receipt of the request, then the Member that requested the holding of consultations
may proceed directly to request the establishment of a panel.
4. All such requests for consultations shall be notified to the DSB and the relevant Councils and
Committees by the Member which requests consultations. Any request for consultations shall be
submitted in writing and shall give the reasons for the request, including identification of the measures
at issue and an indication of the legal basis for the complaint.
5. In the course of consultations in accordance with the provisions of a covered agreement, before
resorting to further action under this Understanding, Members should attempt to obtain satisfactory
adjustment of the matter.
6. Consultations shall be confidential, and without prejudice to the rights of any Member in any
further proceedings.
7. If the consultations fail to settle a dispute within 60 days after the date of receipt of the request
for consultations, the complaining party may request the establishment of a panel. The complaining
party may request a panel during the 60-day period if the consulting parties jointly consider that
consultations have failed to settle the dispute.
8. In cases of urgency, including those which concern perishable goods, Members shall enter into
consultations within a period of no more than 10 days after the date of receipt of the request. If the
consultations have failed to settle the dispute within a period of 20 days after the date of receipt of
the request, the complaining party may request the establishment of a panel.
9. In cases of urgency, including those which concern perishable goods, the parties to the dispute,
panels and the Appellate Body shall make every effort to accelerate the proceedings to the greatest
extent possible.
10. During consultations Members should give special attention to the particular problems and
interests of developing country Members.
11. Whenever a Member other than the consulting Members considers that it has a substantial trade
interest in consultations being held pursuant to paragraph 1 of Article XXII of GATT 1994, paragraph 1
of Article XXII of GATS, or the corresponding provisions in other covered agreements°, such Member
'Where the provisions of any other covered agreement concerning measures taken by regional or local governments or
authorities within the territory of a Member contain provisions different from the provisions of this paragraph, the provisions
of such other covered agreement shall prevail.
4The corresponding consultation provisions in the covered agreements are listed hereunder: Agreement on Agriculture,
Article 19; Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, paragraph 1 of Article 11; Agreement
on Textiles and Clothing, paragraph 4 of Article 8; Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, paragraph 1 of Article 14;
may notify the consulting Members and the DSB, within 10 days after the date of the circulation of
the request for consultations under said Article, of its desire to be joined in the consultations. Such
Member shall be joined in the consultations, provided that the Member to which the request for
consultations was addressed agrees that the claim of substantial interest is well-founded. In that event
they shall so inform the DSB. If the request to be joined in the consultations is not accepted, the
applicant Member shall be free to request consultations under paragraph 1 of Article XXII or paragraph 1
of Article XXIII of GATT 1994, paragraph 1 of Article X.XII or paragraph 1 of Article XXIII of GATS,
or the corresponding provisions in other covered agreements.
A rticle 5
Good Offices, Conciliation and Mediation
1. Good offices, conciliation and mediation are procedures that are undertaken voluntarily if the
parties to the dispute so agree.
2. Proceedings involving good offices, conciliation and mediation, and in particular positions taken
by the parties to the dispute during these proceedings, shall be confidential, and without prejudice to
the rights of either party in any further proceedings under these procedures.
3. Good offices, conciliation or mediation may be requested at any time by any party to a dispute.
They may begin at any time and be terminated at any time. Once procedures for good offices,
conciliation or mediation are terminated, a complaining party may then proceed with a request for the
establishment of a panel.
4. When good offices, conciliation or mediation are entered into within 60 days after the date
of receipt of a request for consultations, the complaining party must allow a period of 60 days after
the date of receipt of the request for consultations before requesting the establishment of a panel. The
complaining party may request the establishment of a panel during the 60-day period if the parties to
the dispute jointly consider that the good offices, conciliation or mediation process has failed to settle
the dispute.
5. If the parties to a dispute agree, procedures for good offices, conciliation or mediation may
continue while the panel process proceeds.
6. The Director-General may, acting in an ex officio capacity, offer good offices, conciliation
or mediation with the view to assisting Members to settle a dispute.
Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures, Article 8; Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of GATT 1994,
paragraph 2 of Article 17; Agreement on Implementation of Article VII of GATT 1994, paragraph 2 of Article 19; Agreement
on Preshipment Inspection, Article 7; Agreement on Rules of Origin, Article 7; Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures,
Article 6; Agreement on S ubsidies and Countervailing Measures, Article 30; Agreement on Safeguards, Article 14; Agreement
on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Article 64.1; and any corresponding consultation provisions in
Plurilateral Trade Agreements as determined by the competent bodies of each Agreement and as notified to the DSB.
Article 6
Establishment of Panels
1. If the complaining party so requests, a panel shall be established at the latest at the DSB meeting
following that at which the request first appears as an item on the DSB's agenda, unless at that meeting
the DSB decides by consensus not to establish a panel.'
2. The request for the establishment of a panel shall be made in writing. It shall indicate whether
consultations were held, identify the specific measures at issue and provide a brief summary of the
legal basis of the complaint sufficient to present the problem clearly. In case the applicant requests
the establishment of a panel with other than standard terms of reference, the written request shall include
the proposed text of special terms of reference.
Article 7
Terms of Reference of Panels
1. Panels shall have the following terms of reference unless the parties to the dispute agree otherwise
within 20 days from the establishment of the panel:
"To examine, in the light of the relevant provisions in (name of the covered agreement(s)
cited by the parties to the dispute), the matter referred to the DSB by (name of party) in
document ... and to make such findings as will assist the DSB in making the recommendations
or in giving the rulings provided for in that/those agreement(s)."
2. Panels shall address the relevant provisions in any covered agreement or agreements cited by
the parties to the dispute.
3. In establishing a panel, the DSB may authorize its Chairman to draw up the terms of reference
of the panel in consultation with the parties to the dispute, subject to the provisions of paragraph 1.
The terms of reference thus drawn up shall be circulated to all Members. If other than standard terms
of reference are agreed upon, any Member may raise any point relating thereto in the DSB.
Article 8
Composition of Panels
1. Panels shall be composed of well-qualified governmental and/or non-governmental individuals,
including persons who have served on or presented a case to a panel, served as a representative of a
Member or of a contracting party to GATT 1947 or as a representative to the Council or Committee
of any covered agreement or its predecessor agreement, or in the Secretariat, taught or published on
international trade law or policy, or served as a senior trade policy official of a Member.
2. Panel members should be selected with a view to ensuring the independence of the members,
a sufficiently diverse background and a wide spectrum of experience.
5If the complaining party so requests, a meeting of the DSB shall be convened for this purpose within 15 days of the
request, provided that at least 10 days advance notice of the meeting is given.
3. Citizens of Members whose governments' are parties to the dispute or third parties as defined
in paragraph 2 of Article 10 shall not serve on a panel concerned with that dispute, unless the parties
to the dispute agree otherwise.
4. To assist in the selection of panelists, the Secretariat shall maintain an indicative list of
governmental and non-governmental individuals possessing the qualifications outlined in paragraph
1, from which panelists may be drawn as appropriate. That list shall include the roster of non-
governmental panelists established on 30 November 1984 (BISD 31S/9), and other rosters and indicative
lists established under any of the covered agreements, and shall retain the names of persons on those
rosters and indicative lists at the time of entry into force of the WTO Agreement. Members may
periodically suggest names of governmental and non-governmental individuals for inclusion on the
indicative list, providing relevant information on their knowledge of international trade and of the sectors
or subject matter of the covered agreements, and those names shall be added to the list upon approval
by the DSB. For each of the individuals on the list, the list shall indicate specific areas of experience
or expertise of the individuals in the sectors or subject matter of the covered agreements.
5. Panels shall be composed of three panelists unless the parties to the dispute agree, within 10 days •
from the establishment of the panel, to a panel composed of five panelists. Members shall be informed
promptly of the composition of the panel.
6. The Secretariat shall propose nominations for the panel to the parties to the dispute. The parties
to the dispute shall not oppose nominations except for compelling reasons.
7. If there is no agreement on the panelists within 20 days after the date of the establishment of
a panel, at the request of either party, the Director-General, in consultation with the Chairman of the
DSB and the Chairman of the relevant Council or Committee, shall determine the composition of the
panel by appointing the panelists whom the Director-General considers most appropriate in accordance
with any relevant special or additional rules or procedures of the covered agreement or covered
agreements which are at issue in the dispute, after consulting with the parties to the dispute. The
Chairman of the DSB shall inform the Members of the composition of the panel thus formed no later
than 10 days after the date the Chairman receives such a request.
8. Members shall undertake, as a general rule, to permit their officials to serve as panelists.
9. Panelists shall serve in their individual capacities and not as government representatives, nor
as representatives of any organization. Members shall therefore not give them instructions nor seek
to influence them as individuals with regard to matters before a panel.
10. When a dispute is between a developing country Member and a developed country Member
the panel shall, if the developing country Member so requests, include at least one panelist from a
developing country Member.
11. Panelists' expenses, including travel and subsistence allowance, shall be met from the WTO
budget in accordance with criteria to be adopted by the General Council, based on recommendations
of the Committee on Budget, Finance and Administration.
6In the case where customs unions or common markets are parties to a dispute, this provision applies to citizens of all
member countries of the customs unions or common markets.
Article 9
Procedures for Multiple Complainants
1. Where more than one Member requests the establishment of a panel related to the same matter,
a single panel may be established to examine these complaints taking into account the rights of all
Members concerned. A single panel should be established to examine such complaints whenever feasible.
2. The single panel shall organize its examination and present its findings to the DSB in such
a manner that the rights which the parties to the dispute would have enjoyed had separate panels examined
the complaints are in no way impaired. If one of the parties to the dispute so requests, the panel shall
submit separate reports on the dispute concerned. The written submissions by each of the complainants
shall be made available to the other complainants, and each complainant shall have the right to be present
when any one of the other complainants presents its views to the panel.
3. If more than one panel is established to examine the complaints related to the same matter,
to the greatest extent possible the same persons shall serve as panelists on each of the separate panels
and the timetable for the panel process in such disputes shall be harmonized.
Article 10
Third Parties
1. The interests of the parties to a dispute and those of other Members under a covered agreement
at issue in the dispute shall be fully taken into account during the panel process.
2. Any Member having a substantial interest in a matter before a panel and having notified its
interest to the DSB (referred to in this Understanding as a "third party") shall have an opportunity to
be heard by the panel and to make written submissions to the panel. These submissions shall also be
given to the parties to the dispute and shall be reflected in the panel report.
3. Third parties shall receive the submissions of the parties to the dispute to the first meeting of
the panel.
4. If a third party considers that a measure already the subject of a panel proceeding nullifies or
impairs benefits accruing to it under any covered agreement, that Member may have recourse to normal
dispute settlement procedures under this Understanding. Such a dispute shall be referred to the original
panel wherever possible.
Article 11
Function of Panels
The function of panels is to assist the DSB in discharging its responsibilities under this
Understanding and the covered agreements. Accordingly, a panel should make an objective assessment
of the matter before it, including an objective assessment of the facts of the case and the applicability
of and conformity with the relevant covered agreements, and make such other findings as will assist
the DSB in making the recommendations or in giving the rulings provided for in the covered agreements.
Panels should consult regularly with the parties to the dispute and give them adequate opportunity to
develop a mutually satisfactory solution.
,/
Article 12
Panel Procedures
...
1. Panels shall follow the Working Procedures in Appendix 3 unless the panel decides otherwise
after consulting the parties to the dispute.
2. Panel procedures should provide sufficient flexibility so as to ensure high-quality panel reports,
while not unduly delaying the panel process.
3. After consulting the parties to the dispute, the panelists shall, as soon as practicable and whenever
possible within one week after the composition and terms of reference of the panel have been agreed
upon, fix the timetable for the panel process, taking into account the provisions of paragraph 9 of
Article 4, if relevant.
4. In determining the timetable for the panel process, the panel shall provide sufficient time for
the parties to the dispute to prepare their submissions.
5. Panels should set precise deadlines for written submissions by the parties and the parties should
respect those deadlines.
6. Each party to the dispute shall deposit its written submissions with the Secretariat for immediate
transmission to the panel and to the other party or parties to the dispute. The complaining party shall
submit its first submission in advance of the responding party's first submission unless the panel decides,
in fixing the timetable referred to in paragraph 3 and after consultations with the parties to the dispute,
that the parties should submit their first submissions simultaneously. When there are sequential
arrangements for the deposit of first submissions, the panel shall establish a firm time-period for receipt
of the responding party's submission. Any subsequent written submissions shall be submitted
simultaneously.
7. Where the parties to the dispute have failed to develop a mutually satisfactory solution, the
panel shall submit its findings in the form of a written report to the DSB. In such cases, the report
of a panel shall set out the findings of fact, the applicability of relevant provisions and the basic rationale
behind any findings and recommendations that it makes. Where a settlement of the matter among the
parties to the dispute has been found, the report of the panel shall be confined to a brief description
of the case and to reporting that a solution has been reached.
8. In order to make the procedures more efficient, the period in which the panel shall conduct
its examination, from the date that the composition and terms of reference of the panel have been agreed
upon until the date the final report is issued to the parties to the dispute, shall, as a general rule, not
exceed six months. In cases of urgency, including those relating to perishable goods, the panel shall
aim to issue its report to the parties to the dispute within three months.
9. When the panel considers that it cannot issue its report within six months, or within three months
in cases of urgency, it shall inform the DSB in writing of the reasons for the delay together with an
estimate of the period within which it will issue its report. In no case should the period from the
establishment of the panel to the circulation of the report to the Members exceed nine months.
10. In the context of consultations involving a measure taken by a developing country Member,
the parties may agree to extend the periods established in paragraphs 7 and 8 of Article 4. If, after
the relevant period has elapsed, the consulting parties cannot agree that the consultations have concluded,
the Chairman of the DSB shall decide, after consultation with the parties, whether to extend the relevant
period and, if so, for how long. In addition, in examining a complaint against a developing country
Member, the panel shall accord sufficient time for the developing country Member to prepare and present
its argumentation. The provisions of paragraph 1 of Article 20 and paragraph 4 of Article 21 are not
affected by any action pursuant to this paragraph.
11. Where one or more of the parties is a developing country Member, the panel's report shall
explicitly indicate the form in which account has been taken of relevant provisions on differential and
more-favourable treatment for developing country Members that form part of the covered agreements
which have been raised by the developing country Member in the course of the dispute settlement
procedures.
12. The panel may suspend its work at any time at the request of the complaining party for a period
not to exceed 12 months. In the event of such a suspension, the time-frames set out in paragraphs
8 and 9 of this Article, paragraph 1 of Article 20, and paragraph 4 of Article 21 shall be extended
by the amount of time that the work was suspended. If the work of the panel has been suspended for
more than 12 months, the authority for establishment of the panel shall lapse.
Article 13
Right to Seek Information
1. Each panel shall have the right to seek information and technical advice from any individual
or body which it deems appropriate. However, before a panel seeks such information or advice from
any individual or body within the jurisdiction of a Member it shall inform the authorities of that Member.
A Member should respond promptly and fully to any request by a panel for such information as the
panel considers necessary and appropriate. Confidential information which is provided shall not be
revealed without formal authorization from the individual, body, or authorities of the Member providing
the information.
2. Panels may seek information from any relevant source and may consult experts to obtain their
opinion on certain aspects of the matter. With respect to a factual issue concerning a scientific or other
technical matter raised by a party to a dispute, a panel may request an advisory report in writing from
an expert review group. Rules for the establishment of such a group and its procedures are set forth
in Appendix 4.
Article 14
Confidentiality
1. Panel deliberations shall be confidential.
2. The reports of panels shall be drafted without the presence of the parties to the dispute in the
light of the information provided and the statements made.
3. Opinions expressed in the panel report by individual panelists shall be anonymous.
Article 15
Interim Review Stage
1. Following the consideration of rebuttal submissions and oral arguments, the panel shall issue
the descriptive (factual and argument) sections of its draft report to the parties to the dispute. Within
a period of time set by the panel, the parties shall submit their comments in writing.
2. Following the expiration of the set period of time for receipt of comments from the parties
to the dispute, the panel shall issue an interim report to the parties, including both the descriptive sections
and the panel's findings and conclusions. Within a period of time set by the panel, a party may submit
a written request for the panel to review precise aspects of the interim report prior to circulation of
the final report to the Members. At the request of a party, the panel shall hold a further meeting with
the parties on the issues identified in the written comments. If no comments are received from any
party within the comment period, the interim report shall be considered the final panel report and
circulated promptly to the Members.
3. The findings of the final panel report shall include a discussion of the arguments made at the
interim review stage. The interim review stage shall be conducted within the time-period set out in
paragraph 8 of Article 12.
Article 16
A doption of Panel Reports
1. In order to provide sufficient time for the Members to consider panel reports, the reports shall
not be considered for adoption by the DSB until 20 days after the date they have been circulated to
the Members.
2. Members having objections to a panel report shall give written reasons to explain their objections
for circulation at least 10 days prior to the DSB meeting at which the panel report will be considered.
3. The parties to a dispute shall have the right to participate fully in the consideration of the panel
report by the DSB, and their views shall be fully recorded.
4. Within 60 days after the date of circulation of a panel report to the Members, the report shall
be adopted at a DSB meeting' unless a party to the dispute formally notifies the DSB of its decision
to appeal or the DSB decides by consensus not to adopt the report. If a party has notified its decision
to appeal, the report by the panel shall not be considered for adoption by the DSB until after completion
of the appeal. This adoption procedure is without prejudice to the right of Members to express their
views on a panel report.
7If a meeting of the DSB is not scheduled within this period at a time that enables the requirements of paragraphs 1 and 4
of Article 16 to be met, a meeting of the DSB shall be held for this purpose.
Article 17
Appellate Review
Standing Appellate Body
1. A standing Appellate Body shall be established by the DSB. The Appellate Body shall hear
appeals from panel cases. It shall be composed of seven persons, three of whom shall serve on any
one case. Persons serving on the Appellate Body shall serve in rotation. Such rotation shall be
determined in the working procedures of the Appellate Body.
2. The DSB shall appoint persons to serve on the Appellate Body for a four-year term, and each
person may be reappointed once. However, the terms of three of the seven persons appointed immediately
after the entry into force of the WTO Agreement shall expire at the end of two years, to be determined
by lot. Vacancies shall be filled as they arise. A person appointed to replace a person whose term
of office has not expired shall hold office for the remainder of the predecessor's term.
3. The Appellate Body shall comprise persons of recognized authority, with demonstrated expertise
in law, international trade and the subject matter of the covered agreements generally. They shall be
unaffiliated with any government. The Appellate Body membership shall be broadly representative
of membership in the WTO. All persons serving on the Appellate Body shall be available at all times
and on short notice, and shall stay abreast of dispute settlement activities and other relevant activities
of the WTO. They shall not participate in the consideration of any disputes that would create a direct
or indirect conflict of interest.
4. Only parties to the dispute, not third parties, may appeal a panel report. Third parties which
have notified the DSB of a substantial interest in the matter pursuant to paragraph 2 of Article 10 may
make written submissions to, and be given an opportunity to be heard by, the Appellate Body.
5. As a general rule, the proceedings shall not exceed 60 days from the date a party to the dispute
formally notifies its decision to appeal to the date the Appellate Body circulates its report. In fixing
its timetable the Appellate Body shall take into account the provisions of paragraph 9 of Article 4, if
relevant. When the Appellate Body considers that it cannot provide its report within 60 days, it shall
inform the DSB in writing of the reasons for the delay together with an estimate of the period within
which it will submit its report. In no case shall the proceedings exceed 90 days.
6. An appeal shall be limited to issues of law covered in the panel report and legal interpretations
developed by the panel.
7. The Appellate Body shall be provided with appropriate administrative and legal support as it
requires.
8. The expenses of persons serving on the Appellate Body, including travel and subsistence
allowance, shall be met from the WTO budget in accordance with criteria to be adopted by the General
Council, based on recommendations of the Committee on Budget, Finance and Administration.
Procedures for Appellate Review
9.	 Working procedures shall be drawn up by the Appellate Body in consultation with the Chairman
of the DSB and the Director-General, and communicated to the Members for their information.
r/
10. The proceedings of the Appellate Body shall be confidential. The reports of the Appellate Body
shall be drafted without the presence of the parties to the dispute and in the light of the information
provided and the statements made. 	 .,
11. Opinions expressed in the Appellate Body report by individuals serving on the Appellate Body
shall be anonymous.
12. The Appellate Body shall address each of the issues raised in accordance with paragraph 6
during the appellate proceeding.
13. The Appellate Body may uphold, modify or reverse the legal findings and conclusions of the
panel.
Adoption of Appellate Body Reports
14. An Appellate Body report shall be adopted by the DSB and unconditionally accepted by the .
parties to the dispute unless the DSB decides by consensus not to adopt the Appellate Body report within
30 days following its circulation to the Members.' This adoption procedure is without prejudice to the
right of Members to express their views on an Appellate Body report.
Article 18
Communications with the Panel or Appellate Body
1. There shall be no ex parte communications with the panel or Appellate Body concerning matters
under consideration by the panel or Appellate Body.
2. Written submissions to the panel or the Appellate Body shall be treated as confidential, but
shall be made available to the parties to the dispute. Nothing in this Understanding shall preclude a
party to a dispute from disclosing statements of its own positions to the public. Members shall treat
as confidential information submitted by another Member to the panel or the Appellate Body which
that Member has designated as confidential. A party to a dispute shall also, upon request of a Member,
provide a non-confidential summary of the information contained in its written submissions that could
be disclosed to the public.
Article 19
Panel and Appellate Body Recommendations
1. Where a panel or the Appellate Body concludes that a measure is inconsistent with a covered
agreement, it shall recommend that the Member concerned' bring the measure into conformity with
that agreement.° In addition to its recommendations, the panel or Appellate Body may suggest ways
in which the Member concerned could implement the recommendations.
sif a meeting of the DSB is not scheduled during this period, such a meeting of the DSB shall be held for this purpose.
9The "Member concerned" is the party to the dispute to which the panel or Appellate Body recommendations are directed.
'With respect to recommendations in cases not involving a violation of GATT 1994 or any other covered agreement,
see Article 26.
2. In accordance with paragraph 2 of Article 3, in their findings and recommendations, the panel
and Appellate Body cannot add to or diminish the rights and obligations provided in the covered
agreements.
Article 20
Time-frame for DSB Decisions
Unless otherwise agreed to by the parties to the dispute, the period from the date of establishment
of the panel by the DSB until the date the DSB considers the panel or appellate report for adoption
shall as a general rule not exceed nine months where the panel report is not appealed or 12 months
where the report is appealed. Where either the panel or the Appellate Body has acted, pursuant to
paragraph 9 of Article 12 or paragraph 5 of Article 17, to extend the time for providing its report, the
additional time taken shall be added to the above periods.
Article 21
Surveillance of Implementation of Recommendations and Rulings
1. Prompt compliance with recommendations or rulings of the DSB is essential in order to ensure
effective resolution of disputes to the benefit of all Members.
2. Particular attention should be paid to matters affecting the interests of developing country
Members with respect to measures which have been subject to dispute settlement.
3. At a DSB meeting held within 30 days" after the date of adoption of the panel or Appellate
Body report, the Member concerned shall inform the DSB of its intentions in respect of implementation
of the recommendations and rulings of the DSB. If it is impracticable to comply immediately with
the recommendations and rulings, the Member concerned shall have a reasonable period of time in
which to do so. The reasonable period of time shall be:
(a) the period of time proposed by the Member concerned, provided that such period is
approved by the DSB; or, in the absence of such approval,
(b) a period of time mutually agreed by the parties to the dispute within 45 days after the
date of adoption of the recommendations and rulings; or, in the absence of such
agreement,
(c) a period of time determined through binding arbitration within 90 days after the date
of adoption of the recommendations and rulings. I2 In such arbitration, a guideline for
the arbitrator° should be that the reasonable period of time to implement panel or
Appellate Body recommendations should not exceed 15 months from the date of adoption
of a panel or Appellate Body report. However, that time may be shorter or longer,
depending upon the particular circumstances.
"If a meeting of the DSB is not scheduled during this period, such a meeting of the DSB shall be held for this purpose.
"If the parties cannot agree on an arbitrator within ten days after referring the matter to arbitration, the arbitrator shall
be appointed by the Director-General within ten days, after consulting the parties.
"The expression "arbitrator" shall be interpreted as referring either to an individual or a group.
4. Except where the panel or the Appellate Body has extended, pursuant to paragraph 9 of Article 12
or paragraph 5 of Article 17, the time of providing its report, the period from the date of establishment
of the panel by the DSB until the date of ,determination of the reasonable period of time shall not exceed
15 months unless the parties to the dispute agree otherwise. Where either the panel or the Appellate
Body has acted to extend the time of providing its report, the additional time taken shall be added to
the 15-month period; provided that unless the parties to the dispute agree that there are exceptional
circumstances, the total time shall not exceed 18 months.
5. Where there is disagreement as to the existence or consistency with a covered agreement of
measures taken to comply with the recommendations and rulings such dispute shall be decided through
recourse to these dispute settlement procedures, including wherever possible resort to the original panel.
The panel shall circulate its report within 90 days after the date of referral of the matter to it. When
the panel considers that it cannot provide its report within this time frame, it shall inform the DSB
in writing of the reasons for the delay together with an estimate of the period within which it will submit
its report.
6. The DSB shall keep under surveillance the implementation of adopted recommendations or
rulings. The issue of implementation of the recommendations or rulings may be raised at the DSB
by any Member at any time following their adoption. Unless the DSB decides otherwise, the issue
of implementation of the recommendations or rulings shall be placed on the agenda of the DSB meeting
after six months following the date of establishment of the reasonable period of time pursuant to paragraph
3 and shall remain on the DSB's agenda until the issue is resolved. At least 10 days prior to each such
DSB meeting, the Member concerned shall provide the DSB with a status report in writing of its progress
in the implementation of the recommendations or rulings.
7. If the matter is one which has been raised by a developing country Member, the DSB shall
consider what further action it might take which would be appropriate to the circumstances.
8. If the case is one brought by a developing country Member, in considering what appropriate
action might be taken, the DSB shall take into account not only the trade coverage of measures
complained of, but also their impact on the economy of developing country Members concerned.
Article 22
Compensation and the Suspension of Concessions
1. Compensation and the suspension of concessions or other obligations are temporary measures
available in the event that the recommendations and rulings are not implemented within a reasonable
period of time. However, neither compensation nor the suspension of concessions or other obligations
is preferred to full implementation of a recommendation to bring a measure into conformity with the
covered agreements. Compensation is voluntary and, if granted, shall be consistent with the covered
agreements.
2. If the Member concerned fails to bring the measure found to be inconsistent with a covered
agreement into compliance therewith or otherwise comply with the recommendations and rulings within
the reasonable period of time determined pursuant to paragraph 3 of Article 21, such Member shall,
if so requested, and no later than the expiry of the reasonable period of time, enter into negotiations
with any party having invoked the dispute settlement procedures, with a view to developing mutually
acceptable compensation. If no satisfactory compensation has been agreed within 20 days after the
date of expiry of the reasonable period of time, any party having invoked the dispute settlement
procedures may request authorization from the DSB to suspend the application to the Member concerned
of concessions or other obligations under the covered agreements.
,.
3.	 In considering what concessions or other obligations to suspend, the complaining party shall
apply the following principles and procedures:
..
(a) the general principle is that the complaining party should first seek to suspend
concessions or other obligations with respect to the same sector(s) as that in which
the panel or Appellate Body has found a violation or other nullification or impairment;
(b) if that party considers that it is not practicable or effectiN,e to suspend concessions or
other obligations with respect to the same sector(s), it may seek to suspend concessions
or other obligations in other sectors under the same agreement;
(c) if that party considers that it is not practicable or effective to suspend concessions or
other obligations with respect to other sectors under the same agreement, and that the
circumstances are serious enough, it may seek to suspend concessions or other obligations
under another covered agreement;
(d) in applying the above principles, that party shall take into account:
(0 the trade in the sector or under the agreement under which the panel or
Appellate Body has found a violation or other nullification or impairment, and
the importance of such trade to that party;
(ii) the broader economic elements related to the nullification or impairment and
the broader economic consequences of the suspension of concessions or other
obligations;
(e) if that party decides to request authorization to suspend concessions or other obligations
pursuant to subparagraphs (b) or (c), it shall state the reasons therefor in its request.
At the same time as the request is forwarded to the DSB, it also shall be forwarded
to the relevant Councils and also, in the case of a request pursuant to subparagraph (b),
the relevant sectoral bodies;
(0
	 for purposes of this paragraph, "sector" means:
(i) with respect to goods, all goods;
(ii) with respect to services, a principal sector as identified in the current "Services
Sectoral Classification List" which identifies such sectors;14
(iii) with respect to trade-related intellectual property rights, each of the categories
of intellectual property rights covered in Section 1, or Section 2, or Section 3,
or Section 4, or Section 5, or Section 6, or Section 7 of Part II, or the
obligations under Part III, or Part TV of the Agreement on TRIPS;
(g)	 for purposes of this paragraph, "agreement" means:
(0 with respect to goods, the agreements listed in Annex IA of the WTO
Agreement, taken as a whole as well as the Plurilateral Trade Agreements in
so far as the relevant parties to the dispute are parties to these agreements;
(ii)	 with respect to services, the OATS;
"The list in document MTN.GNS/W/120 identifies eleven sectors.
(iii)	 with respect to intellectual property rights, the Agreement on TRIPS.
4. The level of the suspension of,concessions or other obligations authorized by the DSB shall
be equivalent to the level of the nullification or impairment.
5. The DSB shall not authorize suspension of concessions or other obligations if a covered agreement
prohibits such suspension.
6. When the situation described in paragraph 2 occurs, the DSB, upon request, shall grant
authorization to suspend concessions or other obligations within 30 days of the expiry of the reasonable
period of time unless the DSB decides by consensus to reject the request. However, if the Member
concerned objects to the level of suspension proposed, or claims that the principles and procedures
set forth in paragraph 3 have not been followed where a complaining party has requested authorization
to suspend concessions or other obligations pursuant to paragraph 3(b) or (c), the matter shall be referred
to arbitration. Such arbitration shall be carried out by the original panel, if members are available, or
by an arbitrator' s appointed by the Director-General and shall be completed within 60 days after the
date of expiry of the reasonable period of time. Concessions or other obligations shall not be suspended
during the course of the arbitration.
7. The arbitrator' s acting pursuant to paragraph 6 shall not examine the nature of the concessions
or other obligations to be suspended but shall determine whether the level of such suspension is equivalent
to the level of nullification or impairment. The arbitrator may also determine if the proposed suspension
of concessions or other obligations is allowed under the covered agreement. However, if the matter
referred to arbitration includes a claim that the principles and procedures set forth in paragraph 3 have
not been followed, the arbitrator shall examine that claim. In the event the arbitrator determines that
those principles and procedures have not been followed, the complaining party shall apply them consistent
with paragraph 3. The parties shall accept the arbitrator's decision as final and the parties concerned
shall not seek a second arbitration. The DSB shall be informed promptly of the decision of the arbitrator
and shall upon request, grant authorization to suspend concessions or other obligations where the request
is consistent with the decision of the arbitrator, unless the DSB decides by consensus to reject the request.
8. The suspension of concessions or other obligations shall be temporary and shall only be applied
until such time as the measure found to be inconsistent with a covered agreement has been removed,
or the Member that must implement recommendations or rulings provides a solution to the nullification
or impairment of benefits, or a mutually satisfactory solution is reached. In accordance with paragraph 6
of Article 21, the DSB shall continue to keep under surveillance the implementation of adopted
recommendations or rulings, including those cases where compensation has been provided or concessions
or other obligations have been suspended but the recommendations to bring a measure into conformity
with the covered agreements have not been implemented.
9. The dispute settlement provisions of the covered agreements may be invoked in respect of
measures affecting their observance taken by regional or local governments or authorities within the
territory of a Member. When the DSB has ruled that a provision of a covered agreement has not been
observed, the responsible Member shall take such reasonable measures as may be available to it to
ensure its observance. The provisions of the covered agreements and this Understanding relating to
The expression"arbitrator" shall be interpreted as referring either to an individual or a group.
16The expression "arbitrator shall be interpreted as referring either to an individual or a group or to the members of the
original panel when serving in the capacity of arbitrator.
compensation and suspension of concessions or other obligations apply in cases where it has not been
possible to secure such observance."
Article 23
Strengthening of the Multilateral System
1. When Members seek the redress of a violation of obligations or other nullification or impairment
of benefits under the covered agreements or an impediment to the attainment of any objective of the
covered agreements, they shall have recourse to, and abide by, the rules and procedures of this
Understanding.
2. In such cases, Members shall:
(a) not make a determination to the effect that a violation has occurred, that benefits have
been nullified or impaired or that the attainment of any objective of the covered.
agreements has been impeded, except through recourse to dispute settlement in
accordance with the rules and procedures of this Understanding, and shall make any
such determination consistent with the findings contained in the panel or Appellate
Body report adopted by the DSB or an arbitration award rendered under this
Understanding;
(b) follow the procedures set forth in Article 21 to determine the reasonable period of time
for the Member concerned to implement the recommendations and rulings; and
(c) follow the procedures set forth in Article 22 to determine the level of suspension of
concessions or other obligations and obtain DSB authorization in accordance with those
procedures before suspending concessions or other obligations under the covered
agreements in response to the failure of the Member concerned to implement the
recommendations and rulings within that reasonable period of time.
Article 24
Special Procedures Involving Least-Developed Countiy Members
1. At all stages of the determination of the causes of a dispute and of dispute settlement procedures
involving a least-developed country Member, particular consideration shall be given to the special situation
of least-developed country Members. In this regard, Members shall exercise due restraint in raising
matters under these procedures involving a least-developed country Member. If nullification or
impairment is found to result from a measure taken by a least-developed country Member, complaining
parties shall exercise due restraint in asking for compensation or seeking authorization to suspend the
application of concessions or other obligations pursuant to these procedures.
2. In dispute settlement cases involving a least-developed country Member, where a satisfactory
solution has not been found in the course of consultations the Director-General or the Chairman of
the DSB shall, upon request by a least-developed country Member offer their good offices, conciliation
and mediation with a view to assisting the parties to settle the dispute, before a request for a panel
17Where the provisions of any covered agreement concerning measures taken by regional or local governments or authorities
within the territory of a Member contain provisions different from the provisions of this paragraph, the provisions of such
covered agreement shall prevail.
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is made. The Director-General or the Chairman of the DSB, in providing the above assistance, may
consult any source which either deems appropriate.
0
Article 25
A rbitration
1. Expeditious arbitration within the WTO as an alternative means of dispute settlement can facilitate
the solution of certain disputes that concern issues that are clearly defined by both parties.
2. Except as otherwise provided in this Understanding, resort to arbitration shall be subject to
mutual agreement of the parties which shall agree on the procedures to be followed. Agreements to
resort to arbitration shall be notified to all Members sufficiently in advance of the actual commencement
of the arbitration process.
3. Other Members may become party to an arbitration proceeding only upon the agreement of
the parties which have agreed to have recourse to arbitration. The parties to the proceeding shall agree
to abide by the arbitration award. Arbitration awards shall be notified to the DSB and the Council
or Committee of any relevant agreement where any Member may raise any point relating thereto.
4. Articles 21 and 22 of this Understanding shall apply mutatis mutandis to arbitration awards.
Article 26
1.	 Non-Violation Complaints of the Type Described in Paragraph 1(b) of Article XXIII of
GATT 1994
Where the pro-visions of paragraph 1(b) of Article XXIII of GATT 1994 are applicable to a
covered agreement, a panel or the Appellate Body may only make rulings and recommendations where
a party to the dispute considers that any benefit accruing to it directly or indirectly under the relevant
covered agreement is being nullified or impaired or the attainment of any objective of that Agreement
is being impeded as a result of the application by a Member of any measure, whether or not it conflicts
with the provisions of that Agreement. Where and to the extent that such party considers and a panel
or the Appellate Body determines that a case concerns a measure that does not conflict with the provisions
of a covered agreement to which the provisions of paragraph 1(b) of Article XXIII of GATT 1994 are
applicable, the procedures in this Understanding shall apply, subject to the following:
(a) the complaining party shall present a detailed justification in support of any complaint
relating to a measure which does not conflict with the relevant covered agreement;
(b) where a measure has been found to nullify or impair benefits under, or impede the
attainment of objectives, of the relevant covered agreement without violation thereof,
there is no obligation to withdraw the measure. However, in such cases, the panel or
the Appellate Body shall recommend that the Member concerned make a mutually
satisfactory adjustment;
(c) notwithstanding the provisions of Article 21, the arbitration provided for in paragraph 3
of Article 21, upon request of either party, may include a determination of the level
of benefits which have been nullified or impaired, and may also suggest ways and means
of reaching a mutually satisfactory adjustment; such suggestions shall not be binding
upon the parties to the dispute;
(d)	 notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 1 of Article 22, compensation may be part
of a mutually satisfactory adjustment as final settlement of the dispute.
2.	 Complaints of the Type Described in Paragraph 1(c) of Article XXIII of GATT 1994
Where the provisions of paragraph 1(c) of Article XXIII of GATT 1994 are applicable to a
covered agreement, a panel may only make rulings and recommendations where a party considers that
any benefit accruing to it directly or indirectly under the relevant covered agreement is being nullified
or impaired or the attainment of any objective of that Agreement is being impeded as a result of the
existence of any situation other than those to which the provisions of paragraphs 1(a) and 1(b) of
Article XXIII of GATT 1994 are applicable. Where and to the extent that such party considers and
a panel determines that the matter is covered by this paragraph, the procedures of this Understanding
shall apply only up to and including the point in the proceedings where the panel report has been
circulated to the Members. The dispute settlement rules and procedures contained in the Decision of
12 April 1989 (BISD 36S/61-67) shall apply to consideration for adoption, and surveillance and
implementation of recommendations and rulings. The following shall also apply:
(a) the complaining party shall present a detailed justification in support of any argument
made with respect to issues covered under this paragraph;
(b) in cases involving matters covered by this paragraph, if a panel finds that cases also
involve dispute settlement matters other than those covered by this paragraph, the panel
shall circulate a report to the DSB addressing any such matters and a separate report
on matters falling under this paragraph.
	 •
Article 27
Responsibilities of the Secretariat
1. The Secretariat shall have the responsibility of assisting panels, especially on the legal, historical
and procedural aspects of the matters dealt with, and of providing secretarial and technical support.
2. While the Secretariat assists Members in respect of dispute settlement at their request, there
may also be a need to provide additional legal advice and assistance in respect of dispute settlement
to developing country Members. To this end, the Secretariat shall make available a qualified legal
expert from the WTO technical cooperation services to any developing country Member which so
requests. This expert shall assist the developing country Member in a manner ensuring the continued
impartiality of the Secretariat.
3. The Secretariat shall conduct special training courses for interested Members concerning these
dispute settlement procedures and practices so as to enable Members' experts to be better informed
in this regard.
APPENDIX 1
AGREEMENTS COVERED BY THE UNDERSTANDING
(A) Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization
(B) Multilateral Trade Agreements
Annex 1A:	 Multilateral Agreements on Trade in Goods
Annex 1B:	 General Agreement on Trade in Services
Annex 1C:	 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
Annex 2:	 Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes
(C) Plurilateral Trade Agreements
Annex 4:	 Agreement on Trade in Civil Aircraft
Agreement on Government Procurement
International Dairy Agreement
International Bovine Meat Agreement
The applicability of this Understanding to the Plurilateral Trade Agreements shall be subject
to the adoption of a decision by the parties to each agreement setting out the terms for the application
of the Understanding to the individual agreement, including any special or additional rules or procedures
for inclusion in Appendix 2, as notified to the DSB.
